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Foreword I
Ethiopia is one of the world’s richest countries in terms of civilization, history and 
culture. This wealth includes democratic traditions that date back to time immemorial. 
The basic democratic principles of self-government, equality, representation, voice, 
open debate and consensus, as well as participation in agenda setting and decision 
making have long since been practiced as traditional cultures at local level in various 
aspects of Ethiopian societies. Most traditional institutions of Ethiopia embrace 
fundamental democratic values such as rule of law, principles of single term office and 
principles of impeachment of leaders amongst others. Incorporating these principles 
into modern day Ethiopian context is an ongoing process. 
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a German political foundation which was established 
in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany’s first democratically elected president, 
Friedrich Ebert. Among its objectives, the goal of FES is to contribute to international 
understanding and cooperation and to foster dialogues on social democracy worldwide. 
Since 1992, FES has established close partnerships to support the Ethiopian 
democratization processes. Its principal areas of activity are; facilitating policy 
dialogues on important political issues for the country’s present and future, 
providing capacity building for various actors of the Ethiopian society and leadership 
development to prepare the next generation of Ethiopian decision-makers. 
The articles compiled in this publication reveal that in Ethiopia, there is more than one 
understanding of democracy or democratic cultures instead of one single (western-
oriented) form of democracy. To analyze their conceptualizations, was the main 
objective of a conference organized in April 2017. This publication “Cultures of 
Democracy in Ethiopia” is a summary of the respective discussions. 
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is convinced that this research on cultures of democracy 
depicts an enriching and unique perspective on democratization in Ethiopia. It is our 
sincere belief that policy makers as well as practitioners will find useful knowledge 
and suggestions within this impressive edition. It can therefore serve to identify 
pathways to cope with ongoing challenges for peace, development and social cohesion 
in Ethiopia. FES expresses its profound gratitude to the Department of Civics and 
Ethical Studies of Gondar University, the inspiring paper presenters and, of course, 
the editors of this endeavor for ensuring excellent collaboration all along the path to 
publication.
Constantin Grund
Resident Representative
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
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Foreword II
Dear Readers, allow me to warmly welcome you to the reading of this book. The 
word democracy comes from a Greek word which means the rule of law. Nowadays, 
democracy is believed to be the best way of governing societies as it gives an 
opportunity for all to exercise the rule of law, justice, freedom and fundamental 
human rights. In many circumstances, democratic culture is not being practiced as 
expected because of prevailing challenges. The fight against lack of democracy and 
good governance has now become not only the concern of a single country but also an 
international concern and a number of initiatives have been taken both at global and 
national levels to improve the culture of democracy. To build a democratic culture, 
people must have equal rights irrespective of their gender, religion, ethnicity and 
origin and many strategies to fulfill these objectives have been fashioned to achieve 
the desired social transformations. One of these strategies is organizing conferences 
such as the one which took place in Gondar. The students and young colleagues are 
the drivers and implementers of the reform and development agenda of society and 
conferences will create networks among all the different actors. 
It is a privilege for the College of Social Sciences and Humanities at the University 
of Gondar to host such a conference in collaboration with FES. I am sure that the 
conference has fostered mutually beneficial relationships and succeeded in creating 
networks amongst scholars, as well as at more individual levels to promote cultures of 
democracy. This book can be an additional way of strengthening these ties.
I would like to express our sincere gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Sonja John and Mr. 
Yared Debebe for their initiative in organizing this conference and other committee 
members for their hard work to realize this conference. I would also like to extend a 
special thank you to FES for their financial support and to the University of Gondar for 
its commitment to and support of the organizing of the conference. My special thanks 
also goes to Dr. Busha Taa and Dr. Dagnachew Assefa for committing to chairing the 
various sessions and for moderating the conference. Their well-informed questions 
and guiding of discussions were a major contribution in making this conference a 
success.
Finally, I want to thank the organizers for inviting me to make an opening speech 
at this conference. From the very outset, the program of the conference looked very 
exciting and I was sure that the conference would give all of us knowledge, insights 
and ideas to help improve our understanding on the culture of democracy. I am fully 
convinced that this conference has served its purpose on broadening our perspective 
on cultures of democracy.
Kassahun Tegegne, Ph.D.
Dean, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Gondar
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Introduction
Dagnachew Assefa, Busha Taa and Sonja John
The spirit and tenor of the essays assembled within this publication focus on the 
cultural metrics that underlie the different cultures and meanings of democracy. The 
central terms and categories that form the basis of analyzing cultures of democracy are 
utterly diverse and range from; dialogue, communication, democratization, vulnerable 
subjects, liberation, self-governing, Indigenous concepts, public reasoning, interparty 
democracy, conflict resolution and secession up to including the question of the 
potential of media and music to act in processes of democratization.
Since the title of the conference invokes the term culture, it is fitting at this juncture 
to say a few words about the phenomenon of cultures. We find a variety of definitions 
and approaches to the concept of culture. In support of this, the papers collected 
in this book reveal that there exists more than one approach to democracy. As Dr. 
Sonja John succinctly argues in her contributory article within this volume, instead 
of looking to the global, we should take a close look at democratic cultural practices 
at local levels. Furthermore, instead of concentrating on the West as a leitmotif for an 
ideal democratic state, we should redirect our attention to societies that actually have 
long-held experiences in democratic cultural practices. It is sure that there is no one 
solidified concept of culture but what we have instead is a more pluralist perception 
of culture that emanates from the different cultural practices of people and societies.
Nowadays, the concept of culture has assumed a very important place in both the 
study of humanities and social sciences. This point is underlined by the preeminent 
cultural sociologist Christ Jenks (2001):
There is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture. Men 
without culture would not be the clever savage of Golding’s Lord of the Flies 
thrown back upon the cruel wisdom of their animal instincts; nor would they 
are nature`s noble men of Enlightenment primitivism or even, as classical 
anthropological theory would imply, intrinsically talented apes who had some 
failed to find themselves. They would be unworkable monstrosities with very 
few useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no intellect, mental 
basket cases. (p. 6)
The concept of culture is derived philologically from agricultural practices emanating
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from working on or cultivating the soil. It implies a transformation of one state of 
being to another such as, cultivating the mind, the person, undergoing educational 
processor transforming and/or cultivating political practices. 
The concept of culture has evolved morphologically into a different set of ideas.Culture 
in this sense implies a state of mind; a properly nurtured and cultivated mind. A classic 
proponent of this perspective was Matthew Arnold (1932), who defined culture as “a 
pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which 
most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world” (p. viii). 
Accordingly, for him, culture is the study of perfection par excellence. In Bonnell and 
Hunt`s volume titled Beyond the cultural turn: New directions in the study of society 
and culture, culture is defined as “the study of mentalities, ideology, symbols and 
rituals, and high and popular culture” (1999, p. ix).
The collected reflections presented in this book naturally gravitate towards the 
making of democratic practices and visions throughout Ethiopian cultural, political 
and educational fields. Hence, the majority of contributors examine the various 
dimensions democracies face from different perspectives. 
We have divided this book into two parts: the first part deals with the theoretical 
framework on cultures of democracy. The second part deals with practical issues 
that emanate when implementing democracy. Particular emphasis is placed upon 
Ethiopian political and cultural practices throughout the text. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY
Dr. Magdalena Freudenschuss’ article centers on the question of the figure of political 
subjects. She begins by launching a formidable critique of the Western notion of 
political subject which emanated from the Enlightenment. She calls for an alternative 
view or perception of political subjects and agents. Her study presents a thoughtful and 
alternative perception about political subjects that resists the old ideas and hegemonic 
practices of powerful European countries. She has systematically and imaginatively 
mapped out how a democratic culture could be accommodative and beneficial to 
vulnerable subjects. 
Dr. Sonja John sees democracy as all members of society practicing conversation 
and dialogue. Basing her argument on Amartya Sen’s The idea of justice (2009), 
she calls for a re-orientation of the dominant institutional perception of democracy 
to government by discussion. She locates democracy’s most essential foundation 
not in institutions but primarily in the promotion of open, all-inclusive, interactive 
discussions. By  calling  for  ‘Indigenizing democracy’,  she  suggests  that instead 
of turning  to  the  West  with its Westminster model and its rather young  democratic
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experience, Ethiopia could turn towards its own internal resources, traditional 
knowledge and cultures of democracy that have already been practiced for centuries.
Fasil Merawi telescoped modernity through the Ethiopian lens of inquiry and is highly 
critical of the way in which it was circumscribed to the centralization of power. He 
further contended that modernization cannot be realized without the inclusion of 
socio-cultural and economic aspects of the country to the process. In fleshing out his 
arguments, Fasil argues that the uniqueness of the non-colonized nation of Ethiopia 
defies all logics of modernization applied elsewhere. Through his analysis, he contests 
that modernization from above without popular participation fails, yielding to the 
current multiethnic identity-based intercultural model of democratization process. 
POLITICAL  AND CULTURAL PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY IN 
ETHIOPIA
Teguada Alebachew’s reflection is based on an examination and exploration of intra-
party democracy in Ethiopia. The fundamental claim of her paper is based on the 
assumption that unless political parties develop democratic cultural practices within 
their structures, it would be very difficult for them to effectively enact government 
practices based on democratic values or to demand them from other actors of the 
political field. Without intra-party democracy, there cannot be a truly democratic 
government or political culture. Therefore, she insistently calls for the establishment 
of a legal regime to regulate intra-party democracy. 
While most contributions in this volume view democratization processes as a state 
responsibility that has to be implemented from the top down, Nigisti Gebreslassie 
explains how the work of her Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Yenege Tesfa 
engages in participatory democracy at the grassroots − or street roots − levels. In 
addition to providing homeless children and their  families with homes and access to 
education, healthcare and job opportunities, the organization also encourages street 
children to discuss their situations, needs and prospects for a self-determined and 
brighter future.
Ebrahim Damtew presents an investigation into conflict resolution and peacemaking 
process led by Dubarti women from Jamma woreda, South Wallo. These local peace 
envoys lead conflicting parties through negotiation and mediation processes until they 
reach a compromise that satisfies the contending parties and the community at large. 
Ebrahim argues that these respected personas become involved in conflict resolution 
due to their traditional Dubarti knowledge and rituality with a sense of neutrality. 
Unlike  the modern court that punishes the offender and rewards the victim, the 
decision by these revered women re-harmonizes the community, reconciles disputants,
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compensates victims and reintegrates the offenders into communities.
Tewelde Gebremariam’s interrogation into the concept of democratic developmental 
states raises profound questions about the distinction between democratic and non-
democratic developmental states. His study is particularly focused on identifying the 
peculiar features of the Ethiopian state and tries to address whether it is democratic or 
rather authoritarian in nature.
Wuhibegezer Ferede’s analysis on the question of nations and nationalities deals with 
the problem of integration and separation in the Horn of Africa. He believes that 
the integrative and disintegrative impulses, which are pulling the Horn states to and 
fro, have become a source of destabilization for the region. In recent times, Ethiopia 
has tried to cope with this problem by adopting semi-Marxist and ethno-nationalist 
measures. Even with the creation of ethnic-federalism, the issue of state legitimacy 
has not been resolved to the satisfaction of some nationality groups. Wuhibegezer 
warns of the destabilizing effects of quarrelling elites, competitive ethnicization in the 
country and how new secessionist states in the region could threaten Ethiopia’s unity.
Yilkal Ayalew argues that civic and ethical education nurtures democratic cultures in 
citizens. He believes that civic culture and knowledge could create a viable political 
habitat for the growth and development of democracy. He finds civic skill, civic 
knowledge and civic disposition to be extremely important ingredients towards the 
attainment of democratic cultures. His study demonstrates some shortcomings within 
the civics education curricula developed by the federal ministry and thus recommends 
modifications.
Tezera Tazebew explores the internet’s unique implication in the process of 
democratization. Depending on context, it has been praised by proponents and cursed 
by opponents. Tezera argues that the internet age has given rise to an explosion of 
information for Ethiopians. The coverage of internet in Ethiopia has risen from 2.9 
% in 2014 to 12% in 2015. However, despite its colossal potential of information 
dissemination, it remains under the monopoly of the centralized government. In the 
case of Ethiopia, ongoing censorship disables the constitutionally granted right of 
freedom of expression.
Solomon Girma’s essay on the interrelationship of music and democratization in 
Ethiopia also addresses the issue of censorship. He tries to demonstrate the existence 
of two antithetical songs; one celebrates the current political trends and the other 
condemns political practices of the current Ethiopian regime. He calls the two trends 
‘protest’ and ‘praise’ songs. In conjunction with these contradictory tendencies, he 
finds freedom of speech immensely circumscribed both at home and abroad. Protest 
songs are encouraged and  promoted  by the Diaspora community, while praise songs
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are championed here at home and listening to critical songs had been outlawed under 
2016/2017 (GC) the state of emergency. Solomon explains how more tolerance and 
openness in regard to music could contribute to an open debate and to democratization. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Culture is a theory and a set of meanings, processes and practices that are both shared 
and contested. As a consequence, the perspectives, topics and suggestions expressed 
in this volume are diverse. The issues addressed in this book involve topics ranging 
from; dialogue, communication, democratization, vulnerable subjects, liberation, 
self-governing, indigenous concepts, public reasoning, interparty democracy, conflict 
resolution and secession up to including the question of the potential of media and 
music to act in processes of democratization.
What they have in common is a call for a better understanding of democracy, for 
practicing democracy and thus for eventually developing cultures of democracy. This 
book is the result of those deliberations.
Although we feel this issue is a valuable and important contribution to the literature 
on democracy theory and practice, it only represents a beginning in the debate of 
developing a culture of democracy. Rather than filling a gap in the literature in 
democracy study − a gap too large for any volume to fill − we hope that this book 
provides a platform for further study.
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Democracy and Its Subjects – Rational, Autonomous, Stable?
Magdalena Freudenschuss1
Abstract
Since the Enlightenment period, Europeans consider the political subject to be a 
rational and autonomous subject. European democracies built upon that tradition 
– a tradition which is undeniably linked to colonialism and the Othering of People 
of Colour and Indigenous People as well as of women. These processes of Othering 
consolidate the male, bourgeois subject as norm. Today, the construction of a 
legitimate political subject of democracy is at stake. Drawing on recent, empirical 
examples from media and activism, I will argue that political subjectivity in 
practice systematically opposes the idea of an autonomous and rational subject. 
On the contrary, political subjectivity in the context of grassroots politics as well 
as hegemonic institutions very often refers to emotions and relationality. I will put 
forth an alternative understanding of the political subject using affect theory and 
postcolonial theory as a critical theoretical framework. By underlining relationality 
as an affective as well as a historical and social matter, the paper focuses on current 
dynamics of constructing the political subject in Germany, especially with regard to 
debates on refugee and migration politics. Since 2015, these debates have turned 
into a core challenge to democratic values: Whose rights are acknowledged within 
the democratic framework? Whose political subjectivity is put up for discussion? 
Following these questions, I will retrace the current constructions of the political 
subject and put it into dialogue, incorporating both the above-mentioned prototype 
and alternative logics derived from postcolonial and affect theory.
Keywords: Political subjectivity, vulnerability, relational subjectivity, refugee 
activism
POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY AND VULNERABILITY
2015 saw ”the long summer of migration“– or at least it was the year 2015 when 
migration to Europe massively gained public attention. Taking the  Balkan route way
1 Dr. Magdalena Freudenschuss, works as sociologist and political scientist as well as trainer for political 
education. She is based in Berlin, Germany. Contact: magdalena@panphotos.org
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north, about half a million refugees reached Germany in 2015. Numbers differed a 
lot; one talked about a million people if not more. In the end, the registration system 
turned out to contain a lot of errors, for example registering people multiple times. 
Less than half a million-people filed for asylum during 2015, about 750.000 in 2016 
with numbers decreasing since summer 2016 (BAMF, 2016). During the first months, 
the media coverage on the arrivals was mostly positive and documented the so-called 
culture of welcoming in Germany but skeptical and more negative voices eventually 
dominated. Also, the state’s policies plugged into former repressive tendencies 
of keeping borders closed and people out. Since then, the number of deportations 
from Germany is constantly rising. The focus on the vulnerability of migrants 
shifted towards an assumed vulnerability of native Germans facing newcomers. This 
summer’s (of 2015) events have broadly been considered a challenge to Europe’s – 
and especially Germany’s – capacities of welcoming and integrating refugees. Right 
extremist parties and political actors even read the comparatively high numbers of 
newcomers as a threat to the country’s (or rather nation’s) identity. Contrary to these 
views, I want to put forward a learning and listening perspective. If we assume a crisis 
is looming for European democracies and its subjects, the refugee movements – both 
in the sense of their moving to Europe as well as their political engagements – provide 
opportunities for an alternative understanding of the figure of the political subject. 
In this sense, this contribution does not aim at a systematic analysis of refugee 
movements but takes their positions, arguments and actions as something to learn 
from. The methodological approach is thus a tentative one, assuming that theory 
or impulses for theory are not exclusively a domain of researchers, but that social 
analysis and critique is strongly held up by civil society agents as well, though 
the format might differ from scientific standards. Moreover, for me, positioned in 
one of the richest countries of the Global North, namely Germany, with a number 
of privileges in society due to my professional formation, a white person and as a 
European Citizen, listening to marginalized societal positions and learning from them 
also forms a political demand of its own.
Such fragments from activist positions might fuel the political as well as scientific 
debate on the figure of a relational, affective and vulnerable political subject. Why 
such a shift in the understanding of the political subject of democracy is of eminent 
importance in the face of crisis, I will try to explain as a first step. Further on, in the 
second part of this chapter, I lay out three possible aspects for learning from refugee 
movements.  There,  I  consider  the  vulnerable  subject  in  terms  of  relationality, 
historicity and network society. In conclusion, I point to different moments of re-
shaping a critical understanding of political subjectivity in times of a multiple crisis 
of democracy, also based in the Global North.
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POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY AND VULNERABILITY
2015 saw ”the long summer of migration“– or at least it was the year 2015 when 
migration to Europe massively gained public attention. Taking the Balkan route 
waynorth, about half a million refugees reached Germany in 2015. Numbers differed 
a lot; one talked about a million people if not more. 
In the end, the registration system turned out to contain a lot of errors, for example 
registering people multiple times. Less than half a million-people filed for asylum 
during 2015, about 750.000 in 2016 with numbers decreasing since summer 2016 
(BAMF, 2016). During the first months, the media coverage on the arrivals was 
mostly positive and documented the so-called culture of welcoming in Germany but 
skeptical and more negative voices eventually dominated. Also, the state’s policies 
plugged into former repressive tendencies of keeping borders closed and people 
out. Since then, the number of deportations from Germany is constantly rising. The 
focus on the vulnerability of migrants shifted towards an assumed vulnerability of 
native Germans facing newcomers. This summer’s (of 2015) events have broadly 
been considered a challenge to Europe’s – and especially Germany’s – capacities of 
welcoming and integrating refugees. Right extremist parties and political actors even 
read the comparatively high numbers of newcomers as a threat to the country’s (or 
rather nation’s) identity. Contrary to these views, I want to put forward a learning and 
listening perspective. If we assume a crisis is looming for European democracies and 
its subjects, the refugee movements – both in the sense of their moving to Europe 
as well as their political engagements – provide opportunities for an alternative 
understanding of the figure of the political subject. 
In this sense, this contribution does not aim at a systematic analysis of refugee 
movements but takes their positions, arguments and actions as something to learn 
from. The methodological approach is thus a tentative one, assuming that theory 
or impulses for theory are not exclusively a domain of researchers, but that social 
analysis and critique is strongly held up by civil society agents as well, though 
the format might differ from scientific standards. Moreover, for me, positioned in 
one of the richest countries of the Global North, namely Germany, with a number 
of privileges in society due to my professional formation, a white person and as a 
European Citizen, listening to marginalized societal positions and learning from them 
also forms a political demand of its own.
Such fragments from activist positions might fuel the political as well as scientific 
debate on the figure of a relational, affective and vulnerable political subject. Why 
such a shift in the understanding of the political subject of democracy is of eminent 
importance in the face of crisis, I will try to explain as a first step. 
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Further on, in the second part of this chapter, I lay out three possible aspects for 
learning from refugee movements. There, I consider the vulnerable subject in terms 
of relationality, historicity and network society. In conclusion, I point to different 
moments of re-shaping a critical understanding of political subjectivity in times of a 
multiple crisis of democracy, also based in the Global North.
TURNING TOWARDS A VULNERABLE SUBJECT
Hegemonic politics still broadly refer to the political figure of the autonomous 
subject. Since the Enlightenment period, Europeans consider the political subject 
to be a rational and autonomous subject. European democracies continuously build 
on that tradition – a tradition which is undeniably linked to colonialism and the 
Othering of People of Colour and Indigenous People as well as of women. European 
Enlightenment’s thoughts are traced back to the French Revolution while ignoring 
the Haitian Revolution with its questioning and overcoming of enslavement. The 
European story of democracy and its subjects held and still holds on to a history 
of discrimination (Ziai, 2016, p. 13). These processes of Othering consolidate the 
male, bourgeois subject as norm. The construction of the legitimate political subject 
of democracy is a continuous case of political negotiations as the recent debates on 
migration in Germany have illustrated. 
In today’s politics, the figure of the autonomous political subject is backed up by 
and profoundly linked to politics of immunization and securitization (Lorey, 2011). 
Vulnerability, there, is primarily if not exclusively considered a default. It is vastly 
understood as the other of security and thus adds to binary constructions as rational 
versus emotional, autonomous versus dependent, male versus female and culture versus 
nature which form the foundation of many of democracy’s logics and mechanisms. 
Structures of domination like racism and patriarchy also draw on these binaries. Gaining 
control over potential vulnerabilities has drawn progressively less attention within 
the political discourse of terrorism and counter-terrorism since 2001. Such logics are 
additionally fueled by cybernetics, but also substantially by capitalism: “Capitalism 
seeks to gain power by controlling and neutralizing the maximum possible number 
of subjectivity’s existential refrains;  capitalistic  subjectivity  is  intoxicated with 
and anaesthetized by a collective sense of pseudo-eternity” (Guattari, 1989, p. 139). 
Gaining control thus also implies control over temporality: eternity can be understood 
as clearly opposing logic to vulnerability. The vulnerable is temporal, it speaks of 
dependency, relationality and limits. In this respect, societies of control (Deleuze, 
1990) cultivate a form of subjectivity linked to hegemonic modes of masculinity and 
especially to the figure of the modern, autonomous subject, developing it along the 
idea of immunity. It is exactly  this autonomous  subject which  claims to make itself
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invincible, liberated from all forms of vulnerability. Risks and threats are sought to 
be prevented before they even turn up. A control society relies on calculating possible 
risks, on identifying potential perpetrators and on eliminating these maybes before 
they turn into actual threats. Security, thus, is one of the key terms of societies of 
control. Today’s policies of border control and migration regimes seem to defend this 
very idea of the subject and of its vulnerability. 
Contrary to this, highlighting vulnerability means highlighting relationality and 
reciprocity. Reciprocity in social and political relations allows for constructing ‘the 
only world we have’ (Mbembe, 2014, p. 331) as a just world. Achille Mbembe links 
his claim for a just world with the idea that we all have a constitutive part in the 
existence of others and that we cannot seize parts of the other without affecting the 
idea of the self, justice, law or humanity as such. Mbembe argues for a mode of 
sociality which he calls ‘living in the open’ where caring for the open is a central issue 
(Mbembe, 2014, p. 331). Such a perspective is of eminent importance to the future 
of democracy itself. Feminist media scholar Wendy Hui Kyong Chun (2006) links 
democracy to vulnerability – and thus challenges politics of restrictive regulations and 
enclosure. She puts emphasis on:
[...] the necessity to deal with questions of democracy in terms of vulnerability 
and fear. Resisting this vulnerability leads to the twinning of control and 
freedom -a twinning that depends on the conflation of information with 
knowledge and democracy with security. (Chun, 2006, p. 127)
Considering, including, even embracing vulnerability might thus be a necessary step 
in order to counter the questionable turn of democracy towards securitization and 
control instead of participation and freedom. One (possible) layer to reflect upon such 
an alternative way of dealing with vulnerability touches upon the figure of the political 
subject. Highlighting vulnerability is not something which envisages inventing a 
new concept. In feminist and postcolonial theories, vulnerability has a long history 
of being dealt with – theoretically as much as on activist grounds (Freudenschuss, 
2017). Rosine Kelz (2015), for example, discusses such a perspective in reference 
to Emmanuel Levinas, Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida. Drawing on these authors 
and their conceptions of a relational and vulnerable form of subjectivity, she argues 
for a respective policy of migration. From her perspective, migrant subjects offer an 
alternative way of thinking about political subjectivity as a kind of relational and 
vulnerable subjectivity. Judith Butler (2010) argues for vulnerability as an ontological 
moment of human subjects. Subjects – including their corporality – are substantially 
constituted through the social. Butler provides – besides other feminist writers – a 
powerful argument for the ethical impulse the notion of vulnerability might be able to 
contribute to debates on sociality: Each life is dependent on others and this dependency
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produces ethical implications of dealing with the general precariousness of existence 
in a sustainable way (p. 39). As such, Butler’s take relates vulnerability with life and 
survival. Sara Ahmed (2004) understands emotions or affect as a relational mode 
by itself. It is through emotions that one experiences and understands the limits and 
borders of oneself. The self finds its shape through the actualization of vulnerability.
So, vulnerability in our very existence is what ties us socially one to another. Being 
vulnerable as a human being is inseparably the fabric of sociality. It brings up the 
question of responsibility and thus it immediately leads us on political grounds and 
consequently to political subjectivity (Butler, 2010; Mills, 2007).
Following the above mentioned theoretical sketches of a vulnerable subject, this paper 
wants to underline dissident and yet long existent modes of political subjectivity by 
learning from activist practices and perspectives. The undertaking of this paper is thus 
to listen to those who already follow alternative ideas of political subjectivity and to 
initiate impulses to rework the concept of democracy.
LEARNING FROM REFUGEE ACTIVISM
During the last years, refugee activists were amongst those in Germany who strongly 
pushed the issue of democracy and participation. In 2012, the so called ”Freedom 
March” from Würzburg, a city in southwestern Germany, to Berlin, the capital situated 
in the country’s northeast, gained public attention for the political struggles refugees 
took up in order to fight for their human rights in Germany. The march was followed 
by the occupation of central places in different cities, of buildings, demonstrations, 
hunger strikes and numerous other forms of protests. All aimed to highlight the 
living situation of the refugees and to change legal regulations discriminating them 
systematically. The protests were led by refugees and found support among migrant 
communities, German citizens and other privileged EU citizens within Germany. 
European attention was drawn to the refugee movement not only during the so called 
“summer of migration” in 2015, but during several other occasions as well. One of the 
crucial questions repeatedly raised was regarding the right to stay and the freedom of 
movement.  In the following sections, I will draw upon a few examples from numerous 
documents, announcements and positions of refugee activists and groups with the aim 
of listening and learning more about the question of democracy and its subjects.
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VULNERABLE SUBJECTS AS RELATIONAL SUBJECTS
Source: The VOICE Refugee Forum Germany
This image is used by the refugee organization The VOICE Refugee Forum Germany 
in order to underline its own position. Lilla Watson, an Indigenous activist from 
Australia, seems to address the political “Other”: an imagined ally in a privileged 
position. The statement refers to the political relationship between the two (political) 
subjects in question: the you – presumably a privileged subject – and the I, the 
Indigenous subject. One layer deeper, the statement gives details of the conception 
of the (political) subject as such. Watson opposes two conceptions of relation and 
subjectivity: on the one hand, she clearly rejects a paternalistic attitude of helping and 
coming in support. Transferred to the German context, where The VOICE Refugee 
Forum operates, that might apply to all those helping hands who understand their 
welcoming action as one-way acts of help or support. As a one-way kind of agency, 
it points  to the idea of an autonomous subject providing help or not to the other 
imagined as different and detached from oneself. Such an attitude is well known from
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development policies, but also applies to the relationship of local, white German 
residents towards newcomers. Whiteness systematically goes along with an attitude 
of helping and generosity towards an (imagined/constructed/othered) Other. Watson, 
in her statement, does not enter negotiations with such a one-sided, patronizing 
definition of the relationship in question. On the contrary, she repudiates it right away.
On the other hand, Watson argues for a relationship building on reciprocity. 
Subjectivity and societal change only work in this context if thought of as relational: 
the liberation of one subject is bound to the liberation of the other. The You and Me 
are part of the same political struggle, not because of a shared identity or experience, 
but their very subjectivity depends on each other, their ”liberation is bound up“ with 
each other (The Voice of Refugees, 2003, p.1). Dependency is thus the criteria for 
cooperation while autonomy – or alleged autonomy – separates. Political subjectivity, 
as it is understood here, seems to be one of interdependency, of ties and relations on 
equal grounds. In the Australian context as much as in the one of Germany and the 
refugees‘ struggles of recent years, the shared struggle might be understood as one for 
democracy and its core values of participation – how can one possibly claim to live 
in a democratic society while systematically discriminating against newcomers to this 
very same society? How can one claim to adhere to principles of democracy whilst 
denying a considerable portion of the population basic human rights? 
In this specific context, cooperation is embedded into unequal power relations. 
Working on the principle of solidarity on equal grounds thus does not mean to deny 
discrimination, power and privileges, but to re-think dichotomous ideas of freedom 
and power. If domination builds upon difference and hierarchies, we need to ask 
whether those in power are really free, if the male, bourgeois, white and heterosexual 
subject is not dependent in its freedom on all of its others. Activists in both contexts 
argue for linking these different and unequal subject positions through a relational 
understanding of political subjectivity. Such conceptions do have implications on our 
understanding of democracy: refugee activists speak of alliances between citizens and 
non-citizens. They highlight the dimensions of citizenship and political rights in their 
analysis of democracy and political subjectivity. Focusing on the judicial classification, 
some activists skeptically reclaim more differentiation in order to sensibly deal 
with intersections of different forms of discrimination (Ünsal, 2015). Subjectivity 
is interwoven with complex structures of privileges and of discrimination. Still, the 
judicial dimension by itself is an indicator for inequality as the status of citizenship is 
key to accessing political participation and subsequent rights. It hints at the necessity 
to rearrange and rethink mechanisms of democratic inclusion and the possibilities of 
participation in democracies beyond the framework of citizenship.
Moreover, the idea of the relational subject demands for a re-negotiation of even more
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substantial elements of democracy. Rosine Kelz (2015) puts forward the concept 
as non-sovereignty – as a response to the changing conditions of democracy in the 
context of migration and what must be learned from the refugee movements. She pleas 
for an interdependent reading of subjectivity and politics. No sovereign autonomous 
subject puts up its rules and decides – with all moral right – about the right to stay 
of others. Following Derrida and activist struggles, Kelz suggests a different form of 
welcoming culture which understands welcoming not as a gesture of generosity but as 
an essential, mutual right.
VULNERABLE SUBJECTS AS HISTORICAL SUBJECTS
Our main goals remain the struggle for equality, justice and human dignity 
for every refugee in Germany. With a strong affirmation that “We are here 
because you destroy our countries” we seek to collaborate with groups and 
initiatives on the basis of solidarity and justice, and we reject any form of 
paternalism, co-optation and continued colonial injustice. […] We remain 
opposed to the deadly migration politics by the European and other Western 
powers, and their brutal border regime and racist practices of oppression and 
exploitation. Therefore, our work is always located in the context of resistance 
against colonial injustice. (The Voice Refugee Forum, 2003, p. 3) 
The hegemonic subject of Western democracies is – if at all – historically traced 
back to the European Enlightenment and its legacy within Europe. It largely ignores 
colonialism and colonial violence as fundamental mechanism of that period. The 
autonomous, rational subject of today, in that reading, is a contemporary idea, 
isolated from the past. Refugee activists’ interventions challenge this understanding 
and insist on an inclusion of historical interdependencies, the presence and relevance 
of colonialism and its legacy today. The reasons for flight and migration are linked 
to thelasting implications of colonial injustice. ”We are here because you destroy our 
countries” (The Voice Refugee Forum, 2003, p. 4) hints at two things: first, again we 
talk about relationality as core principle of political subjectivity. The you and the we 
are closely bound up with each other, this time because of global political dynamics.
Many of the causes of global migration can be traced back to the West’s imperial 
and capitalist ventures: western-manufactured weapons and armed conflicts, 
wars of aggression in pursuit of oil and other natural resources, repressive 
regimes backed by Western governments, climate change and land grabs, and 
so on. (No Borders, 2012, p. 6) 
Global interdependencies touch upon the political, the economic as much as the 
ecological. Globalisation as a notion for growing global links also needs to be thought 
of in terms  of vulnerability.  The  activist  network  No  Borders, an infrastructure of
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support to migrants in Europe, analyses the causes of migration by referring to such 
mutual links2 . Migration policies also need to be mentioned here. They insist on 
state sovereignty in the European context while, at the same time, Europe massively 
intervenes in the migration and border policies of Northern African countries. Second, 
these global linkages are as much current ones as they are rooted in the past, especially 
in colonial times. Right populist parties and nationalist arguments actively draw on 
racism as a legacy of colonialism in order to argue for their isolationist visions of 
European countries. Economic dependencies can be traced back into history; the 
political situation in some of the countries of origin cannot be understood without 
historical references.. 
Still, such historical traces and legacies are frequently ignored in European political 
theory as much as in daily political life. The migrant subject, remembering this 
history, is confronted with the reproach of being backward instead of embracing what 
is thought to be the culture of democracy. Theorist Sara Ahmed (2010a) critically 
assesses the figure of a melancholic migrant subject within British cultural production. 
Drawing on psychoanalysis, she rejects hegemonic reproaches that the melancholic 
migrant is an obstacle to democracy and to an open future because this migrant figure 
is so concerned with the past. On the contrary, she reads the figure of the melancholic 
migrant as an expression of the desire of non-migrants to get rid of the other‘s 
attachments (Ahmed, 2010b, p. 150).
A concern with histories that hurt is not then a backward orientation: to 
move on, you must make this return. If anything, we might want to reread 
melancholic subjects, the ones who refuse to let go of suffering, who are even 
prepared to kill some forms of joy, as an alternative model of the social good. 
(Ahmed 2010a, p. 50)
So, on the one hand ”histories that hurt“ can and should be understood as a productive 
part of democratic politics. They should be valued as a form of attachment. On the 
other hand, looking backwards is also very often used as an inspiring and positive 
reference for struggles against injustice and undemocratic tendencies. No Borders, 
for example, refers to movements of resistance of migrant workers in 17th century 
England in order to back up their own struggles today (No Borders, 2012). Finally, 
looking back while discussing democracy might also involve repairing some of the 
wrongs of democracy‘s constitution in times of colonialism and enlightenment. 
2 No Borders continues this explanation of causes of migration by hinting at the active position of migrant 
subjects. Their decisions are not only driven by external dynamics but are also based on their own desires, 
hopes, ideas and rational as much as emotional reflections of which kind of life they want to live (No 
Borders, 2012).
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Again, the implications for rethinking democracy and democratic cultures are clear: 
a perception of sociality and politics and, consequently, also of democracy as linked 
to vulnerability may start processes of integrating the past into the present and the 
future alike. 
VULNERABLE SUBJECTS AS NETWORKING SUBJECTS
The most successful and inspiring No Borders work has been just about this: 
creating strong networks to support free movement across Europe’s borders. 
This is the infrastructure of a growing movement of resistance: contacts, 
information, resources, meeting points, public drop-ins, safe houses, and so 
on. A pool of formal and informal connections, a web of solidarity, working on 
both public and clandestine levels. (No Borders, 2012)
People manage to move, live, and evade state control because they are part 
of communities and networks. Migration happens because of millions of 
connections between millions of people. Our No Borders networks are one 
small part of this. Yet, as a movement, we can play an active role in bringing 
such connections together across national and cultural boundaries. Our struggle 
is one and the same. (No Borders, 2012)
Both citations underline that thinking of political subjects in terms of relationality 
to some extent means thinking of them as networked subjects. They are part of 
networks and, at the same time, they form their very identity out of these networks. 
The networks hinted at in the above quoted statements of No Borders are twofold: 
on the one side, there are activist networks of support which provide some kind of 
infrastructure to those who are on their way across borders or in between borders. On 
the other hand, there are social or community networks, mainly of migrants, who are 
themselves hinting at broader networks than those of political support in solidarity. 
They flow into each other, are not understood as opposing, but again are considered as 
parts of the same struggle. 
Not only activist networks but also research on migrants’ media practices underline 
the importance of networks and thus hint at some kind of networked subject. Maria 
Ullrich (2017) shows in her research on mobile media use of migrants that digital 
devices are of crucial importance to people during their flight. Digital devices enable 
access to necessary information along the route, about safe spaces and possible tactics. 
The active and complex use migrants make of digital media leads to the conception of 
the ”connected migrant“ (Diminescu, 2012). Digital media are used to deal with and 
negotiate affect, distance, isolation and exposure (Mezzadra, 2017).
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It is the very idea of networking which breaks with the autonomous and sovereign 
political subject. The networking subject necessarily refers to others in order to 
survive and to politically intervene and engage. Networking and solidarity are closely 
interwoven, the connection is not only established through technical devices and 
infrastructure but also through affect:
This description of political activism suggests an understanding of solidarity as 
a political affect that connects people without eradicating difference. Instead of 
invoking the need for close bonds within a clearly defined and limited group of 
people, the concept of solidarity stresses the importance of maintaining open 
political associations. (Kelz, 2015)
Rosine Kelz argues for such a relational reading of solidarity as a form of political 
affect in her analysis of refugee movements in Europe during the last years (2012-
2017). Political agency and thus the figure of a vulnerable, relational political subject 
is one which is based on the idea of connectedness, of networking, of solidarity – or 
in other terms of a ‚we‘: 
We perceive ourselves as a feminist organisation and are one of the few links 
between the women’s movement and the refugees’ movement. In our group, 
we experience that women can relate to each other, regardless of all differences 
like age, origin, religion, status, sexual orientation or other factors, and can 
make an impact together. Together we develop strategies to achieve political 
change and take our protest against the inhumane living conditions of refugee 
women to the public. (Women in Exile, 2015)3
This we does not negate differences within itself. On the contrary, it functions 
as a collective despite and beyond differences in a shared and united struggle. 
Consequently, such a perspective on networking and connecting means to re-think 
logics of cooperation within democracies and perhaps shifting them away from afocus 
on shared identities to solidarity and open conceptions of collective agency.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, learning from refugee movements with regard to cultures of democracy 
might thus mean (at least) three things within the German context. First, it strengthens 
approaches of feminist and postcolonial theoretical decent to re-think the democratic
3  Women in Exile is an organisation of refugee women for refugee women. They started operating in the rural 
region surrounding Berlin. Meanwhile, they operate in several parts of Germany. The activists provide 
information for newcomers, mostly if they are living in refugee camps. They are active in awareness raising 
and support women in their specific needs
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subject as a vulnerable subject in the sense of an existential vulnerability and 
dependency on others. Vulnerability thus does not overly place an emphasis on 
exposure and deficits but the inter-relatedness with others. The vulnerable subject is 
one of relational, affective, historical and connected character as I argue with reference 
to activist positions throughout this paper. 
Second, this vulnerable subject pushes us to re-shape our conceptions of democratic 
interaction: We need to re-define the questions of belonging, of sovereignty, of 
participation and of movement. If interdependence and relationality is core, how can 
European countries insist on nationalistic isolation and border regimes which negate 
all global and historical ties?
Third, the vulnerable subject provides us with ideas of what a future vision of 
democracy could look like. It could inspire us to re-imagine an utopia democracy that 
could be developed. Such a democracy would be open to newcomers, aware of and 
ready for reparations of historical and present injustice. 
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Indigenize Democracy – Public Reasoning and Participation 
as a Democratic Foundation
Sonja John1
Abstract
While Amartya Sen (1999) has convincingly argued for democracy as a universal 
value in his earlier work, current developments might prove him wrong; authoritarian 
and intolerant forces are on the rise today. In his more recent publication, The Idea 
of Justice, Amartya Sen (2009) argues for a re-orientation towards an understanding 
of democracy as “government by discussion”. Following this claim, I argue here 
for a more intensive investigation of Indigenous concepts, cultures and traditions 
of democratic concepts since confining attention almost exclusively to Western 
institutional definitions of democracy has been limiting and parochial. Understanding 
the history of democratic practice globally involves taking interest in peoples’ public 
reasoning in different parts of the world. Investigating the connection between the 
reach of public discussion and the accepted mode of democratic government might 
offer suggestions on how to develop federal systems that are in line with local 
democratic traditions and practices.
Keywords: Indigeneity, democracy, public reasoning, refusal, Amartya Sen
CURRENT REFUSALS IN ETHIOPIAN POLITICS2
Democracy is currently in crisis. Although there is no consensus on how to define 
democracy (EIU, 2017, p. 51), most attempts agree that it is based on a self-controlled 
government of a state, community or other political body by its own members, 
employed through a system of power sharing. Community members want to discuss, 
determine and decide matters affecting their lives. The disregard of this principle of 
self-government and a (perceived) loss of control over community affairs led to the 
current protests in the Oromia and Amhara  regions  in  Ethiopia. Since 2014, Oromo
1 Dr. Sonja John is assistant professor for Civics and Ethical Studies at the University of Gondar, Ethiopia. 
Contact: sonja.z.john@gmail.com 
2 I am grateful to Claudia Brunner for her critical reading and generous comments on an earlier version of 
this paper and also to the two reviewers for their insightful comments. Any errors are my own. 
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people have been demonstrating against alleged land appropriation through the 
controversial Addis Ababa Master Plan, initiated by the federal one-party and ethnic-
based government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.  This 
plan would continue the practice of extending the national capital into the ancestral 
land of the Oromo people without their prior and informed consent. The resistance 
against this plan must be seen in the context of preceding Oromo experiences of land 
dispossession, displacement from their homeland, loss of resources and identity and 
the repercussions of economic marginalization (Davison, 2016, p. 2).
The Amhara protests of 2016 have a similar source; the root of the issue is the 
unilaterally determined expansion of the Tigray region into fertile Amhara territory in 
the Wolkait region. The displaced Wolkait people have formed a committee and have 
been campaigning in Gondar to regain their land and identity as Amhara. Wolkait 
committee member Teshager Woldemichael had declared: “We are from Wolkait; we 
are Amhara, we have always been Amhara, our first language is Amharic” (personal 
interview, April 10, 2016). The protests became violent during the arrest of Colonel 
Demeke Zewdu who also urged for a return of the Wolkait district to the Amhara 
state in his position as leader of the Wolkait Identity Question Committee. Colonel 
Demeke Zewdu and his defenders resisted his attempted arrest and killed several 
soldiers. This resulted in more aggressive military action and mass arrests. During the 
ensuing demonstrations in Gondar, Bahir Dar and elsewhere in the northern region, the 
specific demands for Wolkait self-determination and the release of political prisoners 
broadened to demands for more democratic rights. After appeals from religious 
leaders for peacefulness, protestors were mostly unarmed and changed tactics to 
holding general strikes in Amhara and Oromo regions. These were outlawed when 
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn declared the state of emergency on October 
9, 2016.
The state of emergency is a continuation of restrictive regulations intended at silencing 
critical voices and restoring peace.3Adem Abebe has argued that since the anti-terrorism 
law and the media law in the post-2005 election period have been passed that both 
freedom of expression and association have already been severely suppressed: there 
is “no other country in the world where anti-terrorism laws have almost exclusively 
been applied against journalists and opposition political party members” (Adem, 
2012, p. 9). Hence, the media cannot function as a mediator between different groups 
of society. Further, the anti-corruption laws effectively excluded the opposition from 
participating  in  parliament,  making the parliament a farce (Adem, 202, p. 6).
 3 This is a narrow definition of peace being the absence of war; the conflicts remain unresolved.
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One cannot discuss issues from different angles when articulating differing perspectives 
and opinions are prohibited. Adem has attested to the absence of rule of law, which 
means that no political authority should be higher than the law and the constitution, 
while the rights of citizens are protected by independent courts. Instead of ruling 
with rule of law, Adem argues throughout his article that the Ethiopian government is 
ruling the country by law, changing the constitution and laws to ensure its continuing 
reign. For Ethiopia, just as for most sub-Saharan countries, the Democracy Index 
predicts: “much of the region will continue to be characterised as deeply entrenched 
one-party states that go through the motions of holding elections without providing 
the freedoms necessary to promote genuine democracy” (EIU, 2017, p. 50).
After the Ethiopian government was criticized for taking an authoritarian turn with 
the 2016 state of emergency, the Prime Minister acknowledged that the country’s 
huge youth population has created “dissatisfaction and desperation”. He suggested 
that his government might increase dialogue: “We have shortcomings in our 
fledgling democracy, so we want to go further in opening up the political space and 
engagement with different groups of the society” (cited in Association Press, 2016, 
p. 5).4 From where best to draw guidance and inspiration? After the fall of the Derg 
regime, Ethiopia has turned towards the West and adopted the Westminster model of 
government. However, while the West with its rather young democratic experience 
had to look to ancient Greece for inspiration, Ethiopia could draw on Indigenous 
epistemologies as well as external understandings of democratic systems (Zelalem, 
2015; Abebe, Samson and Tessema, 2015; Sklar, 2005; Bahru, 2002; Aadland, 2002). 
Thus, in its conclusion, this chapter points towards a different tradition in democracy 
study; one that is respectful of the value of practices that precede the present or Greek 
traditions but endeavors to move democracy study to a future that is not bound so 
inextricably to an institutional definition.
This article is an attempt to investigate realization-based comparisons that focus on 
the advancement of democracy. Currently, the deficiency of politically engaged public 
reasoning points towards a weakness of democracies. The refusal of different groups 
to even engage with each other points towards capability deprivation, that people do 
not have the ability to achieve  various  combinations of functionings that they have 
reason to value. Similar to Sen’s approach to develop a theory of justice, the attempt 
of this paper is not merely studying to achieve some perfectly democratic society or 
procedures,  but   about   identifying  the  weaknesses  of  contemporary  democratic 
systems  and  suggesting  remedies.  The  departure point is a rather comparative and
4 The language clearly indicates a top-down mentality of government, assuming the leaders grant rights to 
people instead of people possessing inherent rights of articulation and participation.
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constructive approach: how can democratic practice based on public discussion 
be advanced? The focus lies clearly on actual realizations, lives and capabilities: 
“lives that people manage−or do not manage−to live” (Sen, 2010, p. 9). According 
to Amartya Sen’s capability approach, social realizations are assessed in terms of 
capabilities that people actually have, rather than in term of their utilities or happiness. 
Translated into the realm of theorizing democracy, this means that the departure point 
is the substantive freedoms that people actually have to participate in shaping their 
democracy. Using an informational focus in assessing democracy, in line with the 
freedom-based capability approach, one may choose the person’s capability to do 
things she or he has reason to value and the freedom to determine and articulate what 
she or he wants, values and ultimately decides to choose (Sen, 2010, p. 232).
The following section sheds some light on scenes of disengagement and refusals in 
order to argue for an understanding and analysis of democracy on the grounds of 
open discussion as put forward by Amartya Sen and as practiced traditionally in many 
Ethiopian communities. 
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS
The long praised democratic system of public self-government and administration 
of society is in crisis (EIU, 2017; Preiss and Brunner, 2012). While Amartya Sen 
(1999) has convincingly argued for democracy as a universal value in his earlier 
work, current developments might prove him wrong; authoritarian and intolerant 
forces are widely on the rise today. The “democratic recession”, as democracy scholar 
Larry Diamond (2015) called it, is not recovering. In many countries of the West, 
citizens see themselves as detached from the political elites and react with refusal or 
protest against the establishment. “Political elite” here encompasses governments, 
legislatures, state institutions, political parties, the media and think tanks. In many 
countries upon which the West has imposed its own ideas of democracy, the promises 
of peace, self-government, justice, participation and sustainable development have 
not materialized.5 Hence, processes of institutionalized democratization are being 
reversed in several countries, along with a strengthening of authoritarian government 
and diminishing discussion.  
For the year 2016, the Democracy Index6 attested to a global democratic recession 
(EIU, 2017, p. 3). Out of the 165 countries and territories monitored, 72 had a declining 
level of democracy, 38 an improving and 57 a stagnating level. The indicators of the 
index  examine  five  categories:  electoral  process  and  pluralism, civil liberties, the 
5 The West has given financial support conditional on the existence of democratic institutions, fostering 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and guaranteeing human rights. But experience has shown that 
fulfilling these requirements on paper do not guarantee democratic governments.
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functioning of government, political participation and political culture. Based on 
a combined score achieved in these categories, the country’s governmental system 
is classified on a 10-point scale, ranging from “authoritarian regime” to “full 
democracy”. While in 2015, according to the Index, 8.9% of the world’s population 
lived in a “full democracy”, this number dropped to 4.5% in 2016 (EIU, 2017, p. 3). 
Only 19 countries were listed within the “full democracy” category and within this 
category, most countries had decreased scores in comparison to their 2015 results. 57 
countries were classified as “flawed democracies”, 40 as “hybrid regimes” and 51 as 
“authoritarian regimes” (EIU, 2017, p. 3). 
What complicates the matter of the lack of consensus on how to define democracy 
is that there is also no consensus on how to measure democracy (EIU, 2017, p. 
51). Overused as it is, the term democracy has become an ‘empty significant’, as 
sociologists like to call it. How can we best give recommendations and suggestions 
regarding a topic that is in a definitional limbo? The Economist Democracy Index has 
been following political sociologist Larry Diamond (2008, 2015) in his understanding 
of the nature and the state of democracy. This is something that is not surprising as 
Diamond also applies an economist’s approach. For him, the acceptance of democracy 
is subject to cyclical economic booms and downturns similar to economic cycles of 
growth and recession. Diamond believes that the many countries currently in what 
he calls “democratic recession” phase will eventually pass into the next cycle of 
democracy boom. This understanding of a naturally given sequence of the acceptance 
of democracy leads to the assumption that there is no need for action since the deflation 
will eventually pass and better days will come. However, there is reason to be alert 
since recent authoritarian voices resemble and re-echo those that led to World War II. 
Hence, recent support for racist parties, protests against democratic institutions and 
the refusal to participate in elections or public debate have to be taken very seriously 
if one cares about democracy and peace.
Against the background of these occurrences, the Index warns of the demise of 
democracy: “The trend towards declining political participation, which has been a 
feature  of  all  the  advanced  democracies  in  recent  decades,  is  a  threat to the 
future  of democracy” (EIU, 2017, p. 24). For a better understanding of how political 
6 It is not unproblematic to apply this index normatively when trying to put forward Indigenous 
understandings of democracy; it includes many countries but excludes others; it canonizes questionable 
democracy definitions, and is mainly an Euro-American instrument at the notorious intersection of politics 
and economics. The Index acknowledges the connection between economic recession and democracy 
recession but the authors do not regard the structural inequalities that will exclude more people from 
socio-economic participation; trickle-down trickles even less in the U.S. without slavery or dispossessing 
the Natives; in the UK without colonizing half the world; in Germany without forced labor or the Marshall 
Plan.
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participation can save democracy, I argue here that it is useful to move away from 
Larry Diamond’s institutional definition of democratic practice to Amartya Sen’s 
foregrounding of open discussion and public reasoning.
The Democracy Index for the year 2016 carries the subtitle Revenge of the 
“deplorables”. This is taken from a quote by Hillary Clinton who, during the 
presidential campaign, called her opponent’s supporters a “basket of deplorables”, 
who do not represent the U.S. (EIU, 2017, p. 1). While Clinton distances herself from 
these “folks” (EIU, 207, p. 1), her successful adversary purposefully appealed to the 
angry and anti-political resentment of large parts of the “electorate who feel that the 
two mainstream parties no longer speak for them [emphasis added]” (EIU, 2017, 
p. 12). It was during the U.S. presidential election that it became more evident that 
these different groups do not talk to each other. What they have in common is their 
distrust of the media. Today, the “oldest democracy’s” president often expresses his 
outright distrust in and the obsoleteness of basic democratic institutions like the court 
system or the media. The lack of political participation and democratic culture was 
responsible for downgrading the U.S. from a “full democracy” in 2015 to a “flawed 
democracy” in 2016 (EIU, 207, pp. 4-5).
In the U.S., the failure of democracy as public discussion is particularly ironic since 
their structure was adopted from the inclusive, debate- and consensus-oriented system 
of the Haudenosaunee (League of the Iroquois) (Obama, 2013, p. 1; Alfred, 1995) and 
also since America’s Indigenous societies have been practicing democratic traditions 
since time immemorial (Akwesasne Notes, 1986 [1978]), a point to which I return 
later.
The German translation for “deplorables” may be “das Pack”, an expression used 
by (at that time) Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister Sigmar Gabriel, referring to 
neo-Nazis putting fire to refugee homes (Zeit, 2016, p. 3). On a different occasion, 
he showed neo-Nazis his middle finger when they disrupted his speech. Even before 
the long summer of migration to Germany in 2015, far right parties with clearly racist 
ideas and ideals have been gaining supporters and allocated more space within the 
reported media public voices. Groups that called themselves an alternative (Pegida, 
Alternative für Deutschland) protested the establishment and demanded policies that 
puts  Germans  without  a  migration background (if there are any) first. “We are the 
people” shouts were repeated from the fall of the socialist GDR regime (1989) but 
these turned from uniting to excluding slogans. The established media was defamed 
as “lying press” (“Lügenpresse”) and even movement leaders refused to talk to 
professional journalists.
In the UK, the Brexit debates in 2016 were similarly polarized but a bit more civil. 
However, it also spurred a new wave of anti-migration – in a country that had colonized
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half the world itself. On March 22, 2017, the British citizen Adrian Russell Ajao (aka 
Khalid Masood) with a migration background engaged in a suicide attack at London’s 
Westminster Bridge and House of Parliament. The parliament is the most fundamental 
institution of democracy. The word etymologically derives from the old French 
parler which means “to talk” and parlement, “conversation”. Prime Minister May 
declared that someone has tried to “silence [emphasis added] our democracy” (cited 
in Dearden, 2017, 2). However, what this attack has in common with many terror 
attacks in the West7, is that they are performed by marginalized members of society 
whose voices are not being heard. While Prime Minister May was quick to blame 
“Islam terrorism” (35), she failed to critically assess the situation of democracy in 
the UK. Do all members, so far defined by citizen status, have substantive freedom to 
participate in public discussions and shape them equally? The accessibility of credible 
information is one of the main aspects that connects democracy pessimists across 
international borders, class or ethnic lines. Hence, democracy must also be seen more 
generally in terms of the capacity to enrich reasoned engagement through enhancing 
informational availability and the feasibility of open and interactive discussions.
I have included these three Western examples of rather role model democracies – U.S. 
as the oldest operating system, Germany as the success story after dictatorship and the 
UK whose Westminster model has been exported to most African countries – in order 
to argue that they are not the best prototypes of orientation for countries like Ethiopia 
that are trying to eventually move from authoritarian to full democracies. What these 
examples have in common with the Ethiopian case is a refusal of large segments 
of the public to engage in open discussion. Amartya Sen’s (1999) assessment of 
democracy as a universal value can be disputed today. In several countries that are 
formal democracies, people gradually stopped communicating with each other. What 
democracy pessimists share across national borders, class, gender and ethnicity lines 
is a perceived loss of control over local matters and a massive distrust of the media in 
general. Groups deny others the right to be heard by confining their attention to some 
people and not others, presuming that some people are more relevant than others, 
that only their interests matter or voices count. When democracy is understood as 
public discussion then a refusal to engage in dialogue poses the most fundamental 
threat to democracy. Refusal has been theorized in different ways. In political and 
social sciences, refusal is regarded as the starting point for substantial critique. Lila 
Abu-Lughod (1990) wrote of how the concept of resistance enables a more complex 
recognition and theorization of “the nature and forms of domination” (p. 41). 
Refusalhas also been recognized as a strategy for decolonization, self-determination, 
gaining  of  rights  and  recognition  and  for  rejecting  certain systems of governance” 
7  I.e. the 2017 Manchester bombs, 2015 Paris attacks, or the 2013 Boston marathon bombing. 
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(Simpson, 2014). The diverse approaches share the understanding that refusal marks 
the point of a limit having been reached, when people refuse to continue in a particular 
way. They are unsatisfied or disappointed with the way that things are going and 
refuse or resist to participate in the process that keep things this way. Through refusal, 
they express their dissatisfaction with how things are and the direction in which things 
are moving (Ahmed, 2014, p. 41).8
Here, I want to theorize refusal as a concept to think with and think about, to recognize 
and theorize. Being more concerned with formal refusal linked to state institutions, 
media and class struggle, I want to recognize refusal as an element of political 
relations and, as such, interpret the practice of refusal as a cutting off of political 
relations, as withdrawing the right to be represented by the existing institutions and 
their personnel. As I intend to argue, refusal marks a point where the democratic 
practice of public discussion has obviously failed. Hence, the current political moment 
demands that a new theoretical conversation on refusal be opened and that practical 
attempts on a practice of listening to all be initiated. In Ethiopia, for example, refusal 
can also be viewed as generative and strategic, as a deliberate move towards change 
and to include all in discussions over decision-making processes. In order to grasp 
the dissatisfaction with the currentmode of democracy, I argue here, that a common 
understanding has to shift from an institutional focus to foregrounding democracy as 
public reasoning. In the following, I briefly highlight this shift in Sen’s writing before 
turning to Indigenous practices of democratic cultures as leitmotifs. 
PUBLIC REASONING AS A DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATION
Analyzing the connection between the reach of public discussion and the acceptance 
of democracy can help to explain the current weakness of democratic systems 
evident in the lack of participation and wide refusal to engage with other segments 
of society. Detrimental for this investigation are two processes: first, foregrounding 
an understanding of democracy as public discussion instead of the pure existence of 
democratic institutions. Second, based on this shift in definition, acknowledging that 
democracy as public discussion has been practiced in other regions, long before the 
times of Plato and Aristoteles.
In his earlier work, Sen (1999) adopted an unproblematized and narrow model of 
democracy. He stated the often – and to this day – repeated misconception that 
democracy has its roots in ancient Greece:
The idea of democracy originated, of course, in ancient Greece, more than two
8 Not surprising that a lot of protest movements had slogans like ¡YaBasta!. The Indigenous movement Idle 
No More, however, refuses to refuse any more.
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millennia ago. Piecemeal efforts at democratization were attempted elsewhere 
as well, including India. But it is really in ancient Greece that the idea of 
democracy took shape and was seriously put into practice (albeit on a limited 
scale)9, before it collapsed and was replaced by more authoritarian and 
asymmetric forms of government. There were no other kinds anywhere else. 
(Sen, 1999, p. 3)
When Sen stated in 1999 that democracy originated in ancient Greece, he applied an 
institution-focused definition where the sheer existence of a parliament and elections 
qualifies for democracy. Although the term undeniably has its roots in Greece and 
efforts in parliamentary democracy were recorded there, this ancient country no 
longer upholds its assumed unique position as first and only birthplace of democracy. 
This was further underlined by Sen (2010) who emphasizes an understanding 
of democracy as open public reasoning. Within the ten-year period between the 
publication of Development as Freedom (1999) and The Idea of Justice (2010 [2009]), 
Sen emancipated himself from the quoted statement above and revealed his new 
understanding and definition of democracy.
In contemporary political philosophy, democracy is no longer seen in terms of the 
demands of public balloting, but much more capaciously, in terms of exercising 
publicreason (Rawls, 1999; Ackerman 1989; Benhabib, 1996; Dworkin, 2006). Sen 
(2010) now asserts that the “success of democracy is not merely a matter of having 
the most perfect institutional structure” but the working of democratic institutions 
depends on the activities of human agents in utilizing opportunities for reasonable 
realization (p. 354). This thinking has brought about a general recognition that 
the central issue lies within a broader understanding of democracy as a process of 
political participation, dialogue and public interaction. Sen argues for a re-orientation 
towards an understanding of democracy as “government by discussion” and judging 
democracy “not just by the institutions that formally exist but by the extent to which 
different voices from diverse sections of the people can actually be heard” (pp. 3, xii).
He now stresses that institutions and elections are just one aspect of democracy. “The 
effectiveness of ballots themselves depends critically on what goes on with balloting, 
such as free speech, access to information and freedom of dissent” (p. 327). Hence, 
elections can be thoroughly inadequate, especially when “expressions of public views 
are thwarted by censorship, informational exclusion and a climate of  fear, along with 
9 The shortcomings of ancient democratic experiences that Sen attests as “on a limited scale” are evident in 
its exclusionary nature. The right for political participation was limited to a minority of property-owning 
male adults. Athenian democracy was based on excluding women, slaves and the pauper from public 
discussion. Hence, the majority of voices went unheard (Preiss and Brunner, 2012, p. 11). 
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the suppression of political opposition and the independence of the media and the 
absence of basic civil rights and political liberties” (p. 327).
Tolerance of diverse views, that is so necessary for open discussion, is missing in 
today’s political debates. If we view democracy as participatory public reasoning 
then the end of discussion is inevitably the end of democracy. Amartya Sen (p. 111) 
reminds us that in order to safeguard the liberties of all, we have to cultivate tolerance 
of each other in our respective values; this is a public reasoning justification for 
cultivating tolerance and open discussion. Public reasoning fosters a questioning of 
the normative standing of preferences, questioning the demands of liberty and re-
examining the norms of reasoning and behavior. Developing the willingness to listen 
to each other’s opinions and reasons would allow the currently refusing groups in, for 
example; the U.S., Germany, UK or in Ethiopia to enter into an open discussion and 
eventually democratize their communities and countries.
Sen argues throughout his book how central the role of public reasoning is for an 
understanding of justice: “’Discussion-less justice’ can be an incarcerating idea” (p. 
337). This recognition connects the idea of justice with the practice of democracy: 
if participative open debate is possible and practiced, the more just a society can be 
because multiple voices are being heard to better inform the discussion and decision-
making processes. The strength and reach of public reasoning depends on the 
opportunities for discussion and interactions that the institutions and practice provide. 
As John Rawls (1999) phrased it in his Theory of Justice: “The definitive idea for 
deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate,they 
exchange views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political 
questions” (pp. 579-580). Hence, the essential connection between public reasoning 
and participatory social decisions is central to the acceptance and effectiveness of a 
democratic society. 
This shift in perception of democracy implies that other cultural practices – that are not 
officially institutionalized or labeled as democracy – do now qualify as democratic. 
Sen now asserts that democracy does not exclusively belong to the West and that it 
is not a quintessential ‘Western’ idea: The practice of elections, in fact, has had a 
considerable history in non-Western societies, but it is the broader view of democracy 
in terms of public reasoning that makes it abundantly clear that a cultural critique 
of democracy as a purely regional phenomenon fails altogether” (pp. 330-331). Sen 
corrects this earlier view, stating that the “belief that democracy has not flourished 
anywhere in the world than in the West is widely held and often expressed” and calls 
this belief an “ultimately a wrong and superficial diagnosis” (pp. 322, 328). Now, 
better understanding the roots of democracy in the world, Amartya Sen points out that 
we have to take an interest in the history of people’s participation and public reasoning
CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA
30
in different parts of the world: “We would fail to understand the pervasive demands 
of participatory living if we take democracy to be a kind of  specialized cultural 
product of the West” (p. 322). After recognizing ancient Greece’s contribution to the 
development of democracy, Sen emphasizes that the tradition of public discussion has 
had a much more widespread history. He mentions councils in several Asian countries 
(Iran, Bacria, India), forms of public reasoning in the Middle East and stresses the 
exceptional tolerance of diversity of views in the Muslim world that oftentimes 
gave asylum to persecuted Others from Europe (pp. 329ff.). Examples from several 
Ethiopian nationalities could enrich this collection, as the following section shows.
INDIGENIZE DEMOCRACY
Instead of concentrating on the West as a leitmotif for an ideal democratic state, we should 
redirect our attention to societies that actually have long experiences in democratic 
cultural practices: Indigenous peoples of the world. As Mohawk anthropologist Audra 
Simpson has pointed out, academia has so far failed in effectively studying political 
cultures of Indigenous peoples either robustly or critically. Anthropology has dealt 
almost exclusively with Indigenous peoples in an ahistorical and depoliticized sense, 
whereas political science is relatively new to questions of Indigenous politics because 
of their rather Western, institutional and statist focus (Simpson, 2014, p. 11).10  
Indigenous modes of self-governance can lay grounds for decolonizing externally 
introduced tribal governments in settler states (U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) 
and offer democracy studies insights into non-Western democratic modes as cultural 
practices and lived traditions.
The Haudenosaunee (also known as Iroquois or Confederacy of the Six Nations) were 
accredited to have had the “new world’s first federal system” (Morgan, 1996 [1851], 
p. 8). This  system  not only provides/provided for a check-and-balance system that 
has inspired  the  founding  mothers  and  fathers  in  establishing  the  U.S.  political 
system11, Haudenosaunee politics also provided mechanisms through which all people 
actively engaged in the affairs of the community. Mohawk scholar Gerald Taiaiake 
Alfred (1995, p. 78ff.) has characterized Iroquoian democracy as consensual decision 
making and as a participatory political process.The basis for this process is open 
discussion. The culture of listening to each other in an all-inclusive, consensus-based
10 Duncan Ivison’s (2000) compilation of articles on the rights of Indigenous peoples is noteworthy to 
mention as one exception.
11 Although the extent of influence is still debated, ranging from a complete copy to mere similarities, then-
President Barack Obama has acknowledged that when “the Framers gathered to write the United States 
Constitution, they drew inspiration from the Iroquois Confederacy” (Obama, 2013, 1).
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forum constitutes cultural practices that date back long before the hay-days of ancient 
Greece.  Most  Native nations in the Americas had traditional all-inclusive governing 
systems and many were either matrilineal or matriarchal (Simpson, 2014, pp. 15, 57, 
147, 162). Diné writer Lloyd Lee (2008) stresses that the continuation of the Diné 
people “depends on all people, not just a few” (p. 101).
After colonization, Indigenous nations within the U.S. were required to form tribal 
governments under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 and in Canada 
according to the Indian Act. In both contexts, these tribal governments do not represent 
Indigenous political traditions but stand in stark contrast to them. For example, 
leadership is now elected but not selected and decisions are made on the basis of 
majority rule but not through consensus. Tribal governments resemble Western ideas 
of institutionalized democracy and remain under the supervision and domination 
of the settler state. The IRA and the Indian Act brought severe internal conflicts to 
Native nations12 as they were written by the federal governments for Native peoples 
without deep knowledge of Indigenous self-governing practices. However, very few 
First Nations have considered Indigenizing their political structures. One of the few 
exceptions is the White Earth Nation of Anishinaabeg Natives that, in 2009, ratified 
a new constitution which may be the first official (meaning: on paper) Indigenous 
democratic constitution. “The Constitution of the White Earth Nation was conceived 
and ratified as a resistance to a federal executive constitution and as a necessary 
structure and manifestation of  Native politics” (Vizenor and Doerfler, 2012, p. 
17). This constitution merges Anishinaabeg traditional practices of governance, 
like community councils and cultural reciprocity, with political divisions of power, 
providing for a system that ensures rights and equity for its citizens.
In the African context, political scientist Richard Sklar (2005, p. 8), has argued for 
incorporating traditional institutions with the organs of sovereign state governments. 
This was done in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa with dual goals of preventing 
a boycott of state elections by traditional clans or weakening the authority of the 
kingdom by maximizing the status of the federal system (Sklar, 2005, p. 12). The idea 
of mixed government has been raised since the time of ancient Greece whenever the 
challenge arises to consolidate dualistic forms of political authority, i.e. combining 
institutions that protect interests of the rich with other institutions that protect the 
interests of the poor. Sklar asks to what extent constitutions of sovereign states should 
be shaped by principles derived from Indigenous political traditions. He refers to this 
linkage that binds and strengthens the dualistic system of government as first and 
second  dimensions  of  political  space; first dimension being the sovereign state and 
the second dimension the traditional systems of government (Sklar, 2005, p. 4). Since
12 Divide et impera par excellence.
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he builds his argument on the premises of legal foundations, he does not advocate 
for founding of Indigenous politics: public reasoning. He finds more adequate replies 
when turning to democratic cultural practices instead of institutions.
Investigations into Ethiopian traditional government systems have found that 
they often permit a greater degree of public participation than Western forms of 
parliamentary democracies. But their findings are always limited due to recurring 
conceptual problems; they are either purely ethnologically descriptive (Abebe, 
Samson and Tessema, 2015; Bahru, 2002; Aadland, 2002) or they set normative the 
old-fashioned Western institutionalized understanding of democracy (Zelalem, 2015; 
Sklar, 2005).  A few scholars have considered the potential of Indigenous forms and 
knowledge of governing systems in enhancing participative democracies. Practices 
of consensus-based participatory public discussions can easily be found amongst 
Indigenous communities in Ethiopia. The Gadaa system was found to have a greater 
potential of protecting a constitution than the current Ethiopian federal system could 
ever offer (Zelalem, 2015, p. 36). Lecturer for law Zelalem Tesfaye investigates 
whether the Gadaa system of governance could be applied at the state level despite the 
ethnic federalism prevalent in Ethiopia. But he also bases his inquiry on “indigenous 
versus [emphasis added] modern institutions” (Zelalem, 2015, p. 36) and sets the 
criteria for central normative Western democratic institutions to be ticked off.
These relevant and legitimate questions would produce more relevant and more 
legitimate answers if the dual forms of political authority were not treated dialectically 
or in opposition to each other. If the question is how to transform the current imperfect 
forms of democracy to better cultural practices of public discussion, then it would 
make more sense to treat Indigenous forms of governing as the first dimension of 
government and the institutions as second.
CONCLUSION
The current weakness of many democracies is evident by their deficiency of politically 
engaged public reasoning. While the fundamental institutions are of unquestioned 
importance, they become useless when the public cannot engage in shaping them.
To ask how things are going and whether they can be improved is a constant and 
inescapable part of the pursuit of academia and the advancement of democratic 
societies. The improvement of democratic practices and the removal of autocratic 
processes demand engagement with institutional choice and behavior adjustment 
based on public discussion of what is promised, how institutions actually work and 
what needs to improve. We have to seek institutions that promote democracy, rather 
than treating the institutions as themselves manifestations of democracy, which would 
reflect  a  kind  of  institutionally fundamentalist view. It is the intent of this article to
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contribute to this project by spurring on more research about Indigenous conceptions 
and cultural practices of democracy based on tolerance and public discourse in the 
non-West.
Ethiopia is one of the world’s richest countries in terms of civilization, history and 
culture. This wealth includes democratic traditions in various Ethiopian societies that 
date back to time immemorial. The basic democratic principles of self-government, 
equality, representation, voice, open debate, consensus as well as participation in 
agenda setting and decision making have been practiced as traditional cultures on 
local levels throughout various Ethiopian societies. What I am arguing is that there is 
a disjuncture between the most common understandings of democracy and the various 
traditions at work in the canon of democracy studies. However meaningful and 
flexible democratic traditions may be in day-to-day experiences in many Ethiopian 
communities, particularly in the southern regions, the literature to date has been too 
narrow to capture these. So far, the literature on democracy in Ethiopia has operated 
according to tight, discursively controlled, theoretically delimited and canonical 
imperatives of federalism. What I argue for is that, instead of turning to the West with 
its Westminster model and its rather young democratic experience, Ethiopia could turn 
towards its own internal resources and incorporate democratic principles that have 
been practiced for centuries at local levels onto a national level. Recovering unheard 
voices on democratic experiences will add to expanding the project of understanding 
the history, present and future of democracy. 
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Regulation of Intra-Party Democracy in Ethiopia: 
A Review of the Constitution and Party Laws
Teguada Alebachew1
Abstract
Legal regulations directed at political parties are a fairly recent phenomenon. 
Laws regulating the internal business of parties constitute an important part of the 
developments on party regulations. Some countries have come up with laws requiring 
political parties to implement democratic principles with regard to their internal 
activities. This article identifies the regulation of internal party democracy under 
Ethiopian laws and puts them in an international context so as to effectively carry 
out comparisons. The findings generally show that party regulations in Ethiopia are 
largely focused on parties` operations and external rather than internal behavior. 
Only a few provisions relevant to the regulation of internal matters of parties are 
available in the Constitution and the Proclamation for Party Registration. However, 
as this essay argues effective participation in and of political parties is hardly feasible 
without regulations for intra-party democracy.
Keywords: Political parties, regulation, intra-party democracy, democracy
State regulations directed at political parties are a relatively modern-day phenomenon. 
It was in the 1940s that countries began to make laws directly targeting the behavior 
and functioning of political parties (European Commission for Democracy through 
Law, 2010, p. 1). Since then, a considerable number of countries have made 
regulatory laws with varying degree and purpose directed towards political parties 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2010, p. 1). State regulation 
of political parties is necessary given the crucial role parties play in the electoral 
process in particular and the democratic process in general. In general, state regulation 
is important in order to ensure an effective participation of political parties in the 
electoral and democratic processes.
1 Teguada Alebachew is lecturer at the School of Law at Mekelle University.
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Party regulation is broad and can be implemented for different purposes. Depending on 
the kind of the regime in power, countries may regulate parties for different purposes. 
Dictatorial regimes may make party regulations to lessen parties’ competitive power. 
Party regulatory laws in the vast majority of Asian countries, for instance, argued in 
favour of having a restrictive party regulation (International  IDEA, 2006). Contrarily, 
in democratic countries, parties are regulated aiming at democratic goals. More 
often than not, parties’ internal rules set the tone regarding the importance of party 
democracy. This is even true for the Chinese Community Party which evaluated itself 
for lack of internal democracy; and underlined that the endurance of the party depends 
on better Intra-Party Democracy (IPD) (Li, 2009, p. 2). Yet, political parties, despite 
setting the tone of the significance of party democracy in their internal rule, may lack 
the commitment to implement it on the ground. State regulation is hence important to 
oblige parties to abide by the rules of internal democracy.
This paper investigates the position of the regulation of internal party democracy under 
Ethiopian laws. As such, the provision of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and other laws: the Proclamation for Party Registration, 
the Electoral Proclamation and the Proclamation for Code of Conduct for Political 
Parties’ are reviewed during the course of this article. The paper is organized into five 
sections. The first four sections lay the theoretical foundation discussing the meaning, 
the elements and the potential of IPD and how IPD regulations can be made functional. 
The later section addresses the regulation of IPD under the FDRE Constitution and 
other party laws.
MEANING OF INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY
IPD is a democracy within a party and the extent to which a party pledges and 
commits itself to the principles of democracy. IPD is when democratic principles 
guide a party’s internal functioning. Internal party democracy is about whether there 
is internal distribution of authority at different levels, bodies and individuals rather 
than a concentration of decision-making power on one person (usually party leaders) 
or on a few groups or on one single organ. Internal democracy is about the degree by 
which we can measure the extent to which a party is democratically organized and 
also allows us to compare parties accordingly (Čular, 2009, pp. 69-70). Internal party 
democracy should be taken as a neutral term and valued only if it contributes to the 
quality of democratization on the federal level. As such, an internal democracy is not 
a standalone concept and hence should be treated as an extension of the democracy 
at state level.
Scholars have come up with a set of identifiable features for internal democracy within 
a party including; that members have equal participation in decision making including
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in policy making, in the selection of leaders for internal positions as well as candidates 
for representative bodies and their role in party organs at all levels of the party 
structure, representation of underrepresented groups including but not limited to the 
following women, language and ethnic minorities, decentralization (horizontal and 
vertical) of decision making, institutionalization and appropriate use of party fund 
(Scarrow, 2005; Mimpen, 2007; Salih, 2006).
ELEMENTS OF IPD
The main elements of IPD include (1) members’ equal right to vote and participate in 
political parties, (2) appropriate use of party funds, (3) representation and participation 
of disadvantaged groups and (4) institutionalization.
(1) A party which empowers its members to influence a party’s decision-making 
process is considered internally democratic. Members must equally influence the 
decision-making process within the party including in the formulation of party 
program, candidate and leaders’ selection. As well, members should have equal 
opportunities to assume a leadership role in the party. Acknowledgment of one 
person; one vote, right to participate and dissent is also at the centre of the idea of 
IPD. Beyond recognizing rights of members as individual citizens, equal participation 
of members is considered useful in promoting a deliberative decision-making process 
which is critical to develop an informed and articulated party program and selecting 
appealing party leaders and candidates (Mimpen, 2005, pp. 1-2). Empowerment and 
recognition of equality of members in a political party has also been shown to have 
the potential to reduce, if not to avoid, dominance of party figures or elites in the 
party’s decision-making process as well as the selection of candidates on the basis 
of clientelism and family relationship and unequal representation of interest of all 
groups. Mohamed Salih (2006, pp. 54-55), for instance, identified the dominance of 
elites, non-competitive leadership elections, discriminatory selection of candidates 
and clientelism as challenges to internal democracy in Africa. 
(2) Open and equal participation of members in all aspect of party internal functioning 
is a viable means of creating cohesive and robust parties (Ojukwu and Olaifa, 2011, 
p. 28). Internal cohesion of parties, on the other hand, is crucial for parties to win the 
hearts of the electorate during election. For a party to be successful in election, it is 
important that it appears cohesive in front of the electorate (Ogundimu, 2010 as cited 
by Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011, p. 28).
(3) A party’s internal democracy is also measured in relation to a party’s attention to 
accommodate  disadvantaged groups including women, persons with disabilities and 
language and ethnic  minorities  in  the  party’s decision-making process and in party
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leadership role. Involving disadvantaged groups in decision making in political parties 
may require some affirmative measures. Some countries have legislations requiring 
parties to apply a quota scheme for these groups, particularly for women. 
(4) An institutionalization of internal party activities is another variable used to 
measure internal party democracy (Scarrow, 2005, p. 6). According to Scarrow, 
institutionalization in political parties is the extent to which internal party activities 
are performed in an established system. It is about the availability and potency 
of party organizational structure to effectively and efficiently respond to all party 
matters. Decentralized (vertically and horizontally) party structures and the existence 
of party organs for conflict resolution describe an institutionalized party according to 
Scarrow. The existence of a somehow independent and strong body for party conflict 
management is integral to creating robust and internally democratic parties. In a 
nutshell, institutionalized parties are considered predicable and viable to establishing 
a stable government at state level.
Using party funds for legitimate purposes is also considered necessary for party 
democracy. There is an increasing trend whereby governments allocate money for 
political parties. Parties may also get money from other legitimate sources than the 
government. Accordingly, how and for what purposes this money is spent has become 
a concern for governments in democracy. Inappropriate use of party funds could have 
many distorting effects, involving corruption, buying of votes and clientelism (Griner 
& Zovatto, 2005, p. 19). Use of party funds has thus become one subject of state 
regulation political parties.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND REGULATION OF IPD UNDER 
ETHIOPIAN LAW
As with the constitutions of older democracies, the FDRE Constitution has left parties 
and their extraordinary role in political processes unaddressed. The constitution is 
devoid of any provision which defines political parties or their role in the political 
process in the country. The constitution makes general mention of political parties 
as associations rather than as unique associations which play a critical role in the 
democratic processes. This appears like the framers of the constitution did not intend 
to consider the creation and participation of political parties as also being in the interest 
of the formation of the political will of the society. Accordingly, the constitution lacks 
a provision guiding the specific internal activities of parties. 
The constitution, under article 31, prohibits the formation of associations and political 
organizations that violate relevant laws or subvert the constitutional order. Also, article 
9 of the constitution requires any form of associations, including  political parties,  to
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enforce and obey the constitution. These provisions are directed at regulating the 
external behavior of parties. The only provision in the constitution relevant to the 
regulation of IPD is article 38 (2) & (3). Article 38 (2) guarantees everyone a right 
to join in any association, including in political parties, as long as he or she meets 
the membership requirements of the respective associations or a political party. Even 
here, the constitution has left the membership requirement to be determined by the 
respective associations. More relevant to the issue at hand, article 38 (3) puts in place 
a general requirement that election to the position of responsibility in any association, 
including political parties, shall be made in a free and democratic manner. This shows 
that, irrespective of the issue of freedom of association, there is an interest on the part 
of the constitution that the practices of the association, including political parties, not 
be arbitrary. 
Accordingly, this specific provision of the constitution can give the government a 
legitimate reason to require political parties to be democratic internally and enact 
a regulatory law to this end. Article 51 (15) of the constitution, on the other hand, 
empowered the federal parliament to make laws governing political parties any 
time it deems necessary so as to enforce the political rights of citizens recognized 
and protected within the constitution. Accordingly, if, for instance, the government 
believes that lack of IPD and arbitrariness in the political parties` internal functioning 
is negatively affecting people`s political right protected within the constitution; it can 
legitimately come up with laws to further regulate IPD. The recent state regulation on 
the internal activities of charities and societies, despite a clear constitutional provision 
to this effect, is a good precedent towards regulating parties.
REGULATION OF IPD UNDER ETHIOPIAN PARTY LAWS
Party laws refer to the laws that regulate how parties must act and behave both internally 
and externally. These include both laws with permissive and obligatory provisions 
against parties’ behavior and practices. Relevant elements of these categories in 
Ethiopia are: the Proclamation for Political Party Registration No. 573/2008, the 
Electoral Proclamation (Amended) No. 532/2007 and the Proclamation to provide for 
the Electoral Code for Political Parties No. 662/2009. The Political Party Registration 
Proclamation has seven chapters addressing different sets of issues ranging from 
how parties must be formed, operated and dissolved to the rights of members. It also 
addresses the responsibilities of political parties upon failure to respect the conditions 
laid down in this law and other laws of the country.
The proclamation generally focuses on parties’ external behavior: what goals parties 
must and must not champion and what legal rules they must adhere to in promoting 
their goals. Only a few provisions are found to address  the  internal affairs of parties.
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In fact, more specifically, article 16 of the proclamation grants political parties 
independence to determine their internal organization and process.  It allows political 
parties to determine in their bylaws the procedures of adopting and amending 
their political program, as well as the frequency of meetings, determining internal 
organizational structure and establishing branch offices anywhere in the country. 
Accordingly, there is no legally provided procedure for parties to follow in their internal 
dealings. Parties are hence at liberty to decide on all aspects of internal organization 
and processes. The proclamation also does not provide a general principle for internal 
party activities to be governed by democracy. However, the proclamation provides 
provisions regulating the rights of members and sources and use of party fund.
The proclamation guarantees members the rights to participate in the meetings of the 
party, to vote and be elected. The manner of participation of members in a meeting 
and the procedure of decision making is still left to the parties to be determined in their 
own bylaws (Ethiopian Proclamation, Article 28). Political parties are required not to 
curtail the rights of members as citizens of this country i.e. their right to vote and to 
be elected (Ethiopian Proclamation, Article 15 (2)). Besides which, the proclamation 
requires party statutes to include details on the equality of votes among members of 
the political party (Ethiopian Proclamation, Article 15(19) (I)). Also, as part of the 
requirement for registration, the proclamation puts a prerequisite for political parties 
to present documents showing that the leaders of the party are elected by the general 
assembly (Ethiopian Proclamation, Article 8(f)). Though not provided clearly, this 
requirement has a tone of impliedly requiring positions for party leadership to be 
made in election rather than a veiled selection by the informal party lines. A right 
for members to withdraw from membership at any time is also established under 
article 31 (3). While political parties can expel members from party membership in 
accordance with the bylaws of the party, the proclamation guarantees members a right 
to challenge the decision in front of the Federal High Court (Ethiopian Proclamation, 
Article 30 (2)).
A more detailed regulation is provided in the proclamation regulating political parties’ 
use of state allocated funds and other funds acquired from other legitimate sources. 
Chapter five of the proclamation (42-56) talks about the legitimate or illegitimate 
sources of funds for political parties, how political parties may get government funds, 
how party funds and other properties should be used, a requirement to keep books and 
accounts, financial reports to the Election Board of Ethiopia (2012) and outlines the 
respective penalties and liabilities of political parties for their failure to respect the 
requirements provided in the proclamation in this regard.
The proclamation has empowered the Election Board to oversee the operation and 
decided on the registration and dissolution of political parties in Ethiopia (Ethiopian
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Proclamation, Article 7, 8, 9 (1-17), 37, 38 and 39). The decision of the Board on 
cancelling registration and dissolution is subject to revision by the Federal High Court 
upon application of the party or members. The Federal High Court also has the power 
to dissolve a political party on grounds of criminal charges or parties’ act in violation 
of the Constitution and the Registration Proclamation (Ethiopian Proclamation, 
Article 40). 
With regard to promoting equal representation of underrepresented groups, such as 
women, in a political party, neither the constitution nor the party laws provide specific 
provisions to this regard. The Party Registration Proclamation tries to indirectly 
encourage the participation of women. Article 45 (2) (b) of the same proclamation 
stated that the number of women candidates nominated by political parties will serve 
as a criterion for apportionment of state funds amongst political parties.
Other party laws: the Electoral Proclamation and the Proclamation to Provide for the 
Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties are found to be less relevant to the 
issue of regulating internal party democracy. The Electoral Proclamation (Amended) 
No. 532/2007 addresses parties’ relationships with the Board and the electorate. Also, 
the Proclamation to provide for the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties 
No. 662/2009 addresses the kind of behavior parties must show during election 
campaigns, such as; respecting the constitutional order in general, other parties and 
their candidates, the electorate, the media, election administrators or other government 
bodies. In a nutshell, the proclamation only addresses the behavior that political 
parties must show and practice externally during election campaigns. 
WHY INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY?
The primary function of political parties is to link the citizenry with the government 
(Sartori, 2005, p. 1). If they are to effectively meet this responsibility, parties must 
adhere to the institutional guarantees such as IPD (Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011, p. 3). 
Political parties have to provide equal opportunities for effective participation for party 
members and leaders in the party’s decision-making processes. Unlike any other forms 
of association, the need for democracy in political parties is stronger because parties 
are prospective institutions which could form the parliament and run the government 
at state level. This is different from what used to be the case in older democracies, 
where parties were considered private voluntary associations. The German Basic Law 
explained that political parties and their participation in the political process are in 
the interest of fulfilling the political will of the people (Basic Law, 1949, Article 21 
(1)).More specifically, the German Party Law defines political parties as associations 
freely  established  to  perform a public function (Political  Parties  Act,  1967: section 
one  and two).  For that  reason, parties’ internal  functioning is  strictly  regulated  in
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Germany both under Basic and Party Law. 
The relationship between parties and democracy should reflect the parties’ adherence 
not only to democratic goals and actions but also to internal democratic structures 
(Mersel, 2006, pp. 87-88, 97). Yigal Mersel further argues, likewise the absence of a 
legitimate political goal, democratic deficit in political parties should cause the ban 
or dissolution of parties. This is because, he argues, there is interdependence between 
political parties and democracy. A political party, which does not commit itself to 
democratic values internally, cannot logically hope to form democracy at state level. 
A party, which is intolerant of difference internally, cannot normally hope to respect 
oppositions in the wider political realm (Teorell, 1999, p. 375).
The German Constitutional Court on its 1952 ruling on the constitutionality of the 
neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei also stated that there is logical relationship 
between the concept of free democratic order and the democratic principles of party 
organization (Schneider, 1957, p. 536). A political party which proscribes democratic 
deliberation of ideas has a fractured base from to compete for and occupy state power. 
These kinds of parties face a risk of disintegration. The risk of disintegration resulting 
from undemocratic internal functioning of parties is particularly critical as these 
parties assume state power. For that reason, internal party democracy is regarded as 
reflective of the ability of the party in question to form a robust, cohesive and stable 
government at state level. Again, internal democracy allows for free deliberation of 
ideas, which may have positive effects on the representation of ideas of the electorate 
and may strengthen the organization by attracting new members and creating space 
for fresh ideas (Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011, p. 3). 
Moreover, in any constitutional democracy where democracy, accountability and 
transparency are proclaimed fundamentals of the system, political parties cannot 
become exceptions to disregard democratic values in their internal functioning. These 
fundamentals should give the state legitimate ground to impose external regulation 
on party democracy in the absence of clear constitutional provisions empowering the 
state. Last, but not least, relates to the importance of party democracy to nurture the 
culture of democracy both within the political party and on parties’ relationship with 
the outside world and at societal level at large. Forbidding dissenting opinions and 
deliberation, factionalism, discrimination among members, imposition of candidates 
and all sorts of parties’ malpractices reinforces the pattern of weak culture of 
democracy at both state and societal level. 
In the continent of Africa, where democratic culture is scant, intra-party democracy 
is thought to have the potential to promote the culture amongst both political parties 
andthe society at large. In such polities, where levels of civic awareness are extremely
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low, intra-party democracy provides opportunities to expand civic education and 
awareness through participation, while at the same time devolving power and 
decision-making processes to broader sections of society (Maiyo, 2008, p. 23). In 
Africa, political parties are perceived more as instruments of assuming public office 
than institutions of democratic consolidation; intra-party democracy is more likely to 
improve the overall effectiveness of the party against its competitors (Maiyo, 2008, 
p. 23). 
Some argue that IPD could weaken the power of a party’s inner leadership and 
make it difficult for that party to keep its electoral promises (Scarrow, 2005, p. 4). 
Furthermore, it is argued that internal democratic procedures may raise possibilities 
for party splits and crises, possibly harming democratic stability. The arguments in 
favor of party democracy are pretty convincing, but a one-size-fits-all approach to 
IPD may not work. The benefits of intra-party democratization depend on the specific 
instruments used, as well as the implementation methods and interaction with the 
political context (Mimpen, 2007, p. 2).
REGULATING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR IPD
Political parties were treated for a long time as private associations which were entitled 
to compete freely in the electoral marketplace and determine their own internal 
structure and process (van Biezen & Piccio, 2007, p. 1). As a result, regulating how 
parties must behave and function internally was considered very much outside of the 
state’s mandate. In consequence, state regulation was thought to be a contravention 
on parties’ internal affairs; and a restraint against political pluralism (van Biezen & 
Piccio, 2007, p. 1). In countries such as US, United Kingdom and Australia, regulation 
is still considered against the liberal understanding of parties as non-state agencies 
(Gauja, 2006). In the US, although the constitution makes no mention of political 
parties, the Supreme Court has ruled that freedom of association is not absolute; 
and states can regulate certain aspects of political parties, including their internal 
government structure and nominating process. This remains the case as long as they 
can demonstrate an interest in the regulation that corresponds to the severity of the 
burden imposed (NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)). Political 
parties in the US and the UK are particularly regulated by the Campaign Finance 
Law of Congress in relation to the money they are provided by the state. In Australia, 
only the state of Queensland has adopted intra-party democracy regulations. The need 
for greater transparency and accountability through party laws in Australia is being 
discussed (Gauja, 2006).
A  fear  of   reprisal   from   past   despotic  regimes  and  communism,  like in the 
case of Germany and Finland respectively (ACE,  2008, p. 2), have fostered people`s
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discontent about the behavior and performance of parties (Mersel, 2006). The 
introduction of state financing of political parties (van Biezen & Piccio, 2007, p. 
28) necessitated and encouraged a regulatory regime on parties and their behavior 
both internally and externally. The need for party regulation has now dominated the 
understanding regarding their role in political process. There is an increasing demand 
for party regulation from politicians, partisan, policy makers and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) (van Biezen & Piccio, 2007, p. 28). Vince Commission, for 
instance, emphasized the need for IPD regulation without undue influence on parties 
as free associations to ensure proper functioning of parties in democratic societies 
(European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2010, p. 25).
Countries, appreciating its importance, have shown an increased interest towards 
regulating parties and their internal functioning. To be sure, although regulation is 
important, by itself it cannot ensure IPD in the internal dealings of parties. Establishing 
a potent enforcement system and a body which watches over the activities of the 
political parties and takes corrective measures is equally important. Problems related 
with enforcing regulatory provision, for instance, are reported as prevailing in Ghana, 
Sierra Leone and Nigeria due to weak enforcing institutions and dominant party 
leaders (ACE, 2008, p. 3).
Regulation of party democracy can be implemented in different ways. It can be made 
both for content and form. In terms of regulating content, laws may stipulate or require 
parties to guarantee certain rights for members. In terms of form, laws may regulate 
parties to follow certain procedures or adopt a certain internal organizational structure. 
Regulations could take the form of positive and/or negative kinds of regulations. The 
positive regulation is by way of incentivizing parties which uphold some behaviors 
required by the state (ACE, 2008, p.1). This kind of regulatory scheme is usually 
made to encourage parties to ensure equal participation of underrepresented groups 
such as women. The most widely used regulatory scheme is “a negative regulation” 
by way of demanding parties to act according to a certain prescribed procedure or 
behavior and if not enforcing certain legal responsibilities to be upheld. 
In their analysis of regulation of IPD in the European countries, Van Biezen and Piccio 
(2007, pp. 38-39) have observed a variety of forms of regulation. In some countries, 
party democracy is regulated by way of generally requiring political parties to abide 
by principles of democracy in their internal functioning and leaving the details for 
them to address under their internal rules. Others, on the other hand, have regulated 
party democracy through stipulating specific democratic principles and procedures 
which parties must abide by, whilst dealing with their day to day internal business.
These   include;  guaranteeing  the  specific   rights  of members,  stipulating  specific 
procedures for decision making, justly selecting party leaders, nominating candidates
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as well as specifying the kinds of organizational structure parties must adopt and 
the manner and purpose party funds must be spent. Countries such as Finland and 
Czech Republic have more stringent regulations; party democracy is provided as a 
precondition for party formation (van Biezen & Piccio, 2007, pp. 38-39). A party which 
wishes to register must show that it will apply democratic principles in its internal 
functioning. Also, in the Czech Republic, political parties with undemocratically 
elected leaders and undemocratic statutes are unqualified for both establishment and 
operation. Regulation of internal party democracy may be carried out based on both 
the constitution and other laws. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF IPD
Due to the consideration of political parties as free institutions, constitutions were not 
a source of party regulation laws for a long time. This is still true for the constitutions 
of older democracies. A good example is the US constitution which is now more 
than 200 years old. The US Constitution is devoid of a provision mentioning the 
word political parties let alone any provision regulating party democracy. The same is 
true for the constitutions of older democracies in Europe such as Denmark, Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands (van Biezen & Piccio, 2007, p. 31). Following the 
constitutionalization of political parties and party democracy in Germany in 1967, 28 
European countries now have a constitution which addresses political parties. 
In Africa, the Nigerian and Kenyan Constitutions can be cited as examples of where 
constitutional recognition of parties and party democracy is accorded (ACE, 2008, pp. 
2-3). Beyond acknowledging the role of parties in the democratic process, the Nigerian 
Constitution has provided specific regulatory statements on internal party democracy 
(ACE, 2008, pp. 2-3). It, for instance, requires political parties to undertake periodic 
and democratic elections of its leadership. 
The Constitution of Kenya, which is often cited as representing the fourth wave 
of African constitutions (Hessebon, 2014), has addressed political parties in much 
greater depth and in a separate section (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Part three of the 
constitution provides a list of requirements for political party formation and requires 
them to practice democracy and abide by principles of good governance internally. It 
also empowers the parliament to make laws to further regulate political parties in both 
their internal and external behavior.
Apart from the constitutional laws which often provide the principles, states may also 
make other laws regulating parties’ internal behavior and practice in detail. These laws 
are generally referred to as “Party Laws” which usually include: party registration 
law, electoral law, campaign finance laws and party code of conduct laws.
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CONCLUSION
As a consequence of the critical role that parties play in democracy, party regulation 
in general and IPD regulation in particular are essential in ensuring an effective 
participation of political parties in the electoral process. In Ethiopia, political parties 
are regulated on their behavior and activities externally rather than their behavior 
and activities internally. Internal matters are left to the parties’ discretion rather than 
state imposition. From the constitution to other subsidiary laws, internal functioning 
of political parties is left unregulated in Ethiopia except on few instances: rights of 
members and use of party fund. While securing parties’ independence on internal 
matters is appropriate, state regulation remains important on matters that have a 
bearing on the overall democratic processes. Internal party democracy is among the 
institutional guarantees likely to create vigorous political parties capable of playing a 
meaningful role in the democratic processes. On the flip side, regulation is critical to 
implement internal party democracy. 
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Modernity, Democratization and Intercultural Dialogue in 
Ethiopia
Fasil Merawi1
Abstract
Understanding the parameters, essence and implications of modernity in the Ethiopian 
context is a difficult task. By its very nature, modernity is a highly contested concept 
which is associated with the triumph of subjectivity, exercise of rationality and the 
realization of human freedom and emancipation. It is in such a critical praxis that 
modernity tries to implant its tradition, custom and authority. Rather than developing 
a broader understanding of Ethiopian modernity, there is too narrow a focus on 
political modernity conceived as centralization with regard to the emergence of the 
modern Ethiopian state. Alongside these lines, intellectual discussions regarding 
the essence and function of democracy in Ethiopia situate democracy as a solution 
to the problems of centralization and cultural assimilation and, hence, a way of 
accommodating cultural differences. Democratization is here analyzed from the 
perspective of popular participation, power relations and empowering individuals 
in making decisions. What is neglected in such attempts is the need to understand 
democracy as a normative orientation, value reference and philosophical problem. 
After discussing the ambiguities found in defining Ethiopian modernity, this paper 
argues that a more elaborated understanding of democracy in Ethiopia could be 
developed by appropriating key lessons from a recent orientation in philosophy known 
as intercultural philosophy. The various concepts to be studied here include; dialogue, 
polylogue, mutual enlightenment and learning amongst diverse cultural backgrounds. 
Keywords: Philosophy, democracy, dialogue, modernity, centrism
A great deal of controversy surrounds intellectual attempts at characterizing the 
dynamics of political, social, economic and other relations in modern Ethiopia and 
their implications for state making, democratization and systems of administration. 
Trying to characterize Ethiopia’s history with conventional categories like the thesis 
of colonialism dictating African history or a historiography that appeals to a universal
1 Fasil Merawi is a lecturer and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Philosophy, Addis Ababa University. 
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path to human history is a problematic task. As such, there is a need to study the 
contingent, local and specific factors that are unique to Ethiopian history. This failure to 
arrive at a strict understanding of Ethiopian history in general and defining the essence 
of modernity in Ethiopia in particular arise from the existence of different religious 
worldviews, cultures and languages in Ethiopia.  existence of a unique process of state 
formation and cultural dynamics also negates Rather than being uniformly dictated 
by the colonial legacy like most African nations, Ethiopia continues to occupy a 
special place in the African context. The modernization theories according to which 
modernity is a material phenomenon and the embodiment of instrumental rationality. 
This shows that “Modernization cannot result from the total assimilation of Africans, 
the condition of which is the complete extirpation of their historical past” (Messay, 
2004, p. 115). Local responses to the introduction of foreign ideals and cultures 
are diverse in the Ethiopian context. Whereas the attempt to evolve a model of 
Western cultural resistance and seclusion characterize Ethiopia’s response to Western 
influence, “the rest of Africa has been set in a colonial mold and are the result of non-
African ideas and conventions” (Silberman, 1960, p. 141). Such a historical stature 
served to establish Ethiopia’s status as the source of black pride, self-affirmation and 
decolonization.
Although there is a debate regarding the essence of Ethiopian modernity, an argument 
is ongoing that the political project of modernity in Ethiopia could be situated in 
processes of state making, centralization and emergence of a highly homogenized 
population. Based on this, absolutism and centralization are identified as the key 
features of the modern Ethiopian state. For historian Saheed A. Adejumobi (2007), the 
nature of cultural encounters and historical image in today’s Ethiopia are as a result of 
two major factors. On the one hand, in the political dimension, one witnesses a gradual 
evolution from an agrarian and feudal system into popular forms of governance. 
On the other hand, there is a search for a model of governance that accommodates 
diversities in culture, societal dynamics, politics and other aspects of the life of the 
individual. Alongside these lines, using the modern Ethiopian state, democracy in 
Ethiopia is situated in terms of the politics of identity, realizing equal participation 
and creating space for the participation of individuals, different groups, worldviews 
and cultural identities in public life and decision making. Against such an insistence, 
the philosophical dimension of democracy emphasizes the normative presuppositions 
of respect, accommodation, pluralism and dialogical encounters. It shows the need to 
understand democracy from a normative perspective.
The aim of this paper is to make a plea for the introduction of a value orientation 
and intercultural dimension in the discourse on the nature, function and viability of 
democracy within the Ethiopian context. In section one, I  will  try  to  demonstrate 
how  the  conventional  understanding  of  democracy  in  Ethiopia  is founded on the
CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA
51
understanding of the political project of Ethiopian modernity as a process of 
centralization and the emergence of the absolutist state. In section two, I will discuss 
intercultural philosophy and the issue of democracy and dialogical encounters. Finally, 
in the third section, the benefits of intercultural philosophy in the Ethiopian context 
will be explained in terms of a critique of ethnocentrism and dialogical encounters in 
order to initiate a process of mutual learning amongst different cultures.
METHODS
The paper is grounded on a philosophical discussion and a conceptual analysis that 
seek to explore the discourse on Ethiopian modernity, political modernity, intercultural 
dialogue and democratization. To this extent, I will rely on a discursive analysis that 
seeks to explore the discourse on modernity, identity and popular participation. The 
paper, as such, is founded on a study of secondary data and literature bearing upon 
the nature of Ethiopian modernity, democratization and intercultural philosophy. 
The paper uses a philosophical method of deconstruction where one seeks to expose 
binary operations and structures that underlie our understanding of reality. Applied 
to the discourse on modernity, I will deconstruct the foundations of the Ethiopian 
discourse on modernity with an aim of exposing their impacts in our understanding of 
democracy in contemporary Ethiopia.
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE PROJECT OF POLITICAL 
MODERNITY IN ETHIOPIA
In the current context, realizing the equal participation of citizens in the affairs of 
their community, creating a space for the participation of different identities, popular 
participation and instituting a democratic establishment are identified as some of the 
major tasks facing the Ethiopian state. Democracy could be conceptualized as a form 
of government which realizes the voices of citizens either in a direct or indirect form 
of participation. Such a quest is founded on the discourse on modern Ethiopia, which 
is seen as highly centralized and absolutist. Still, addressing the following questions is 
difficult to summarize: What is Ethiopian modernity? What are its historical origins? 
What is its lasting impact?
For Teshale Tibebu (1996) Ethiopian history and culture are considered anomalous 
and paradoxical. In the isolationist image, Ethiopian culture represents a secluded, 
separated and unique culture characterized by an internal growth separated from alien 
influence. Related to this, for the romantic image, aesthetic refinement of everyday 
life, purity and perfection characterize the Ethiopian culture. This is further developed 
by the civilization image for which “Ethiopian civilization, majestic and exotic, 
hibernated  throughout  its  long  history,  lost  in  the  entanglement  of  geographical
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isolation and hostile neighbors” (Teshale, 1996, p. 417). Furthermore, in the Adwa 
complex image, Ethiopia is seen as a source of African pride and root of Pan-African 
aspirations, in the barbarism image as a communalistic, religious, culturally oriented 
and  materially underdeveloped culture and for the black colonialism image, as a 
nation of cultural exclusion and dominance. In the arrogance image, Ethiopia’s cultural 
resistance to outside influence and the inability to modernize and catch up to the 
advancement of the West are emphasized. Finally, in the pan African image, Ethiopia 
“symbolized the hope and pride of Africa” (Tibebu, 1996, p.  426). For Tibebu, there 
is a need to situate such historical images within the context of African history.
In observing the quest for modernity in Ethiopia, Paulos Milkias (2008) argues 
that the logical consequences of Ethiopia’s quest for modernization stemmed from 
the Western system of knowledge, education and cultural awareness that seek to 
dismantle the feudal system and find discomfort with the realities of the Ethiopian 
condition. Currently, in the globalized era, it is time to face the implication of such a 
quest in the antagonism between modern scientific and traditional localized systems 
of knowledge. From the outset, there was a failure to recognize the antithesis between 
feudalism and modernization. As such, “feudalism and modernization are by their 
very nature incongruous and cannot live side by side without creating fissures in 
the body politic” (Paulos, 2008, p. 91). Grounding itself in the transition from the 
church to public schools as agents for the dissemination of knowledge and education, 
being modern in Ethiopia constituted a minimal role of the church and a growingly 
important role of secular institutions. Thus, “the image of the new political order 
was drawn in terms of a new ideology: Zamanawi-seletane (modernity), which meant 
modern institutions, modern schooling and modern thinking” (Teshale, 1996, p. 93). 
Even the genesis of modernity in Ethiopia for Paulos signified overcoming religion 
and tradition and is clearly evident in the modernization project of emperor Tewodros. 
As Paulos remarks, “not only was Tewodros anti-clerical, but he saw the development 
of Ethiopia as going necessarily against the influence of the church” (Teshale, 1996, 
p. 94). Thus, the grounds for the struggle between tradition and modernity also took 
the form of education and the dissemination of knowledge.
There is a need to situate the discourse of modernity in existing realities. As such, 
understanding modernity requires situating modernity in social, political, value-
oriented and economic aspects. For Andreas Eshete (2012), starting from its genesis, 
modernity has been an ambiguous project causing controversies centering on questions 
of; To what extent is modernity a clear departure from pre-modern times? How did it 
propagate the exercise of individual freedom, when did it start and where? Based on 
this, Andreas argues, “I doubt that either the key originating elements can be definitely 
singled out or when it first made its appearance can be fixed with finality” (p. 10). 
Furthermore,  most  conceptions  of  history  are  dictated  by  the  myth  of historical 
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progress and history as a linear path of enlightenment. Andreas argues that the project 
of modernity stands without recourse to metaphysical systems and cumulative visions 
of history and one could salvage the notion of modernity as declaring the arrival of the 
unique present and exercise of subjective rationality to examine the human condition.
Thus, the visions of modernity “can exist in the absence of any commitment to grand 
narratives about the course of human history” (Andreas, 2012, p. 11). In heralding 
the prospects of modernity, Andreas also cautions against the other side of modernity 
manifesting itself in asymmetrical power relations, economic inequality, racism and 
destruction of human life. Andreas believes that the mottos of justice and solidarity 
and critique of the feudal order are the manifestations of the Ethiopian discourse of 
modernity. The precursors and multidimensional features of the Ethiopian discourse 
of modernity are witnessed in diverse conduits such as the written philosophy by Zera 
Yacob, the Dekike Estifanos, economic modernization propounded by Gebre-Heywat 
Baykedagn (Andreas, 2012, p. 21) and the political project of modernity that Ethiopian 
rulers introduced serving bureaucratic, material and technical considerations. The 
most radicalized manifestation of Ethiopian modernity finds expression in the 
Ethiopian student movement which questions ascribed status, hierarchical relations 
and envisions equality, justice and freedom guided by socialist principles. Thus 
“Socialism was championed because it would serve the aspiration to bring about 
modernity by revolutionary means” (Andreas, 2012, p. 22). A second major gateway 
to modernity found expression in the aesthetic movement of modernism that is less 
conceptual and more practical and focused in the transient and suppressed. A large 
continuum didn’t emerge between the student movement and modernism and such 
movements have not “prompted change in the institutions and practices of the practical 
world” (Andreas, 2012, p. 25). Comparing the impacts of the student movement with 
the aesthetic movement of modernity, it is the former one that planted the seeds for 
societal transformation, whereas the later was highly conceptual and abstract. 
Witnessing the political project of modernity in Ethiopia as centralization and cultural 
assimilation, democracy is situated in the politics of recognition and equal participation. 
Furthermore, there is an attempt to institute a system of federalism that realizes the 
needs of nations, peoples and nationalities. Although in the Ethiopian context, the 
colonial thesis cannot explore or fully capture the nature of cultural contact and 
interaction, internally the introduction of a monarchical regime, common trade routes 
and religious rivalry have exerted a significant influence over the culturaldynamics 
and encounters. The relations amongst cultures were ones of trying “to intermarry and 
establish commercial links as well as to unite against common enemies and of course, 
to fight with each other for regional primacy” (Alemseged, 2004, p. 593). Such a 
moral fabric and ethos of interdependency persisted throughout modern Ethiopian 
history. Still, going beyond a homogenization of cultures and also a secessionist  path
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which abandons a common cause, one must further promote “the reign of civic 
nationalism over ethnic nationalism” (Alemseged, 2004, p.  614). Clearly articulating 
the nature of modern Ethiopian history seems to be a difficult task. On one hand, there 
is a unionistcause which in tracing Ethiopia’s long historical past situates the cultural 
encounters as setting the stage for a common identity, societal solidarity and striving 
for a common cause. On the other extreme, there is an attempt to underscore relations 
of hierarchy, exclusion, superiority and inferiority dictating cultural encounters and 
dynamics in the Ethiopian context. 
Against the argument on assimilation and dominance of one cultural group and 
identity, some argue that modern Ethiopia is founded on a power politics that favored 
the elite and nobility rather than a specific cultural identity. Such critics “posited that 
rather than a monopoly of one group, the system was based on elite integration and 
was open to all with proven military, political, or administrative skills” (Tesfaye, 
2005, p. 59). Looking at the dynamics of power relations, historical transformation 
and cultural integration in modern Ethiopia, Tesfaye identifies three major periods that 
exerted a lasting impact on the power dynamics. These constitute feudal economy, 
communist ideology and federal state structure. This shows that “each stage involved 
unique state-society struggles” (Tesfaye, 2005, p. 70). It is based on such historical 
trajectory that equal participation is situated as the ultimate solution to the politics of 
identity in Ethiopia. 
Generally, the historian Alemseged Abbay (2004) characterizes the quest for 
recognition and politics of identity in Ethiopia as revolving around assimilationist, 
secessionist and accommodation policies. He locates the assimilation policy in 
processes of centralization and modern state building that were initiated by Emperor 
Tewodros’ program of modernization. Secessionist paths emerged as a way of 
challenging the status quo, introducing the causes of a group and quest for recognition. 
Being fueled by familiarity with ideas of secularism and modernity, an attempt was 
made to challenge assimilationist policies. Here, “the intelligentsia and the nascent 
middle class produced by Ethiopia’s exposure to modernity had to determine whether 
sub-nationalisms bound to pass from their benign level to a malignant stage inter-
communal bickering had to veer towards settlement or confrontation” (Alemseged, 
2004, p. 599). In between the centralized and local, assimilationist and secessionist 
policies, Alemseged locates an accommodative option that seeks to balance the cause 
for ethnic identity with state building, by giving groups and identities the ultimate 
power to decide on their belongingness to a political entity. Once we have situated 
contemporary discussions of democracy in Ethiopia  within  Ethiopia’s  discourse 
ofmodernity, let’s consider the vitality of approaching democracy from a perspective 
of a philosophical analysis of cultural encounters based on the intercultural orientation 
in philosophy (Wimmer, 2002, 2007; Mall, 2000).
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DEMOCRACY AND THE IDEA OF INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY
As a notion and ideal the modern conception of democracy has ancient origins. On 
the dominant Western narrative, its origin can be traced to ancient Greek city states 
and the emergence of a form of administration where the people as a whole directly 
participate in the affairs of their society (Sterba, 2001). Still, there is an attempt at 
creating a Western conception of democracy driven by capitalist economy and the 
virtues of liberalism. Such an effort redefines the very notion of development driven 
by capitalism and is universalistic, consumerist and instrumentalist in its orientation. 
Thus, “in contrast to the past, when traditional knowledge was typically seen as an 
obstacle to development, it is now claimed by some that this is pivotal to discussions 
on sustainable development resource use and balanced development” (Brouwer, 
1998, p. 661).
In today’s world, the existing forces that animate the need for a democratic establishment 
arise from the complexities of the world of globalization and its political, social, 
economic, moral and other challenges. In such a world, the ideals of multiculturalism 
and intercultural participation serve as driving forces for introducing the rights of 
the subaltern and the discarded into the world of neoliberal market economy. Such a 
world also witnesses the reemergence of fundamentalism, extremism and nationalism 
that challenge the existing bounds of the state, local cultures and domestic economies. 
The sociologist Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (2000) witnesses the re-emergence of the 
religious dimension of human life in the growth of Islamic 
[…] fundamentalism in Turkey and some Arab countries, by Muslim diasporas 
in Europe and in the United States, by various Jewish groups, and by 
Evangelical movements in the United States and Latin America; and, secondly, 
the emergence of national-communal movements in south and south-east Asia, 
India, and Sri Lanka. (p. 4)
This necessitates a quest for a normative order and political ideal that can address the 
challenges of today’s global societies. Beyond competing ideologies and diverging 
visions of the state, democracy in today’s world is a question of crises in human 
values, evolving a platform for a discourse on issues of common concern, recognizing 
diversity in different walks of life and the politics of recognizing and  expanding 
thehorizon of Western modernity to different parts of the world. As such, what poses a 
new ground for conflict in the contemporary world is the rise of “multiple (Eisenstadt, 
modernities”, each striving for universality and attempting to appropriate modernity 
2000, p. 4). I will focus on a philosophical orientation of intercultural philosophy 
that has the potential to introduce a discussion of values, cultures and processes of 
mutuallearning in today’s conceptions of democracy and the search for a political 
ideal that can realize an equal participation of diverse cultures and identities. 
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In the world of philosophy, intercultural philosophy originated as a way of questioning 
Eurocentric tendencies that situate Western modernity as the genesis and culmination 
of of human civilization and progress. Hand in hand with a critique of absolutistic 
claims, intercultural philosophy also tried to create the space for affirming different 
cultures and initiating a process of mutual learning. Amongst others, the Indian 
philosopher Ram Adhar Mall (2000) situates the practical necessities that animated 
the need for intercultural philosophy and the intimacy of culture and philosophy in 
the quest for understanding ‘the other’ in general. Here, it is the universal implication 
of the modern project and the search for what ultimately underlie diverse grounds of 
truth, which initiates the intercultural search for truth. Such a quest involves cultural, 
philosophical, religious and other forms of aspirations. Mall claims that in terms of 
philosophy, beyond particular associations of the philosophical quest, first philosophy 
glances at the universal. Mall argues, “The general concept of philosophy possesses a 
universal connotation over and above its particular, adjectival qualifications, such as 
Chinese, Indian, European and so on. This connotation gives us the right to speak of 
inter-culturality” (Mall, 2000, p. 1). What are the implications of inter-culturality for 
cultural equality?
As Mall puts it, philosophical efforts are not just abstract concepts devoid of a 
particularities, but culturally oriented realizations, which try to resituate the universal 
within the particular. Here, trying to prioritize one culture over the other in the name of 
pure universality neglects the contextual aspects of all human knowledge. Alongside 
these lines “there is almost no philosophy that can claim to be fully free from influence” 
(Mall, 2000, p. 2). In terms of possible cultural encounters and relationships, Mall 
claims that cultures must be constructed as the locus of dynamism enclosing a process 
of give and take where learning is at a center stage. In highlighting the limitations of 
an isolated conception of a culture, Mall adds that such a position is not rationally 
validated or practically applicable and that it instills relations of asymmetry in the 
world. As such, intercultural philosophy situates itself as a critique of an ethnocentric 
rationality which sacrifices everyday centers of learning for pure abstraction. 
Hence, “any attempt to examine cultures as a closed system is philosophically and 
methodologically unsound and even politically dangerous because it may lead to the 
ideology of “culturalism” which ascribes to a hierarchical gradation of cultures and 
treat others as a means to an end” (Mall, 2000, p. 2).
As the Austrian philosopher Franz Martin Wimmer (2002) establishes it, if truth 
is situated in its nature than in what ways are the insights of different cultures 
communicated? This could be used to utilize individual insights as a way of glancing at 
the universal. Possible responses to cultural encounters have to do with two extremes; 
one looking for a universally valid logic upon which to scrutinize individual cultural 
achievements  and  the  other  one  limiting  all  cognition  to  the particular. Wimmer
CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA
57
claims: “There are two possible ways out of this dilemma; one is to search for a single 
method of reasoning that goes beyond every cultural conditioning […] the second 
way out is to cultivate ethnic particularities and calls that philosophy” (Wimmer, 
2002, p. 14). The specific solution that Wimmer upholds includes a polylogue as a 
modification to the nature of dialogue. Whereas a dialogue occurs amongst two equal 
partners, apolylogue is a process of learning taking place amongst multiple centers 
and partners which have equal voices.
The contemporary radical interpretation which questions Western hegemony is, for 
Mall, an all rounded approach being conducted from different sites and perspectives. 
The first aspect of the interpretive analysis highlights the general picture in which 
Western society’s understanding of its place in the emblem of existence is formulated. 
In a sense, the West gets to glance in its own practices as well as guiding precepts. 
The second aspect exposes Western conceptions of other cultures and communities. 
The philosophical degradation of other cultures and the ideological justification for 
Western supremacy are included. This is followed by the non-European conception 
of its own existence and contributions to universal civilization. Finally, the state of 
analysis also includes the questioning and understanding of the European in the eyes 
of the suppressed non-European. As Mall claims “this new hermeneutic situation also 
bears the label of a fourfold hermeneutic dialectic. First is the way in which Europeans 
understand themselves. Second is the European understanding of non-Europeans. 
Third is the way in which non-Europeans understand themselves and fourth is the way 
non-Europeans draw a picture of Europeans” (Mall, 2000, p. 3). Regarding the goal 
of intercultural philosophy, Mall makes it clear that it is inspired by the need to affirm 
the uniqueness and novelty in the intellectual edifices of the other culture. Thus, it 
stands against the attempt to impose one’s own constructs on the other and exclude 
others from the realms of interaction. To this extent, only an “analogous” hermeneutic 
empowers the other by respecting its uniqueness and individuality. Whenever there is 
a methodological limitation in uncovering the thoughts of the other, the strategy must 
rely on understanding similarities across various cultures. The intent is not reducing but 
tolerating the other in a mutual search for the truth. As such, “analogous hermeneutics 
does not demand the identity of views for for understanding” (Mall,200, p.3).
Wimmer (2007) characterized the spirit of intercultural contact as taking four 
possible forms or modes depending on the process of learning and relations of 
inclusion and exclusion. The first model of expansive centrism assumes that the 
one superior culture which possesses the highest possible wisdom possesses a moral 
right to disseminate such insight by any means necessary (Wimmer, 2007, p. 56). 
Secondly, integrative centrism laminates the idea that only one center is good enough 
to be imitated by others. Here, it is not the superior culture that initiates the conversion 
but  the  inferior  others  in  the  quest  for  clarity and progress. Thus, “one’s own way
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could be thought to be attractive to such a degree that it would be self-sufficient to 
attract and integrate others” (Wimmer, 2007, p. 57). Thirdly, in multiple centrism, 
the essentially different nature of each culture is affirmed, such incommensurability, 
in the end, inhibiting any process of learning whatsoever. Finally, in tentative or 
transitory centrism, truth is situated as a quest for different centers of learning; each 
provisionally enlightening the other. 
According to Mall’s understanding of intercultural encounters amongst various 
cultures, the possible encounters revolve around three major vistas. In a sense, the 
particular response that a given culture develops in intercultural encounters determines 
its conception of the other. The first possible reaction is found in retreating further into 
one’s own culture and engages on a deep cultivation of Indigenous ways of being. 
Here, affirming one’s uniqueness is a way of indirectly discriminating the values of 
others. Secondly, another response resides in simply resisting others and possible 
forms of influence. Finally, the spirit that intercultural philosophy tries to foster is 
found in considering others as equal partners and developing a set of guidelines as 
well as practical approaches, which yield a process of learning. As such, “there is no 
doubt about the cultural embeddedness of philosophy, but this embeddedness does not 
mean the loss of the universalistic application of the generic concept of philosophy” 
(Mall, 2000, p. 4).
One way in which the mutual search for truth is endangered in intercultural encounters 
is found in being a fundamentalist towards one’s own values and degrading the values 
of others. Accordingly, the need to revisit the supremacy of a given philosophical 
tradition must be coupled with questioning the prioritization of one culture over 
another. Such an interpretive situation in intercultural philosophy resists subsuming 
the other, is tolerant, mutually entertaining and analogous in its nature. Thus, “it 
approves of overlapping centers, searches for them, finds them and cultivates them” 
(Mall, 2000, p. 6). In terms of the general goals that it tries to envision, intercultural 
philosophy for Mall entails a broader accommodation of diversity from philosophical, 
political and pedagogical perspectives. In terms of its philosophical aspect, intercultural 
philosophy questions the dominance of one’s philosophy over the others and specially 
the prioritization of Western philosophy over others. This is followed by a theological 
encounter across various conceptions of the divine resulting in diverse and tolerant 
theological aspirations. Then, through its political lenses, intercultural philosophy is 
interested in a participatory and symmetrical power structure that equally utilizes the 
voices of diverse centers. Finally, in its pedagogical centers, intercultural philosophy 
tries to install a gradual process of learning for the realization of a truly accommodating 
universe of discourse. As such, “one of the main reasons for the destructive character 
of cultural and religious (and even political) encounters must lie in the claims of 
exclusive  truth  made by certain cultures. Absolutistic claims are, by nature, violent”
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 (Mall, 2000, p. 8). Rather than prioritizing one center, outlook and horizon over 
the other, intercultural philosophy envisages a process of mutual learning. In 
comparingthe basic tenets of intercultural orientation in philosophy to the multicultural 
one, Mall argued that an intercultural search for underlying similarities offers a better 
alternative to multiculturalism’s advocacy of an isolated and frozen identity. Refusing 
to acknowledge dynamism as the nucleus of a culture and cultural interactions, 
multiculturalism necessarily confines a culture to fixed ways of being. Accordingly, 
“those who overrate identity cannot avoid becoming formalistic, exclusivist, or even 
fundamentalist” (Mall, 2000, p. 9). In a world where Western practices and supremacy 
are being questioned and the viability of a general narrative is being undermined, Mall 
asserts that truth, although situated in a tradition, must not be confined in it.
One major step towards mutual understanding is questioning any form of tendency 
that only prioritizes the one over the many, the false universal over the truly diverse. 
In such a world, intercultural thinking questions the attempt to trace individuality to 
an ultimate origin, explaining others only in our terms and hierarchical gradations 
amongst cultures. In the final analysis, although an individual philosopher aims at 
the universal, such an inquiry is made possible by focusing on the particular. Thus, 
“an intercultural oriented philosopher” is sometimes needed to effectively face a 
dilemma. He or she cannot do good intercultural philosophy with centrism and can do 
no philosophy without a center. I have considered this paradox and have the following 
suggestion; to have a center does not necessarily mean to be centristic” (Mall, 2000, 
p.18). Once the basic tenets of intercultural philosophy are analyzed, let’s identify 
their applications in Ethiopia. 
APPROPRIATING INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHY
In the previous sections, I tried to situate the current discussions on democracy in the 
Ethiopian context within the Ethiopian understanding of political modernity. I also 
argued that democracy in today’s world must take into consideration the  challenges 
of the world of globalization. To this extent, the idea of intercultural  philosophy  and 
different sites of knowledge were entertained. I will try to draw some key lessons 
fromthe idea of intercultural philosophy in terms of resisting eurocentrism, realizing 
dialogical encounters and processes of mutual learning amongst cultures. 
Intercultural philosophy helps to resist ethnocentrism or the idea that only one’s 
cultural background and outlook is superior and paramount compared to others. It 
helps to develop a critique of cultural models of asymmetrical relations. Intercultural 
philosophy also helps to develop a dialogue amongst different groups, cultural 
identities and forms of thought. It fosters a mutual understanding on issues of common 
concern. Mutual  learning  and  identifying  common structural patterns could also be
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facilitated by intercultural philosophy. As we have seen in Ethiopia, the process of 
state building and cultural dynamics is dictated by the existence of a greater diversity 
in terms of language, ethnicity, religious ties and other particular ways of being. 
Furthermore, past attempts to find a space for the articulation of cultural diversity 
have not succeeded in developing a common cause and thereby either abandoned 
cultural identities in the process of state making and national identity or, on the other 
extreme, propounded particular causes that set to undermine the need to strive for a 
common agenda. 
Celebrating pluralism, intercultural philosophy helps a multiethnic polity like Ethiopia 
in numerous ways. Standing against expansive centrism, it critically undermines the 
attempt to disseminate the values of one culture at the expense of others. It also exposes 
reductive attempts to subsume other cultural outlooks intoone’s own cultural construct 
and integrative centrism, which assumes that I argue that certain similarities could be 
exhibited between the federal state structure and intercultural orientations in light of 
recognizing diversity. As we have seen, intercultural philosophy develops the idea of 
truth being found in each center and, hence, resists the supremacy of one culture and 
subsequent hierarchical relations between cultures. Recognizing both universal and 
contextual aspects, it tries to envision a mutual dialogue amongst different centers. 
only one’s cultural outlooks are good enough to be imitated by others. In Ethiopia, 
attempts to analyze cultural encounters and dynamism must be founded on commonly 
shared structural patterns that emerged during Ethiopia’s long historical past and 
served as a source of societal solidarity and as a foundation of social cohesion. 
Furthermore, in studying cultural diversity and dynamism in Ethiopia, one needs to 
be critical about a generalization of specific cultural practices in a general framework. 
As the anthropologist Data De’a remarks regarding the study of diverse cultures on 
a given context, deep relations and connections must be underlined over manifest 
appearances like inhabiting a same physical space. Again, in studying the nature of 
cultures, “the analysis must not be concentrated only on macro level realities, but 
also what is the one fabric that holds individual identities together in a similar scale” 
(De’a, 2000, pp. 164 - 167). Dena Freeman (2000) supports such an argument on 
identifying the diverse aspects of affirming general diversity. As such, subsuming 
differences under a general platform as if they belong to a collectivity, leads into the 
suppression of individual cultures in practice. Freeman argues about the dynamism 
of cultures, “Movement and flux are pervasive at every scale, leading to shared 
ideas, group and clan relations and cultural innovation. It is this dynamic aspect of 
culture that we find fascinating” (Freeman, 2000, p. 20). Thus, one must refrain from 
conceiving Ethiopian cultures as closed systems that are immune to mutual learning 
and participation. Intercultural philosophy could also be understood as a supplement 
to  the  federal structure’s advocacy of empowering different levels of administration.
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In federalism, the power of each constitutive unit in the process of political legitimating 
is developed. Without losing autonomy, regions are being integrated into the federal 
structure. As a consequence, forms of authority are realized in the agreement between 
federal and regional arrangements. Federalism could be situated as a response to 
the challenge of diversity and different modes of life. It is a general devolution of 
power that leads into the coordination between units. This also finds expression in 
intercultural philosophy’s search for different symmetrical sites of knowledge.
As we have seen, intercultural philosophy develops the idea of truth being found in each 
center and, hence, resists the supremacy of one culture and subsequent hierarchical 
relations between cultures. Recognizing both universal and contextual aspects, it 
tries to envision a mutual dialogue amongst different centers. I argue that certain 
similarities could be exhibited between the federal state structure and intercultural 
orientations in light of recognizing diversity.  First, both federalism and intercultural 
philosophy are responses to diversity in terms of culture, geography and modes of life. 
Still, federalism is a state structure and intercultural philosophy a critique within the 
philosophical discourse. Secondly, both of them emerge as a critique of absolutistic 
power relations, federalism challenging the unitary state structure and intercultural 
philosophy, the absolutist tendencies of the Western culture of philosophy. Thirdly, 
in both of them, analysis and power are envisioned in contextual and general levels; 
in federalism, realized in federal and regional levels: and in intercultural philosophy, 
in different sites of knowledge and the universal aspect of the human experience. 
Finally, both of them set the equal participation of cultures and identities as a goal. 
In trying to identify the cultural dimensions of federalism in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian 
philosopher Andreas Eshete (2010) argues that, despite the existence of cultural 
uniqueness and differences in Africa and in Ethiopia in particular, cultural pride and 
the essential worth of cultures are still not affirmed. Thus, he asks, “what explains 
the prevailing disposition in Africa to look askance at federative ideals, among them: 
recognition of cultural pluralism  and  identity;  collective  rights, including  national 
self-determination?” (Andreas, 2010, p. 1). He further  assumes  that  conceptions of 
modernity must be supplanted with ideas of equality of cultures and that one must 
expose the ideological manipulation of cultural diversity in the African context. In the 
Ethiopian case, Andreas Eshete believes that historical consciousness must be taken 
as an ingredient for the federal experience. As such, one must identify what it is within 
Ethiopia’s history that animates federalism. Thus, “to champion the political freedom 
and equality of all cultural communities [...] was to call for the emancipation of 
manywhose cultures and identities had been scorned and their land and labor forcibly 
taken by those who belonged to the politically privileged culture” (Andreas, 2010, 
p. 9). Federalism in its stance towards cultures affirms oneness and simultaneous 
differences, reciprocal relations and a give and take ethos.
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Intercultural philosophy helps to instill an element of pluralism since it recognizes 
the equal importance of all cultures, exposes relations of superiority and inferiority 
and looks for processes of learning amongst different cultures grounded in a shared 
experience and cultural contact. It also treats cultures as dynamic units gradually 
changing to accommodate inputs from the environment and other cultures. Here, 
intercultural concepts of analogous hermeneutics, tentative centrism and polylogue 
(Wimmer, 2002, 2007) could be used to guarantee the equal participation of cultures 
in creating a present-day reality in Ethiopia. As we have considered, the challenge 
in intercultural philosophy is the need to develop an orientation that resists the idea 
of one superior culture and which recognizes the situated nature of truth and aims at 
strengthening the insights of multiple partners conceptualizing the universal. Using 
such concepts as centrism and polylogue, we could emphasize the need to expose 
relations of hierarchy in Ethiopia’s historic past coupled with an affirmation of equality 
in the present scenario. Cultures must not prioritize themselves over one another 
and a mutual dialogue on the Ethiopian condition centering on existential issues of 
development, social problems and understanding should be promoted. Based on this, 
for the realization of the Ethiopian cause, the mutual participation of different cultures 
is a necessary task. As Wimmer showed, the major challenge in cultural encounters is 
the fact that one culture tries to interpret others using one’s own terms. The solution 
lies in recognizing and conversing with different modes of life.  Again, the integrative 
approach only establishes one’s own way as the path to be followed by others that will 
eventually imitate it. Finally, a separative centrism also depicts a world of interaction 
where each culture, focusing on its own integrity develops a secluded orientation. 
Wimmer claims “the main task of the various centers in this view will consist in the 
conservation of their respective identity and heritage and in the differentiation from 
other traditions” (Wimmer, 2007, p. 4). In the final recourse, it is the interplay amongst 
different horizons and cultural origins that leads into intercultural participation. 
CONCLUSION
Discussions of democracy in Ethiopia focus on power relations, politics of identity 
and equal participation. This is predicated on Ethiopian modernity conceived as 
centralization, assimilation and cultural superiority of one group. What is neglected in 
such discussions is the normative, ethical and value oriented conception of democracy. 
Taken from the angle of intercultural participation and relations, democracy could 
also be situated in terms of dialogue, mutual affirmation and enlightenment.  Here, 
intercultural philosophy emphasizes analogous hermeneutics, polylogue and mutual 
quest for the truth. As such, the lessons of resisting ethnocentrism, dialogue and 
mutual learning could be derived from intercultural philosophy.
In  the  Ethiopian  case,  the  uniqueness  of  cultures; forces that serve as catalysts for 
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cultural integration as well as discontent, must be identified. This can only be situated 
in a normative framework that treats all cultures as embedded, situated and recognizes 
the symbiosis between Ethiopian modernity, cultures and processes of modernization.
Applied to the relations amongst cultures, intercultural philosophy emphasizes the 
concepts of polylogue and mutuality. This is based on the exposure of grand claims 
to truth, which yield hierarchical relations amongst cultures. Whereas expansive, 
integrative and separative centrism added to a reductive, hermeneutics conceptually 
negate the other and practically enslave other cultures; the solution lies in situating 
truth as a dialogical search residing in both the objective and relative experience.
Within the Ethiopian context, intercultural philosophy helps to resist ethnocentric 
attitudes that envision hierarchical relations amongst cultures, posits a model of 
cultural pluralism and instills a dialogical encounter amongst cultures and a process 
of learning based on analogous hermeneutic and underlying structural patterns.
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Hope for Tomorrow through Street Children Dialogue
Nigisti Gebreslassie1 and Sonja John2
Abstract
This interview highlights the work of the local Gondar Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) Yenege Tesfa (Hope for Tomorrow) in its attempt to include the 
most vulnerable members of society – orphans and street children – in discussions 
about their needs. While many of Yenege Tesfa’s activities in offering vulnerable 
neighbors homes, financial support, education, medical care or jobs-skill training are 
well perceived in Ethiopia, their program “Street Children Dialogue” is less known. 
By reaching out to street children and making their voices, concerns and opinions 
heard, Yenege Tesfa intends to enhance political representation of street children and 
the participatory culture of democracy in Gondar’s streets.
Keywords: Democracy, discussion, vulnerability, street children, Yenege Tesfa
Discussions on democracy and representation tend to focus on institutions, politicians 
and state administrators. This interview looks at ways in which the Ethiopian NGO, 
Yenege Tesfa, gets street children actively engaged into discussions about their 
situation, needs and prospects. Since 2001, Yenege Tesfahas has been working 
to provide homeless and/or parentless children in Gondar with more and better 
opportunities. This includes providing homes for more than 400 children, as well as 
access to education, health care, counselors and vocational training. The approach is 
holistic and is based on an empowerment strategy. The goal of the NGO is to increase 
skills, capabilities and capacities for a self-determined brighter future. The founder 
and manager of Yenege Tesfa, Nigisti Grebreslassie, explains to political scientist 
Sonja John about the practical aspects and theoretical prospects of the NGO’s street 
children dialogue.
Sonja John: What was the idea behind initiating the street children dialogue?
1 Nigisti Gebreslassie is founder and manager of the non-government and charity organization “Yenege 
Tesfa” in Gondar, Ethiopia.  Contact: nigist@yenegetesfa.org 
2 Dr. Sonja John is assistant professor for Civics and Ethical Studies at the University of Gondar, Ethiopia. 
Contact: sonja.z.john@gmail.com
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Nigisti Gebreslassie: In Gondar, we always have hundreds of children living on the 
streets. Some live separate from their families, others do not have any relatives. Living 
on the streets means that they are in a very vulnerable position. They face multiple 
challenges and problems but society at large does not listen to them. They also do not 
have a safe place where they can go to discuss their experiences. We invite them to sit 
together and thus empower them and themselves to discuss their problems and how 
they might find possible solutions.
Sonja: Who attends the meetings?
Nigisti: They are mostly boys aged between fourteen and eighteen. There are not too 
many girls living on the streets.
Sonja: What are the most common reasons as to why children who have family 
choose to move out?
Nigisti: It is mostly poverty related. Another reason is caused by divorce or other 
forms of family disruption. In many cases, there is a lack of family planning resulting 
in families with many children. Some parents are not able to support all their children 
so some of those children have to leave the house.
Sonja: How often do they meet?
Nigisti: We offered the dialogue sessions once a week. But not everybody can attend 
each week because they also have to work. So, they decided to meet every second 
Saturday. Our social workers and mobile school teachers organize the meetings since 
they are already working closely with the street children. The children know that there 
is someone there who they can trust and that is very important. The social workers 
guide them but do not judge them. We also feed them and show movies or provide 
them with other forms of entertainment.
Sonja: Who is setting the agendas for the dialogue sessions?
Nigisti: The children themselves set the agendas. When we started with the dialogues, 
we gave training to who we call street leaders. We trained them to lead these meetings. 
We do not bring them any certain topics or a set agenda. They are the ones who 
develop the agendas and prioritize the topics. We do not interfere in the dialogue 
unless there are grave misunderstandings. Once they talked about HIV and that it can 
easily be transmitted by sharing a meal or sitting together. The social worker clarified 
that but usually we do not interfere; the social workers are only there to listen in. It 
is the goal that the children talk to each other. Usually they share their experiences 
regarding safer places to sleep and safer sleeping arrangements. They come up with 
the topics  because  we  do not have the experience; they are the ones who live on the
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streets and have gained experience and knowledge in these situations. They know the 
problems that they face and are more likely to come up with good ideas.
Sonja: Which topics do they discuss during the meetings? 
Nigisti: They discuss different topics. They are mostly about how to survive in the 
streets despite not having food, not having clothes, not having a place to sleep or how 
to avoid sexual violence. They also discuss prospects on how to have a better life, 
possible ways to get education and income and information about support systems. 
It is difficult to find solutions individually and that is why we bring them together so 
that they can share how they go through their lives now and what they can do to attain 
better lives.
One topic that reappears has to do with pedophiles or other forms of sexual violence 
and abuse. They either have experienced it themselves or know someone who has. 
But it is still one of the most difficult situations to deal with. They do not know if 
they should report it to the police or ignore it. They do not trust the police because 
often they are not treated nicely by them. If a son is beaten, he can turn to his parents 
for help. But orphans and street children lack this support system. When they go to 
the police, they are perceived as being the source of the problem and mostly no one 
will be charged. When our boys reported being raped to the police, the police did not 
believe them. So, the children do not have any confidence to talk about it because they 
may get treated as the problem, not as a victim who deserves justice.
Sonja: How does Yenege Tesfa react to what they hear?
Nigisti: We advise them, for example, not to go to motel rooms. We have different 
activities for them. We take them to formal schools and provide them with information 
on how they can enrol. We also give them life skills training to open perspectives 
about a different future. We try to help them realize the solutions that these trainings 
could bring about.
Sonja: What are the solutions that they have brought to your table?
Nigisti: For example, some of the boys said that they want to work. They may not 
have a formal education but they want to be useful and earn some money. They are 
willing to work as shoe shiners or vendors in the streets. We also trained some to make 
and sell bracelets, earrings and other handcrafts. We also encourage them to save 
some money, not to spend everything that they earn. 
Sonja: Where do street children save money?
Nigisti: They can save it with us. We keep the money and the bank books safe for 
them. 
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Sonja: The street children are growing, hopefully outgrowing their situations. How 
long do the children stay in the dialogue sessions? Is there a high turnover?
Nigisti: We have many boys who always come but also new boys join us. We also see 
the improvements in their lives. Many now attend school every day although they are 
homeless. Others used to be homeless but now have a street business and can afford 
a bed somewhere. After a while, they get the idea that they have gained all they can 
from the dialogue sessions and that they know how to take care of themselves. If they 
do not come back to the dialogue sessions, we try to reach them through our social 
workers and encourage them to stay in school, save money and participate in some of 
our trainings.
Sonja: Will there be a graduation at some point in the dialogue sessions?
Nigisti: We do not call it a graduation but they get a sense of becoming experts when, 
after so many months, the same topic may come up again and they have discussed it 
before and can give advice to the newer members of the group and empower them. 
Sonja: What is your conception of empowerment?
Nigisti: We focus on different aspects of empowerment but usually start with 
psychological empowerment. Living in the streets involves experiencing trauma. We 
provide counselors and also provide perspectives on different ways of living. They 
should not focus on having problems but ways by which to overcome these problems 
and to embrace opportunities, to grab them. We also believe in the importance of 
self-empowerment. In the street children dialogue sessions, we offer an open and safe 
place where they can share without anyone judging them.
Working with the children is very rewarding because once they trust you, they give 
you their all. They are so loyal and appreciative. Once they trust you, it is so easy to 
communicate with them. The positive energy you give them will be spread by them 
in the future.
Sonja: Do you forward the needs expressed by the children to decision makers?
Nigisti: We write their needs up as part of a report that we share with the government 
and our sponsors. But we do not advise the government on what to do, give 
recommendations or express demands. I think the city government is just overwhelmed 
with the many problems within the community so that they just leave certain topics to 
NGOs to deal with. It could also be the case that they believe social issues are solely 
in the realm of NGOs. For example, the Women and Children Affairs Office could 
work closer  with  us  but  all  they  do  is select children to place with us based on 
the criteria and project descriptions we give them. That is all they do. No prevention,
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no information, no city social workers in the streets. Even for serious problems like 
pedophiles that we brought to their attention and made recommendations about, they 
refused to deal with it claiming it is a taboo in our society. I understand our tradition 
of not addressing taboos and keeping controversial subjects out of conversation but I 
also see that it is killing us inside. We need to open up. The children have a right to be 
protected by the government. The first thing in solving a problem is to acknowledge 
that there is a problem. Street children are citizens too and the government has a 
responsibility to care for them. They cannot leave all social problems to NGOs and 
religious institutions.
Sonja: Is the city administration involved in informing the public about some of the 
issues that the street children have to deal with?
Nigisti: Not really. For example, people refuse to talk about homosexuality. Of course, 
hardly any homosexuals are pedophiles but this is a widely held misconception 
because people do not talk about sexual orientation. Nobody, really nobody in Gondar 
talks about homosexuality, gays or lesbians. For many people, it is a sin so you do 
not talk about it at all. Homosexuals are not able to talk about their desires. You can 
imagine the psychological and emotional stress involved. Even my own friends who 
are more progressive ignore me when I want to address this issue. They know that I 
am heterosexual but they tell me outright that they do not want to talk about this. Of 
course, our teenagers cannot mention their own orientation if it diverts from the norm.
Sonja: Democracy is about representation, participation and political decisions being 
made which equally benefit everybody’s needs. How can we ensure that the street 
children’s issues are also being heard?
Nigisti: I fear we are too far away from the decision makers. Everybody’s voice 
should be heard but I do not see that in reality. People with little access to information 
and material wealth are not properly represented within our system of democracy. 
The government still has a lot to do in order to hear and represent every citizen. We 
still have a long way to go to combine the whole society as one. We try to serve as 
mediator between the most vulnerable members of society and the government. Right 
now, we are disappointed in the lack of responses to our reports. We provide directly 
for some immediate needs like shelter, food and advice. But the state policies need to 
change and that is something the government has to do.
Sonja: What are your future plans for the street children dialogue sessions? 
Nigisti: We want to continue to create our own safe zone. We want to build a youth 
center or recreation center where the street children dialogue sessions and numerous 
other activities can take place. We are getting more children and also more children of
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different age groups. Next year, we want to open separate groups so that the teenagers 
do not have to hold back when younger boys are in the room. We want them to be free 
to share whatever they want to talk about.
CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA
71
Aspects of the History of “Queens of peace and 
co-existence”: the dubarti and their qoti in Jamma, 
South Wallo
Ebrahim Damtew1
Abstract 
This study is about the prestigious institution of mothers called dubarti in Jamma 
wereda, South Wallo. The objective is to investigate the role of the dubarti in peace 
building. Sources for the research were drawn from primary and secondary data. The 
people of Ethiopia are considered as patriarchal, which means that males dominate 
the entire life system. Women, in such studies, are ascribed as the least participants, 
subordinate, victims and dependent on whatever homegrown institutions are in 
place. This general conclusion is misleading in a way that overshadows the immense 
contribution and role modeling activities of elderly women. For instance, the dubarti, 
whom I like to call “queens of peace and coexistence” were credibly recognized in 
various social issues such as conflict management. In summary, the dominant notion 
that Ethiopian women had been cultural victims rather than givers and builders of 
culture is a mere generalization that needs rethinking.
Keywords: Dubarti, coexistence, conflict resolution, Jamma
Until very recently, the scientific community and political elites remained reluctant 
to recognize women’s competence for decision making and carrying out public 
responsibilities to the highest levels (Original, 2002; Eskedar, 2015). It is also believed 
that the introduction of Western democratic institutions in Africa served as a bringer 
to the fore of gender issues. However, studies on Indigenous societies in Africa such 
as Kenya and Tanzania, pointed out that elderly African women have held remarkable 
roles in those societies as agents of peace and coexistence (Snyder, 1997, p. 562). 
1 Ebrahim Demtaw is assistant professor at the Department of History and Heritage Management at the 
University of Gondar. Contact: damtewebrahim@gmail.com
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Such an experience was also true among various ethnic groups, communities and 
regions of Ethiopia. For instance, Jemila and his associates (2014) note that elderly 
women have indispensable roles in conflict settlement in different parts of Ethiopia. 
Wallo area is one of these regions where, in the past, elderly women exercised their 
societal leadership responsibilities in local courts alongside their male counterparts 
known as abagars. They shared in the societal wellbeing bymanaging peace and 
order, working on natural calamities, issues of fertility and ensuring the continuity of 
culture. These elderly women were called dubarti and were honored and adored by the 
community. A dubarti’s honor was not fully in place without their blessed stick which 
is called qoti. This was particularly true in cases where there was a conflict to settle 
in front of the contestants when the role of the qoti, a symbol of peace and blessing, 
was paramount. They also initiated prayers and the female spirit atete with their ritual 
symbol called chele. Scholars from various fields of study such as history, economy, 
linguistics, anthropology, folklore, philology and others studied various aspects of the 
people in the study area, South Wallo, where Jama wereda is found (Asnake, 1983; 
Hussien, 2001). The role of the abbagars (Shimagle), which are agents of Indigenous 
conflict resolution, had been studied in some districts of Wallo (Birhan, 2002 A.M.; 
Meron, 2010; Netsanet, 1998 A.M.; Molla, 1999 A.M.). These passing references 
might not give a full picture of Indigenous conflict management strategies in Wallo as 
a whole as they totally neglected the role of elderly women in the making. The current 
study is an attempt to fill in aspects of those gaps in local history and culture. As far 
as the existing literature is concerned, up to now, no research has been conducted on 
conflict resolution in Jamma wereda wherein the present study is focused. This study 
therefore aimed at exploring aspects of the historical roles of dubarti (elderly women) 
in conflict resolution in Jamma wereda. 
The method employed in this particular research is qualitative and used both primary 
and secondary data sources. Purposely selected knowledgeable elderly informants 
from both sexes were contacted for interview, during which leading questions 
prepared ahead of time and based on the objective of the study were used. The life 
stories of some informants were also included regarding dubarti’s role in the society. 
Oral history sources such as poems and sayings were also systematically included 
based on their content and themes to show how important traditions are to understand 
the subject being investigated.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study has three major headings. The introductory section is comprised of a 
general background, methods, concept of conflict, conflict resolution and an overview 
of  African and Ethiopian customary conflict resolutions.The second and the main 
part is  devoted to  sources  of  conflict  in the study area, geographical and historical
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description, conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms, the dubarti, elders in 
peace making, positions of the dubarti in the society and, finally, the paper contains 
precise concluding remarks.
THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT
Studies on conflict provide different definitions and conceptual meanings depending 
on existing cultural settings. For example, Fisher (cited in Solomon, 2014) defines 
The Ethiopian experience is not an exception. It is a country of diversity with different 
conflict as “an incompatibility of goals or values between two or more parties” (p. 
102). In addition, Birhan (2002 A.M.) defines conflict as part of human experience 
inevitable in all human interactions. Swanstram and Weissmam defined conflict 
as the outcome of antagonistic interest over resources of whatever kind (cited in 
Gonfa, 2014, p. 16). Gonfa further pointed out that “conflict is a situation in which 
two or more parties endeavor to acquire the similar scarce resources at the same 
time”. Similarly, Jemila (2014) proceeds in defining conflict as a disagreement of 
people due to differences in interest or ideology. She further elaborates her standby 
saying disagreement among people is a natural and unavoidable act that all humanity 
encounters in daily life.
Having such definitions and descriptions in mind, we can summarize conflict as a 
social friction of parties or individuals that arises from emotions or selfishness over 
resources or other factors. In contrast to the above descriptions, informants in the 
study area perceived conflict in a simpler and easier sense. For them, conflict has 
no meaning beyond the sense of  “no peace no war“ between individuals or groups. 
However, conflicts of all kinds have something in common − requiring settlement. 
For settlement to be effective, prior knowledge of the local context and attitudes are 
indispensable (interviews with sheikh Ahmed, Hussien, Feleke, Alemu, 2015).
Conflict resolution, as a phrase, is perceived differently by different scholars. Some 
perceive conflict resolution as an activity which may include mediation, negotiation, 
reconciliation or arbitration (Meron, 2010; Assefa, 2005). Others consider conflict 
resolution as a process followed while resolving conflicts and focus on joint action to 
bring about acceptable solutions for all parties (Esayas, 2015; Gonfa, 2014; Jemila, 
2014).  Murithi  (2006)  states  that  conflict resolution is a means by which to 
create peace and rebuild social harmony between combatants. Accordingly, conflict 
resolution strategies can be divided into two − formal and informal − mechanisms.
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION
African societies have developed customary conflict resolution practices and 
‘democracy’ (Joseph, 1999; Bahru, 2002; Yacob, 2002). In the continent, the idea and
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practice of ‘democracy’ include: respect for elders, tolerance, coexistence, 
communality, mutuality, patience, self-control, moderation, open mindedness, 
honesty and hospitality (Murithi, 2006; Assefa, 2005). Studies have shown that 
modest families and other combatants rarely take their cases to formal courts (Murithi, 
2006; Walelign, 2015). Elders are at the center of conflict resolution. This is because 
they are knowledgeable about the traditions and rituals and are thereby respected as 
trustworthy mediators. 
The Ethiopisn experience is not an exception. It is a country of diversity with different 
languages, religions and nationalities whose unique cultural practices often overlap 
(Walelign, 2015; Bahru, 2002; Yacob, 2002; Getachew, 1998; Dejene, 2002). It is 
common to hear a popular saying which bears witness to the indispensable role of 
customary conflict resolution in the society: “Bad reconciliation is better than smooth 
litigation”. This applauds the significance of customary conflict resolution where 
parties are wholeheartedly encouraged by the tradition to forgive each other before the 
authority of peace. One cannot find himself or herself a winner or a loser. However, 
in the formal court system, there had been many injustices, such as perjury, nepotism 
and other related partialities. Although someone wins the case, the scar remains for 
the loser, therefore peace might not be long lasting. For this reason, many people 
in Ethiopia are not interested in the formal resolution system. Additional deterrents 
include; high costs, fears of corruption and prolonged time spans in waiting for 
decisions (interviews with Tafaraand Reshid, 2015; Meron, 2010; Birhan, 2002 AM). 
So far, studies in Ethiopia witness that traditional institutions were and are still playing 
remarkable roles in matters that have always customarily belonged to them. 
SOURCES OF CONFLICTS IN THE STUDY AREA
Conflicts in Jamma, as elsewhere, may vary from minor interpersonal disagreements 
to a serious dispute which might eventually lead to homicide (interview with Hawaand 
Beshir, 2015). The most common reason for conflict in Jamma arises from land issues 
(interview with Hawa, Beshir, 2015). Almost all of the people of Jamma are farmers 
who live off farming and rearing animals. The main contentious issue is that of 
inheritance which, in olden days, manifested itself by court litigation, disagreements 
of husband and wife, denial of money between people, insult, theft, burning houses, 
killing and beating a man/woman (interview with Muzeyen and Feleke, 2015).
Geographically, the study area is located in the southern tip of the present day South 
Wallo Zone bordering with Mida, Gishie Rabel, Woreilu, Menz, Gera Midir Weremo, 
Laybet and Tachbet and Kellalla weredas. Historically, Jamma wereda is a melting 
pot of the region’s societies and languages, where coexistence and cross boundary of 
cultures and social lives are well entrenched and pronounced (interview with Hawa 
and Beshir, 2015; Hussien, 2001). 
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The people of Jamma are not exceptional in the strategies and established institutions 
that they use in conflict resolution. Their experience and traditions are similar with 
the rest of the country although there are some dialectical differences. As elsewhere 
in Ethiopia, the sacred trees, shrines and compounds of religious institutions, such as 
Churches and Mosques, are places where the elders meet to deal with conflict. In such 
areas of convergence, everyone is expected to speak only the truth (Esayas, 2015; 
interviews with Hussien and Beshir, 2015).
Conflict resolution has its own processes and procedures depending on the nature 
of the conflict. Some might be solved very easily and other may take more time to 
resolve. Historically, there were four types of institutions to settle larger scale conflict 
in the study area. These are ante (family council) for very brief and family conflict 
settlement, abbagars/shemagle/anddubarit (country judges) and the Mesal (visiting 
holy place of former saints). The shimagle institutions were and still are responsible 
for serious conflicts involving for example murder or blood feuds and those of spirit 
reconciliation (interviews with Hussien and Beshir; Ayelech, 2015). Dealing with each 
of these is not the objective of the study. Nevertheless, all were important institutions 
for conflict settlement and harmonious life amongst the study area population. 
The dubarti were the “divine sources of blessing and fertility” and thus made up a 
sacred category of the society. Moreover, in Jamma, the term dubarti refers to the 
elderly and prestigious women of the society who were working together for the 
wellbeing of the community (interview with Asiya and Yesuf,  2013). The dubarti 
role in the customary cultural practices such as those related to conflict settlement 
is the one worth mentioning in this scenario. These are values related to morality, 
fairness, integrity, trustworthiness, respect for elders and traditions and the like. 
Councils of women elders such as the institution of dubarti were established to 
discharge responsibilities vested  upon  them  in  the society, particularly with regard 
to matters related to peacebuilding, environmental issues and fertility. The dubarti 
were culturally empowered. As will be highlighted, their activities and engagements 
were directly related to pacification or diversion of manmade and natural calamities 
imposed on the society in general. These elderly women go beyond their gandaa/
neighborhood. Local evidence witnessed that their symbolic value was great for the 
society regardless of religion or ethnicity (interview with Ali and Damtew Worku, 
2013).
They were considered as leaders of public prayers and as having a different spirit 
from other women of the society. It is the responsibility of the dubarti to mediate the 
female spirit atete for those women who celebrate the ritual ceremony. Other than 
their knowledge and skill of working for peace, they were called whenever natural 
disasters struck. The dubarti gathered together along the river bank or near the sacred
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trees with other women to perform prayers coupled with ritual ceremonies. These 
factors all demonstrate the leadership role women elders had in defending their 
communities (interview with Muzeyen and Abolu, 2014). 
ELDERS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEMAKING
Be they male or female, elders in the study area were respected and venerated for their 
tremendous engagement in society (interview with Muzeyen and Abolu, 2014). 
Every matter of the society that needed critical evaluation was usually managed 
by these elders. Male councils of elders were usually called abagars or shimagles. 
Members of this council of elders were elected by seemingly free and democratic 
means by their respective villages. The abagars numbered more than three in any 
occasion of conflict settlement. Their number varies from three to seven whereas this 
number varies from three to five in the case of dubarti (interviews with Ayelech, 
Bizuye and Reshid, 2015). The below popular saying is about elders’ competence and 
capacity in their knowledge, skill and attitude and overall knowledge of the culture 
and tradition. 
In another instance, a popular proverb used in the community to express the 
position elders held in the society states: “ባለጌን በእርቅ ወይፈን ንበድርቅ” (offender 
with reconciliation and a bull with drought). Offenders are always dangerous for 
governance but they can be shaped towards peace with the persuasive words of the 
shimagle/abagars or dubarti. The same is true for a young bull which cannot be easily 
persuaded to plough. Hence, the dry season is good to shape and train than during 
times of abundance (interviews with Tafara, Bekelech and Ahmed, 2015). These 
councils of elders ruled the public in line with yahagerquna (the law of the land) 
sometimes named after founding fathers Yaamariedembe. When any sort of conflict, 
trivial or serious in nature, occurred in the community, the council of elders strove to 
settle matters in a peaceful way without harming any of the conflicting parties. The 
council of elders’ requests that the disputants handle their problems by means of a set 
of expressions and sayings (interview with Bizuye, 2015). The dubarti with their qoti 
(blessed stick) persuade the victims by sharing experiences and traditions to come to 
terms. These statements in which their experiences are shared are very important as 
they illustrate the capability of elders in retrieving and rehearsing traditions for peace 
building. Here are some examples:
Do not forget the law of the land. 
If you are out of it your fate will not be good.
You know it can dry a living tree not least a human being
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Respect it just for peace
(Interview with Abebu, 2015).
As such, elders cite more articulate sayings which are persuasive enough to enable the 
message of the shimagle to be accepted “አገር መርቻም መረቻም ነው” (in the law of 
the land, you would win and/or lose). The law of the land belongs to everyone. It is 
not there to hurt some and favor the other. One of my key informants (Hussien, 2013) 
pointed out this ethos in the following way: 
You would be penalized if you go against it and vice versa. If you are persuaded 
to accept the customary law, you must accept that you are not a loser. You 
forgive your combatant as per the custom. He/she must also do the same in 
front of the elders. You therefore take the riches of blessings for the good of 
your future.
The concept of customary laws and settlement procedures are indications of win-
win strategy which is an aspect of refined ‘democracy’. My key informant (Yesuf, 
2013) summarized what the dubarti’s have meant to him in the past in peace making 
amongst the public: “ዱባርቲዎች ዘንጋቸውን /ቆቲቸውን /ከደጃፍካቆሙ ይከበራል፡፡ ማንም 
አይተላለፈውም፡፡ አማራጭም የለም መታረቅእንጂ፡፡ ዱበርቲዎች ልክ እንደ አበጋሮች ሁሉ 
የአገር አፍና ወኪል ስለሆኑ ተደማጭነት ነበራቸው፡፡” (The dubarti were an important 
segment of the society as were abagars. Their qoti was also respected. They were the 
mothers of the land and the people).
Another important issue worth mentioning accomplished by the abagar was a swearing 
of an oath to finalize the agenda of warfare between parties. This is called “የጃማበሌ” 
compound term ‘Jamma’ as  we  have  seen  is the name of the study areabele denotes 
an oath in the name of “Jamma”, the founding father of the land and the people. The 
oath can be “ጃማበህሩይዋጠኝ” (May I sink in the sea of Jamma). This is a mechanism 
within the tradition to ensure loyalty for the land and the people of the study area. 
Someone who passed an oath in front of elders repeats it in order to prove innocence. 
In the case of the dubarti “የነነየ ጀበና ይፋረደኝ” (let the coffee ritual of elderly mothers 
[eneneye] pass judgment at me). Another oath sentence includes “ቃሌን ሳፈርስ ሰውነቴ 
ይፍረስ!” (If I failed to respect my words, I better die). An additional form of oath 
showing respect for the law of the land and the public is “ማን ይሙት!፣ ሀገር ይሙት”!” 
(Who dies? The country dies!)
Swearing an oath in the name of a country, as we have seen above, has tremendous 
pressure on the oath performer. It has greater implications for the parties to come to 
terms and assures inevitable peace for the community. After long processes have been 
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gone through to reconcile parties, the elders used to bless in the following way to wish 
good things for the conflicting parties and for the country in general:
Let God please the land
Let God accept our call
Let the words be blessed…. 
(Interview with Bekelech, 2015).
As part of reconciliation, the guma ceremony was also very important in the study 
area. This ceremony involved compensation in terms of money or cattle for the dead 
family member in the case of homicide. The money paid for compensation was not 
derived directly from the killer’s own wealth, however rich he was, he had to be 
chained and go from door to door to beg for money for compensation. This is to teach 
others that killing is inhuman (interviews with Reshid and Bekelech, 2015). For minor 
cases, such as beating other than killing, a gift called qeq for aiding the recovery of the 
wound is given. Informants rehearse two very telling couplets composed for singing 
where one tells about his or her feelings. The poems are associated with guma and 
express longing between two partners who were once in good partnership but later 
lost that relationship and wanted to resume what they had lost.
ወንድ
እንደነህ እንደነሺ አንባባልም ወይ 
ሰው ካባቱ ገዳይ ይታረቅ የለም ወይ
Wouldn’t it be good if we greet each other?
It is clear that a man/woman reconcile with his/her father’s killer.
ሴት
ሰው ካባቱ ገዳይ የሚታረቀው
ባገር ሽማግሌ ጉማ በልቶ ነው (Ahmed, 2015)
A man or a woman comes into terms,
It is due to the work of the council of elders,
That the harmed party was compensated with guma.
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The couplets carried valuable social lessons. The first thing is that for peace to prevail, 
round table discussion and communication between parties are important. The other 
thing that surfaced in the couplet is the notion of “win-win” in the combatant’s needs 
and interests. To enable this to be possible, there would be a revisiting of customary 
practices of conflict settlement based on the law of the land. “የበደለ ክሶ የተበደለ ተክሶ” 
(the harmer compensates the harmed). This ritualistic situation is known as guma. The 
role of the actors of the whole process is also mentioned in the couplets in one way 
or in another. As such, in both couplets, the fathers are duly acknowledged for their 
knowledge and skill in bringing about peace and harmony in the society. As the same 
time, it is also clear how deep rooted was their role in society.
POSITIONS OF THE DUBARTI IN SOCIETY
A study of African society pointed out that “the woman was far from being excluded 
from power in black Africa. She took an important part in it, at least in certain 
societies” (Joseph, 1999, p. 144). Similarly, the cultural and philosophical position 
attributed to the dubarti within the study area are important in this regard.
The dubarti usually undertook many initiatives in the society. When they realized that 
peace did not exist in the community, that nothing was going right: people were ill, 
drought was continuing, the land no longer produced good crops, there were many 
deaths in the community, there were epidemics, a member of the community was 
suffering from or died of a serious disease and/or some members were experiencing 
difficulties linked to community life, a prayer or ritual might be held for the wellbeing 
of the country (interviews with Muzeyen and Abebu, 2014). 
The dubarti had spiritual power that resided not only in themselves but also in their 
walking sticks called qoti. In some regions of Ethiopia, for instance in Arsi, this qoti was 
called sinqee stick. Sinqee is a symbol of Oromo women’s rights. According to Jemila 
(2014), the sinqee stick was given to a woman in order to protect her rights. The sinqee 
was traditionally used on a number of different occasions: it was the holders of these 
sticks who led prayers during special occasions. This was done when the community 
faced problems, such as lack of rain, infertility, disease among human and livestock 
and in times of political instability and war. Informants have due respect for the qoti, 
which I came to understand was due to the perception of its spiritual power (interview 
with Bekelech, 2015). The respect vested to qoti seems cultural and religious and is 
associated with the spiritual power of the dubarti. Local evidence pointed out that 
women are feared and respected because of their charismatic, kind personalities and 
knowledge of traditions. It was believed that women are religiouslysuperior and are 
heard faster in the Kingdom of God as compared to men; something which explained 
their closeness to God. Women are closer to God because they are more humble, soft
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and innocent. “Their spirits are with God”. These are qualities which are attributed 
to the fact that God listened more to women than to men and were amongst others 
articulated within the following belief: “What a woman blesses will be blessed, what 
she curses will be cursed. ”If the wrongdoer does not accept his faults, the elders and 
the women could curse and place other social sanctions on the offender” (interviews 
with Mohamed Ali and Damtew Alyou, 2013).
The following poems and extracts act as witnesses for the institution:
ዱበርቲ ያልሽው ይሁን
ሳይዘገይ ያውም አሁን (Abolu, 2014)
May your payer heard in the kingdom of God, dubie
May the blessing of God come true now
As the center of the prayer, be it for blessing or curse, the dubarti used to sing a 
song with their own particular rhythm and melody to communicate with God the 
creator to hear them and to give them responses as per their requests and prayers.
CALL FOR PUBLIC PRAYER
As leaders of society, the dubarti had various responsibilities beyond local 
affairs of peace making. This included invoking prayers for fertility, disease, 
natural calamities and other social crisis nationwide.
ልጄን ያለች አሁን ትመጣለች፣
ባሌን ያለች አሁን ትመጣለች፣
ሀገርያለች አሁን ትመጣለች፡፡ (Hawa, 2015)
A lady with concern for her kids’ wellbeing will join us soon,
A lady with due concern for her husband’s wellbeing will join us soon
A lady with concern for the country’s wellbeing will join us soon
It is customary to see prayers done in groups, spearheaded by the dubarti or 
abagars, under the sacred tree or along river banks or other vast areas in response 
to the ongoing crisis. In this case, irrespective of religion or any difference, 
the public joined together, forgiving each other for any disagreements. It is for 
this tradition that the above verses were composed and sung by dubarti in their 
leadership of the public in general and their female compatriots in particular. 
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It is with this togetherness in prayer that the eminent dubarti of the 20th century 
Jamma composed couplets to show their leadership, friendship and success 
stories in their prayers and winning peace and co-existence:
አንድ በሬ አይስብም ያለመቀኛጆ፣
ብርዘገን ሀሰን ጀንየ ወዳጆ፡፡ (Interview with Hussien Yimer, 2015)
An ox cannot plough alone but with another partner
Likewise, Birzegen Hassen and Jenye Wodajo, Birzegen and Jeneto were close 
friends throughout their peacemaking process and prayers. They are remembered 
by this couplet in the study area. “An ox cannot plough without his partner 
similarly conflict or any other matter is not solved with one mind.” This reality 
prevailed in the works and the names of the above mentioned elderly women.
RESPECT FOR THE DUBARTI
There are a number of instances that the public rejoices and shows feelings of respect 
towards the institution of the dubarti in social media including in Islamic religious 
songs and poetry called menzuma and in the secular music:
በእናቷዱበርቲ ባባቷ አበጋር
በለስየቀናው ነው ከርሷጋር ሚኖር (interview with Mahmud, 2015)
Her mother is dubarti and her father abagar
What a lucky one her partner in life is
In the above verse, the message rests on that she is blessed because she is the daughter 
of an abagar and dubarti. Since sons and daughters of such people are well informed 
about the humanistic values pertinent to social life, they become an asset to any family.
የወሎ ዱበርቲ ደጋጎቹ መጀን
በነካካው እጅህ እኛንም ፈርጀን
The wallo dubarti, the righteous 
May God bless us in their line.
የዱበርቲ ልጅ የሀገር እናት
እኩል የምታይ ያምላክ በርከት (interview with Mahmud, 2015)
The son of the dubarti, the mother of all people
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The dubarti on whom the blessing of God rest, 
There is justice in their endeavors.
In the above two couplets, God is mentioned in addition to the sacred and blessed 
personality of the dubarti. With the work of the dubarti, there are also contained the 
blessings of God − proving their power and legitimacy. As such the issues of fairness, 
justice and righteous are depicted clearly to the dubarti. That is why praising and well 
thought out couplets are shared amongst the community and beyond.
Case 1
My name is Hussien Endeshaw. Now, I’m close to 80. I was born and grew 
up in Jamma wereda in a village called Gauagurie. We knew details about 
the institution of dubarti. They were recognized peacemakers. I remember 
what the Emperor did in thanks for their blessed work in society. That 
could be considered as recognition. The elderly women selected to dubarti 
membership were forerunners in every aspect. Allah, the creator, is also with 
them. Whatever they did was accepted by everyone regardless of religion 
or ethnicity. They showed their cultural power against offenders with their 
calls for peace. I remember their prayers and blessings for peace and societal 
wellbeing. (Interview with Hussien, 2013)
Case 2
Falaka Gesit, one of my key informants, added his knowledge on the tradition of 
dubarti. Above all, he remembers the following issues. He said:
I’m native to Jamma and grew up here. I do not know any place in the country 
other than this region. I remember phrases which govern the community 
irrespective of religion or any other initiation. The blessed ritual of eneneye 
Jebena (coffee pot of elderly mothers) was the reference for everyone to 
prove innocence or to show that someone is honest and trustworthy. The ritual 
practices of the dubarti usually governed the land more than government 
soldiers or police force that are considered as locusts and appeared only for 
limited times and left things without solving them from the root of the problem. 
(Interview with Falaka, 2015)
Case 3
Another important experience on the dubarti tradition comes from one of the grandsons 
of the renown dubarti women in Jamma wereda, from a village called Debreguracha. 
Eneneye  Birzegen  Hassen  is  my  grandmother. She was known for her work
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as a mother of peace and other societal leadership roles. Her prayers and 
blessingswere respected by everyone. She was there for everybody, above all 
for the country. In addition, she was a spiritual leader in society. Instead of 
local lords, it was her who won the emperor’sadmiration practice of conflict 
resolution alongside with her valuable local knowledge and the practice of 
ancestors, tradition and spiritual remedies. Emperor Hailesilassie I gave her 
five gasha tracts of land in response to her public service to live on. (Interview 
with Ali, 2013)
CONCLUSION
Customary conflict resolution practices are important components of the life 
philosophy of the people of Ethiopia. Elders with deep knowledge of the traditions and 
oral utterances are the guardians of values relevant for peace making and round table 
discussions. The female role in peacemaking is rarely examined in Ethiopia, although 
the country has a rich culture of ‘democratic elements’ at the grass root levels. This 
study therefore attempted to show aspects of the multiple roles of elderly women 
in the building of humanistic values in societies and in peacemaking. Women have 
been integral actors on issues of societal importance. They were givers and guards of 
values for co-existence. It is fair to argue that women elders were symbols of fertility 
health, wellbeing and thereby an enemy of poverty, insecurity unemployment and 
misfortunes. Mothers, as indicated in this study, were custodian of customs, laws, 
morality, forgiveness, humanity and teachers of the young and on whom society based 
their humble character and practice. The dubarti, with their qoti for instance, were 
actively involved in mediation amongst warring factions within the family and the 
community. They were at the center of conflict resolution rituals and acted as peace 
envoys; a position which is conventionally given to male elders. They also led the 
communities in prayers against natural calamities and infertility. 
The study also tried to inculcate the characteristics of customary conflict settlement 
which is based on empathy, cooperation, shared destiny and for giving and receiving. 
It is the researcher’s belief that revitalizing and studying such institutions with 
contextual dimension along with contemporary development could play a pivotal role 
in social development. The issues raised should be promoted and incorporated for 
policy formulation and further research should be carried out with a view towards 
incorporating the traditional conflict resolution practices into a formal system of 
peacemaking and democratization.
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List of Informants
Name of 
Informant Age
Date of 
Interview
Place of 
Interview Remarks
AbebuTareke 77 3/11/2014 Gobenti
She has a very good 
memory of abagar and 
dubarti traditions
Abolu Mohamed
(ato)
85 12/6/2014 Tuludida
He had dubarti relatives in 
the imperial time and shared 
his rich knowledge of the 
role of the dubarti in the 
larger society.
Ahmed Seman
(sheikh)
90 3/2/2015 Kayafar
He was the qadi (judge) in 
Keyafer kebele and shared 
his memory on dubarti 
traditions.
Alemu Gesit
(ato)
85 1/4/ 2015 Buqasa
A farmer well-informed on 
the traditions customary to 
conflict management.
Ali Harun
(ato)
90 12/12/2013 Gebre Guracha
His grandmother was one of 
the renowned dubarti in the 
imperial era. He shared his 
rich memories with us.
Asiya Endeshaw
(w/ro)
82 11/8/2013 Guagurie
She has a rich knowledge 
of the customary rituals of 
conflict resolution.
AyelechTareke
(w/ro)
80 4/6/2015 Keyafar
She has detailed knowledge 
on the traditions and 
customary laws.
Bekelech 
Gulenti
w/ro
87 5/6/2015 Jengeto
She has much to tell about 
dubarti traditions in the 
region.
Beshir Yimer
(ato)
57 4/8/2015 Jengeto
He has tremendous 
memories from his father 
on the role of abagar and 
dubarti in the study area.
Bizuye Yesufe
(w/ro)
89 1/7/2015 Meserbo She has a good memory for local history.
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Damtew Alyou
(ato)
89 4/1/2013 Keyafar
He shared his memories 
on customary conflict 
resolution.
Damtew Worku
(ato)
79 5/1/2013 Gende Mitad
He shared his thoughts on 
the law of the land.
Feleke Gesit
(ato)
89 4/6/2015 Jibgurie
He has sharp memories 
about local history 
including the dubartis
Hawa Seid
(w/ro)
72 4/6/2015 Mojjo
She is well informed of 
dubarti and abagar or 
shimagle practices.
Hussien 
Endeshaw
(ato)
85 1/2/2013 Guagure
He has good memories 
about local history events. 
He shared his valuable 
memories on the dubarti
Hussien Yimer 56 6/8/2015 Degolo
He has shared what he 
inherited from his father on 
dubarti
Mohamed Ali
(ato)
48 2/12/2013 Gondar
Originally from Jamma, he 
shared his rich memories on 
dubarti.
MuzeyenAman
(w/ro)
88 7/12/2014 Yejerti
She shared her rich 
memories on traditional 
customary conflict 
resolution.
Mahmud 
Damtew
(ato)
38 6/12/2015 Jibgurie
He has good memories 
about customary conflict 
management.
Tefera Feleke
(ato)
56 7/12/2015 Degolo
He is well informed about 
the shimagle council called 
Yagerabat.
Reshid Bahru
(ato)
74 8/12/2015 Keyafer
He shared his father’s diary 
on traditions and Yejama 
Bele.
Yesuf Endeshaw
(ato)
81 10/12/2013 Guagurie He has a good memory on dubarti roles in society.
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The ‘Democratic Developmental State’ in Ethiopia: Origin, 
Challenges and Prospects
Tewelde Gebremariam1
Abstract
Some scholars argue that the democratic transition of the successful developmental 
states of the East Asian countries is exceptional and that it is difficult to replicate this 
model in other countries, including Ethiopia. In view of such fundamental concerns, 
this paper asks whether Ethiopia qualifies as a democratic developmental state. 
What is a ‘democratic’ developmental state? What are the different features of a 
democratic developmental state and how can it be distinguished from developmental 
states? What are the challenges and obstacles that have stood in its way to becoming 
a “democratic developmental” state? The study employed a qualitative historical 
review of the democratization process since 1991 in Ethiopia. Results indicated that 
since 1991, Ethiopia, by its nature of politics and historical legacy (civil war) had 
to start with both democracy and development simultaneously. However, there is 
growing pessimism about Ethiopia consolidating democracy. Currently, Ethiopia is in 
a political crisis due to leadership incompetence; inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy; 
skewed emphasis on economic growth rather than development; poor human rights 
records and repressive measures on media, civil society and political parties. Thus, 
the government of Ethiopia should take lessons and revise its ‘developmental state’ to 
make the country more democratic, inclusive and participatory.
Keywords:  Developmental state, democratic developmental state, Ethiopia
With the emergence of economic success stories of undemocratic nations in East 
Asia - followed by unprecedented development with stagnation of formal democracy 
- debates had been raised as to which should come first - democracy or development 
(Leftwich, 1996a; Sen, 2000; Edigheji, 2010). Despite the ongoing disagreements on 
the concept of development, political science scholars like  Adrian Leftwich  (1996a) 
argue  that  what  matters  in  development is not a form of government but “the 
politics that generates and sustains  that  state”  (p. 5).  Even though  there is a  positive 
1 Tewelde Gebremariam is lecturer for gender and development studies at the University of Gondar. 
Contact: tewibili@gmail.com
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relationship between democracy and the wellbeing of nations, achieving democracy 
depends on the character and capacity of the state (Leftwich, 1996b; Edigheji, 2010). 
However, other scholars like Sklar (1996) and Sen (2000) insist on the universal value 
of democracy as the best alternative to authoritarianism, by arguing that “[…] the 
method of dictatorship has never been as developmental in their effect as those of 
democracy” (Sklar, 1996, p. 29). Supporting this claim, the Economic Nobel Prize 
winner Amartya Sen argues that “there is little evidence that  authoritarian political 
system actually helps economic growth” (Sen, 2000, p. 15).
The pioneer developmental state thesis scholar Chalmers Johnson, who initially 
reported the ‘Japanese Miracle’ argues that “[a] state attempting to match the 
economic achievements of Japan must adopt the same priorities as Japan. It must 
first of all be a developmental state” (Johnson, 1999, p. 37). In contrary to Chalmers 
Johnson, scholars from the school of liberalism argue that the democratic transition 
of the successful developmental state of the East Asian countries such as Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan are exceptional and that it is difficult to replicate their model (Levy 
& Fukuyama, 2010; Edigheji, 2010).
This is because the historical and political ‘path dependency’ of countries matters 
in succeeding state-centered development (Levy & Fukuyama, 2010, p. 16). In 
comparison, since the 1990s, with the third wave of democratization and collapse of 
the Soviet Union, there was hope that African countries were in transition with the end 
of some authoritarian and dictatorship regimes (Matfess, 2015, p. 182). Nevertheless, 
only a few consolidated democracies and most African countries remain characterized 
by underdevelopment (Edigheji, 2005).
However, these prominent developmental states of East Asia have been in transition 
and have consolidated democracy in order to sustain their development and become 
democratic developmental states. But, according to the South African political 
scientist Omano Edigheji, in Africa, with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius and 
currently South Africa, there has been limited success in democratization (Edigheji, 
2005, p. 1). Likewise, after 17 years of war, in 1991, Ethiopia had to initiate both 
democracy and development simultaneously so as to consolidate peace, democracy 
and development (Alazar Kebede,2012; Bekele Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012). 
However, thedemocratization process is facing challenges in Ethiopia and there is 
growing pessimism in light of the challenge of consolidating democracy and, at the 
same time, sustaining the unprecedented economic growth achieved in the past decade 
(Arriola & Lyons, 2016). 
Therefore, this paper raises the question as to whether Ethiopia qualifies as a 
democratic developmental state. What is a ‘democratic’ developmental state? What 
are the different  features  of  democratic  developmental  states  and  how can they be
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distinguished from a developmental state? What are the challenges to the “democratic 
developmental state’ in Ethiopia? In answering these questions,  this paper relies on 
a qualitative historical review of the democratization processin Ethiopia since 1991 
and the challenges in integrating the developmental state paradigm with democratic 
processes. Literature reviews on democratization in Ethiopia are used as a source of 
data by relating these with the theoretical foundations of the democratic developmental 
state generated by theorists (Leftwich, 1996a, 1996b; White, 1998; Johnson, 1999; 
Bagchi, 2004; Edigheji, 2005 and 2010). This theoretical foundation could illustrate 
the trajectory of democracy in Ethiopia while identifying possible policy measures 
with which to consolidate democracy.
The first part of this paper focuses on the origins of the developmental state and 
democratic developmental state and their respective distinct features. This is followed 
by an analysis of the historical trajectory of Ethiopia’s democracy from its post-
civil war (1991), to its first ever seen democratic practices in the 2005 election and 
the subsequent repression of democratic institutions. Following this, the current 
challenges related to the ‘democratic developmental’ state in Ethiopia are discussed, 
wrapping up with conclusions and recommendations.
ORIGIN AND CONCEPTS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
According to Amiya Bagchi, “the only developmental state to arise in the nineteenth 
century and survive into the late twentieth century was the Japanese Developmental 
State” (Bagchi, 2004, p. 30). The concept of a developmental state has been introduced 
with the success stories of the East Asian countries with the works of distinguished 
American political scientist, Chalmers Johnson, during the 1980s. Chalmers Johnson 
“invoked the concept of ‘developmental state’ to characterize the role that the Japanese 
state played in Japan’s extraordinary and unexpected post-war enrichment” (Johnson, 
1999, p. 33). For him, the developmental state model in Japan was different from 
the American (capitalist economies) and Soviet (socialist economies) ones (Johnson, 
1999, p. 32). Adrian Leftwich (1996b) widely defined developmental states as:
[...] those states whose internal politics and external relations have served to 
concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competency and capacity 
at the center to shape, pursue and encourage the achievements of explicit 
developmental objective, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions 
to economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of 
both. (p. 284)
In short, it can be defined in terms of “its ideological orientation (i.e. promoting the 
ideal and agenda of developmentalism) and its institutional arrangements (i.e. its 
institutional capacity to formulate and implement its policies and programs)” (Bekele
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Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012, p. 5). 
Except for post-war Japan, most of the prominent and successful developmental 
states like Korea and Taiwan have been under authoritarian rule. Gordon White 
(1998) categorized developmental states as state capitalist, intermediate and state 
socialist. Apart from China, most socialist developmental states ended with the end 
of the socialist block, including the developmental state in Russia (Bagchi, 2004). 
The dominant type of developmental state appears to be the capitalist developmental 
state (Leftwich, 1996a; White, 1998). The capitalist developmental state also has 
been categorized into two main types: democratic and non-democratic. This paper 
emphasizes the democratic variant but in order to ensure greater understanding of the 
development state; its major features are discussed below.
MAJOR FEATURES OF A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
Chalmers Johnson argues that “the first element of the model [developmental state] 
is the existence of small, inexpensive, but elite state bureaucracy staffed by the best 
managerial talent available in the system” (Johnson, 1999, p. 38). The small number 
of elite in the policy circle as well as dominant national figures act with commitment, 
determination and capacity to bring about economic growth and transformation, allied 
with leaders, all the while remaining relatively uncorrupted. These characters were 
evident in Korea under General Park Chung Hee, Singapore under Lee Kwan Yew 
or Botswana under Sir Seretse Khama. These elites were nationalists who also faced 
internal and external threats that forced them to strengthen economic development 
(Leftwich, 1996b).
The second common feature of the developmental state is a relative autonomy of 
the state and its institutions from any internal and external forces. Here, state 
autonomy means the state ability to achieve relative independence or ‘insulation’ 
from an influence of interest groups in favor of national interest. This does not mean 
an isolation of the state from society, rather “[…] autonomy of the well-developed 
bureaucracies is embedded in a dense web of ties with both non-state and other 
state actors (internal and external) who collectively help to define, re-define the 
implementation of development objectives” (Leftwich, 1996b, p. 286). To Johnson 
(1999), in developmental states “the legislative and judiciary branches of government 
must be restricted to ‘safety valve’ functions” (p. 38).
In addition to this, the autonomous  state  capacity “depends on  the […] presence 
of substantial institutional coherence in the constitutional arrangement for the 
distributionand use of political power among different sections of the bureaucratic 
apparatus, and in the nature of party systems in political society” (White, 1998, p. 30). 
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With the assets and presence of the above two features -determined elite and relative 
state autonomy-, it becomes possible for an emergence of competitive powerful 
bureaucracies with authority to plan, direct and shape development without external 
influence.
The common examples stated by Leftwich (1996b, p. 286) are MITI in Japan, the 
Economic Planning Board in Korea, the Economic Development Board in Singapore 
and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning in Botswana. According to 
Leftwich, what makes these planning institutions (he called them ‘economic high 
commands’) different from other developing nations’ institutions is their “real 
power, authority, technical competency and insulation in shaping the fundamental 
thrusts of development policy” (p. 286). Likewise, as per Amiya Bagchi (2004), the 
developmental state should have “rational bureaucracy and the spread of the wings of 
the state over all the citizens it claims as its members” with disciplined bureaucrats 
(p. 7).
In development states, civil societies should not be abused by the state (Johnson, 
1999, p. 52). The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) might be insignificant in 
the time of developmental state as in the case of Botswana or destroyed or controlled 
by the authoritarian as in the case of Korea, China and Indonesia. The ‘weakening’ 
of CSOs was a means by which to consolidate the developmental state” (Leftwich, 
1996b, p. 287).
After all the power, authority and relative autonomy are established and consolidated 
at the early stage of modern development, the states secure their national interest to 
enhance the capacity of these states to deal authoritatively (Edigheji, 2005). This is 
because their aspiration is based on “catching up with the advanced world by breaking 
out of the dependency path that has not led to the economic transformation needed to 
overcome poverty” (Bekele Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012, p. 10). 
According to Amiya Bagchi (2004), the three basic requirements for any polity to 
emerge as developmental state are “[i] abolition of exercise of non-market coercion 
by private groups, [ii] universalization of literacy and [iii] nationalism” (p. 3). The 
‘abolition of exercising non-market coercion by private groups’ needs to be applied in 
order to discipline domestic or foreign capitalists (Bagchi, 2004, p. 3). Even though 
the developmental state differs in the context of different nations, Edigheji (2010, p. 
5) asserts that ‘superior economic performance’ is one common characteristic of the 
developmental state.
One of the negative features of the developmental state has been a very poor human 
rights record. There is no room for opposition and it is considered intolerable, “any 
organization  or  movement  which  looked  as  if  it would challenge the state and its
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developmental purpose has been swiftly neutralized, penetrated, or incorporated as 
part of the ruling party” (Leftwich, 1996b, p. 288).
The developmental state of East Asia began a time of unprecedented economic 
performance during the 1970s. However, their performance in respecting human 
rights was poor although their potential to distribute the benefit of the rapid growth 
provided them with considerable legitimacy. These countries (e.g. Korea and Taiwan) 
performed well in their human development and social services with remarkable 
achievements in health, education and per capita income as compared with other non-
developmental states.
THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
The democratic developmental state is one of the alternative models in the wider 
political economies of democracy and has emerged through a process of ‘institutional 
accumulation’ not as a sudden political transition (White, 1998, p. 32). The theoretical 
base as the notion of democracy alone could not sustain democracy and development 
must go hand in hand and could reinforce each other. Therefore, the developmental 
state is an activist state in solving socio-economic problems and giving wider space 
to public participation through civil society. Edigheji (2010) defined the democratic 
developmental state as “a state that could act authoritatively, credibly, legitimately 
and in a binding manner to formulate and implement its policies and programs” (p. 4).
Likewise, Bagchi (2004) argues that, in a democratic developmental state, people 
are free to change their government through free and fair elections. Thus, what 
are the different features of the democratic developmental state from the non-
democratic? According to an American political scientist Gordon White (1998, p. 
30), the developmental state imposes autonomy by itself and the relationship with 
the society and other forces with which ‘embeddedness’ is set by the ruling elite. The 
authority of the democratic developmental state is based on principles of consent and 
accountability. In addition to this, Leftwich uses the examples of Botswana, Singapore 
and Malaysia to explain the differences. In these countries, political parties are free 
to organize regular and fair elections with universal suffrage (Leftwich, 1996b, p. 
290). Moreover, “governments are essentially accountable to representative political 
institutions, the judiciary is independent and the rule of law is more honored than not”. 
They also have a good record of civil and human rights compared to the other 
developing countries. White (1998) believes that a democratic developmental state 
needs to have: 
[...] sufficient political authority and administration capacity to maintain 
public order by managing  the social and  political  conflicts arising from the
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structural division in society and form the tension inherent in a successful 
growth. (p. 29)
In explaining the secret behind the success of these democratic developmental states, 
Leftwich (1996b) states that, 
[...] in all three cases [Botswana, Singapore and Malaysia] the necessary 
power, authority, autonomy, continuity, and political capacity which 
developmental states and their elite require if they are to achieve sustained 
and rapid economic growth have been achieved because they are all 
dominated-party democracy. (p. 290)
Moreover, White (1998) outlined that what makes a successful developmental state 
is the autonomy of state institutions and political elite which allows them to plan and 
execute development programs and a form of social ‘embeddedness’ “whereby states 
are part of broader alliances with key social groups which are themselves a stimulus 
to socio-economic change” (p. 30).
In a nutshell, the democratic developmental state differs from the developmental state 
in which the autonomy of the state is legitimized by democratic election, the autonomy 
of the democratic developmental state comes not by repressing civic society, but by 
consensus with civil society for one goal of economic reforms and inclusive public 
participation, all the while remaining insulated from the direct political pressures 
of interest groups. It is also built upon considerable economic development and 
institutional accumulation. The occurrence of fair, free and periodic elections wherein 
which political parties are free to organize and fully play their roles are also important 
features of democratic developmental states (White, 1998; Edigheji, 2005). In addition 
to this, the democratic developmental state has a good record of human rights and 
has an accountable, responsible government in place which respects rule of law and 
independent judiciary; all factors which make the democratic developmental state 
different from the non-democratic developmental state.
THE ETHIOPIAN ‘DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL’ STATE: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
With its long history of feudalism, democratic practices in Ethiopia were limited. 
During the brief period in the 1950s and 1960s when other African countries were 
enjoying relative democratic politics and periods of independence, Ethiopia wasunder 
Haile Selassie rule of ‘absolute’ feudalism (Tigist Fisseha & Medhane Tadesse, 2011). 
The military junta (Derg) overthrew the Hailselasie regime in 1974 but the ‘vicious 
circle of extractive institutions’ continued with an absolute military dictatorship and 
socialist centralization (Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012). 
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In May 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
overthrew the Derg after 17 years of civil war and established the government that 
has remained in power since 1991. The EPRDF is a coalition of four political parties: 
Tigrian People Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement, 
the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization and Southern Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Movement. After the declaration of the new constitution in 1995, the 
EPRDF government under the leadership of Meles Zenawi, restructured what was a 
highly centralized state into a design of ethnic federalism (Tigist Fisseha & Medhane 
Tadesse, 2011).
The year 1991 was a critical year for Ethiopia (when peace was consolidated and 
the nation sustained). It was also surrounded with unstable neighbors like Somalia. 
Eritrea’s quest for independence from Ethiopia was also ongoing. As Bertus Praeg 
(2006), an American political scientist who studied the transitional government in the 
1990s, outlined, this period was accompanied by “the weakening of forces opposed to 
the system and on the other, by legitimizing the EPRDF’s mandate through election” 
(p. 113). 
In the 17 years fighting the Derg, the EPRDF had followed the ideology of Marxism 
(De Waal, 2012, p. 4). Immediately after they come to power in 1991, they began to 
adhere much more to socialism. They came with the vague notions of ‘revolutionary 
democracy’ and semi-market policies in order to better follow the new world order 
(De Waal, 2012, p. 4). Alex De Waal (2012), a political scientist from the Netherlands 
who was following the EPRDF politics starting from the guerrilla fighting of TPLF, 
interviewed the late prime minister who stated that “[f]or the first ten years after 
we took over, we were bewildered by the changes. The New World Order was very 
visible and especially so in this part of the world. The prospect of an independent line 
appeared very bleak. So, we fought a rearguard action not to privatize too much” (p. 4).
While this nation and peace building was underway, a vague ‘revolutionary 
democracy’ war between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke out in 1998 and continued until 
2000. The war not only cost lives from both sides but also seriously affected the infant 
economies of these nations and led to continued instability in their bounders. The war 
also brought about significant political structural changes in the ruling party after th 
split of TPLF leadership in 2001. This became an opportunity for Meles to consolidate 
his power when he solved the crisis by dismissing and arresting nearly half of the 
central committee of TPLF (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 79). This was a transitional 
period from the collective leadership of the EPRDF to an uncontested ‘Big Men’ rule 
of Meles that paved the way to implementing his ‘developmental state’ model (De 
Waal, 2012, p. 7).
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Thereafter, Ethiopia under the ‘Big Men’ registered unprecedented economic 
growthwith a double digit real GDP average growth from 2006-2014 with records 
of 10.58 % (World Bank, 2016). However, this economic growth was achieved at 
the expense of democracy, particularly after the 2005 elections –the first democratic 
elections to take place in Ethiopian history. The results showed that the coalition of 
opposition parties won 31% of the parliament seats (Aalen, 2014, p. 193). However, 
some of the opposition parties did not accept the results and boycotted parliament by 
claiming the election result was fraudulent. As a consequence, the ruling parties used 
harsh measures which resulted in them, once again, gaining almost complete control 
of the parliament (Arriola & Lyons, 2016). 
ETHIOPIA POST-2005- ‘A DIVERGING PATH OF DEMOCRACY’
Scholars and the public alike agree that the 2005 election is a ‘historic lost opportunity’ 
and that Ethiopia missed out on an opportunity to consolidate democracy. This 
election had short term and long term consequences. The short term was that more 
than 200 opposition supporters were killed by brutal security forces and nearly 30,000 
were arrested, including the top opposition party leaders (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 
81). Consequently, a long-term closing of the political space, increasing migration of 
political leaders, journalists and fractions on the ethnic groups came about (Messay 
Kebede, 2011). Some of the opposition politicians chose armed struggle so that they 
then became threats to the peace and security of the country and national survival. 
The vague notion of ‘democratic developmental state’ got its biggest push from the 
frustration of the ruling party after the 2005 election. Scholars associate it with the 
drive of Meles to have total autonomy and use the ‘developmental state model’ to 
legitimize his power by creating economic growth and disempowering his opponents 
(Kebede, 2011).
In addition to this, new laws were introduced to weaken internal and external 
pressures. These laws targeted democratic elements such as the media, civil society 
and opposition parties (Adem Abebe, 2012). The two most controversiallaws on 
‘Charities and Societies Proclamation’ and Anti-Terrorism Law were both introduced 
in 2009. Under the new civil society law, “[…] any Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) that receives more than  10 percent  of its funding from outside  the country’s 
borders is considered ‘foreign’. Any foreign NGO is banned from engaging in work 
pertaining to human rights, […] or democratic governance” (Matfess, 2015, p. 193). 
With the broader definition of the anti-terrorism law, a number of opposition party 
members and journalists were imprisoned and criticizing policies of the ruling party 
become a dangerous activity (Matfess, 2015; Arriola & Lyons, 2016). This is the time 
where a divergent path of the infant democracy started. 
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ETHIOPIA POST-MELES: THE CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE 
‘DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL’ STATE
Despite the constitutional provision of ethnic based federalism of 1995 when power 
was divided amongst the executive, judiciary and legislature and between federal and 
regional governments, power became centralized to the ‘Big Men’. With this centralized 
power, Ethiopia under Meles’ rule, Leftwich characterized the developmental state as 
having features as of a determined elite with relative autonomy (De Waal, 2012, p. 
8). As Arriola and Lyons (2016) stated, “Meles’s eulogies emphasized his individual 
brilliance and his personal role in bringing development to the modern Ethiopian 
state” (p. 82).
After the death of Meles, international media and opposition groups anticipated 
instability and some hoped for a change of regime. However, there was a peaceful 
transition as the Deputy Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, became Prime 
Minister (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 84). However, the new prime minister is facing a 
lack of relative autonomy as a result of high power and resource competition within 
the EPRDF and also due to the patronage nature of the party (Aalen, 2014). As a result 
of the competition on the most important position on the constituent of the EPRDF, he 
was forced to appoint three deputy prime ministers representing the three dominant 
parties of the EPRDF. However, this arrangement was short-lived as in 2017 the prime 
minister appointed only one deputy prime minister. 
With diverging interest and ‘inter-coalition’ politics, the new prime minister’s 
“[…] ability to assert himself as a leader in his own right—and to form his own 
government—remains constrained […]  (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 84). This could 
constrain the prime minister in securing and exercising the relative autonomy that 
the developmental state demands. These intra-party power dynamics mean that many 
unsolved legitimate and constitutional questions like the special interest of the state 
of Oromia in Addis Ababa, which the EFDRE Constitution Article 49/5 lifted to be 
determined by law remains unsettled. This and other issues are starting to re-emerge 
as contentious issues, especially with the introduction of the Addis Ababa Integrated 
Master Plan introduced by the government. From May 2014, this Plan has resulted 
in spontaneous unrest as it is believed that it will cause an eviction of more than two 
million farmers from their livelihoods with insignificant compensation being allocated 
(Human Rights Watch, 2015). This measure is in contradiction with the assertion of 
the government that the developmental state formed a coalition with the 85% of the 
Ethiopia rural population. 
Lack of decisions on the ‘collective administration’ of Hailemariam Desalegn is 
evident in  this  crisis after  which  they accepted their faults and canceled the Master
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Plan. This is an unprecedented move during the EPRDF regime (BBC, 2016). The 
Oromo protest influenced interest groups in different areas of the country and cases 
of increasing clashes and murders forced the government to proclaim a state of 
emergency. This implies that the relative autonomy of the state from the influence of 
interest groups (which is an important element of developmental states) is degrading.
Regardless of the unprecedented economic growth and improvements in human 
development, the ambitious vision of the country to create a ‘democratic and a middle-
income society’ by 2025 (MoFED, 2010) is facing challenges. Since 2005, Ethiopia 
has not only missed the historic opportunity for democratization but this missed 
opportunity is costing the relative peace and stability in the very fragile region of 
East Africa. It is becoming a fragile state with more than 10 armed oppositions which 
have, so far, been excluded from the politics of the nation (Messay Kebede, 2011; 
Matfess, 2015). The internal instability is also influenced by its geopolitical position 
in the volatile region of East Africa, wherein which are located terrorist movements 
in the failed state of Somalia, the recent civil wars in South Sudan and rough relation 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. All of these factors have adversely impacted upon the 
domestic politics of Ethiopia (Bekele Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012).
All the media, civil society and anti-terrorism laws are rationalized on the notion of 
national security in relation to the country’s geopolitics (Adem Abebe, 2012). Thus, 
the developmental state lacks the inclusiveness, popular participation and the most 
favorable condition for such democratic developmental state as Edigheji (2005, p. 10) 
stated the ‘insulated state’ from direct political pressures of interest groups. Moreover, 
the Ethiopian government’s efforts to secure legitimacy by economic growth at the 
expense of democracy could be easily reflected by Arriola and Lyons’s comparison 
between democracy and development (see Figure 1 below). They used a political 
rights measure of the Freedom House (on a scale 1 to 7, with 7 being the worst) and 
economic growth registered from 1995 to 2015 and compared it with the average of 
other sub-Saharan African countries (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 80). 
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Figure 1—Ethiopia’s Receding Democracy and Rising Development, 1995–2012
Source: Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 80
Thus, as Hilary Matfess (2015, p. 182) states in her case study of Ethiopian and Rwandan 
governances’ ‘confusing governance character’ that they are characterized by; high 
growth economies (which can be seen in the above Figure 1), free-market ideologies 
with high state intervention, weak civil society with formal institutions of democracy, 
poor records of human rights but high foreign investment and military partnership with 
international community. This is how the external legitimacy of Ethiopia, particularly 
because of the geopolitical  position and  proximity of Ethiopiato the fragile region of 
East Africa, helps to allay strong international powers like the United State, Britain 
and the European Union in fighting terrorism (Matfess, 2015, p. 199). Ethiopia is 
one of the highest aid receipts in return for its role in the regional security; nearly 
one-third of the nation’s budget comes from donors (Matfess, 2015, p. 199). These 
funds allowed the authoritarian government to sustain its tyrannical nature. This is 
the reason Hilary Matfess (2015, p. 182) calls Ethiopia a state of ‘developmental 
authoritarianism’. However, this internal legitimacy based on economic growth is 
facing challenges. Today, people in Ethiopia are raising grievances following 25 years 
of authoritarian rule. The opposition and public unrest are as a consequence of the 
100% election results won by the ruling party in May 2015, an increase from the 
99.96% 2010 election results (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p. 84). 
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In comparison, the success of the East Asian countries with one dominant party system 
was due to their relatively homogenous society and relatively fairly distribution 
of the economic growth (Edigheji, 2005). But, the sustainability of one dominant 
party system is unlikely in Ethiopia with its multicultural society and historical 
‘path dependency’ (Messay Kebede, 2011; Matfess, 2015). Due to the fact that 
“religious and communal differences are, of course, vulnerable to exploitation by 
sectarian politicians” (Sen, 2000, p. 157). However, Ethiopian experts from UNDP 
are optimistic that a developmental state in Ethiopia could be a model developmental 
state for African countries (Bekele Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012).
Predominantly foreigners but also some Ethiopian scholars based in the West see 
Ethiopia’s capacity in building meritocratic bureaucracy, the effectiveness and 
success of developmental state have all not yet been fulfilled. The medium and lower 
civil servants lack capacity and are inefficient and corrupt (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, 
p. 79). Positions are given based on loyalty to the party (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, 
p. 79). This has been seen in the recent campaign of ‘good governance’ when in 
response to the current public grievances, many cadres and civil servants have been 
let go from their positions from different regions Ethiopia. In addition, repression to 
opposition party followers and favoritism to political loyalists in the civil service, 
including higher education, is increasing and high turnover and brain drain is growing 
(Bekele Sehen & Regassa Tsegaye, 2012, p. 16). These rent-seeking behaviors were 
used by the late Prime Minister Meles in his justification on the importance of the 
democratic developmental state to stamp out the rent-seeking practices and develop 
social capital (Alazar Kebede, 2012). Today, democratic development is deteriorating. 
Meles himself, during an interview with Alex De Waal (2012, p. 8), expressed his fear 
that the developmental state would decay before becoming hegemonic throughout 
Ethiopia. 
Thus, is the ‘democratic developmental state’ in Ethiopia on a democratic track? This 
could be measured in status of the country’s political rights which  is the worst 7 point 
(1= best and 7= worst) (Freedom House, 2016, p. 21) and “freedom of the press in 
Ethiopia, as measured by Freedom declined dramatically; an astounding twenty points 
on a scale of one hundred since 2002” (Matfess, 2015, p. 193). The Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index of 2016 ranked Ethiopia 108 out of 176 
countries (Transparency International, 2017).
Moreover, Ethiopia became ‘not free’ in the Freedom House measures for the first time 
in 2011 Freedom Index (Adem Abebe, 2012, p. 3). Likewise, in sub-Saharan African 
standard in the 2015 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Ethiopia ranked 31 (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). The Economist Intelligence Unit classified Ethiopia as an 
“authoritarian” regime in its 2015 Democracy Index (The Economist, 2016). Human
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Rights Watch and Amnesty International are accusing the regime of making excessive 
use of force in halting peaceful demonstrations and oppositions. The laws introduced 
since 2005 are repressive; control of the mass media and movement of the political 
oppositions are unlikely to support Ethiopia in becoming more democratic, rather 
the infant democracy is following a diverging path which makes the future highly 
uncertain.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For the last decade, Ethiopia has achieved unprecedented economic growth. However, 
the findings suggest that Ethiopia implemented the developmental state model by 
closing the political space and repressing civil society, political parties and media in 
the name of nation building and security. Thus, these factors could not make Ethiopia 
a level player on the democratic developmental state playing field, rather I agree with 
the characterization of Hilary Matfess (2015) that the current government in Ethiopia 
is an “authoritarian developmental state” (p. 182).
The above reviewed literature indicates that Ethiopia’s active role in counterterrorism 
and the established nominal democracy gives impunity for their repressive measures, 
resulting in a strong partnership with the West; meaning more aid and investment. 
This helped Ethiopia in achieving unprecedented economic growth at the expense 
of democracy. However, I argue that this economic growth cannot be sustained 
without democratic practices. This is currently becoming evident as the ‘authoritarian 
developmental state’ is facing anticipated challenges including the incompetence in 
leadership.
In addition to this, the multicultural nature of Ethiopian society with its multiple 
ethnicities and religion is posing a challenge to implementing the developmental state 
model. The repressive nature of the government could not legitimize its power by 
economic development. But, today after the 100% election win by the ruling party in 
May 2015, public unrest has led to an unprecedented cancellation of grand national 
projects. At the time of writing this paper, in the first half of 2017, Ethiopia is in a 
state of emergency. Every day the situation is worsening due to the following issues: 
leadership incompetence, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, emphasis on skewed 
economic growth rather than development and poor human rights records. 
From these findings, the government of Ethiopia should take lessons and revise 
its ‘authoritarian developmental state’ to make it more democratic, inclusive and 
participatory. The subsequent opening of the political space through national dialogue 
should be done to assure legitimate power which is a key factor for any successful 
democratic developmental state.
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(Re) Assessing the Questions of Nationalities in Ethiopia: 
Focusing on Secessionist Politics
Wuhibegezer Ferede1
Abstract
The world has witnessed the twin processes of globalization and localization through 
fragmentation. These integrative and disintegrative impulses primarily challenged the 
legitimacy of the modern state as the internal centrifugal forces opt for dissociation 
within the penetrating transnational forms of association. These twin processes 
are evident in the Horn of Africa. In this region, there is a move towards greater 
supranational integration under the auspice of African Union, Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development and other trans-national political and economic actors 
amidst of series of complex secessionist movements. Due to the complexity of addressing 
the genesis, aspiration and accompanying difficulty of managing diverse data set, the 
spatial focus of this study was confined to Ethiopia. Thus, this study analyzed the 
historical, political, legal, economic, social, ethnic and cultural factors which are 
relevant to explaining the intensification of secessionist impulses in Ethiopia in spite 
of the adoption of ethnic federalism and the secessionist constitution (article 39) to 
contain such political forces using meta data and discourses collected from social 
media, interviews and public discourses such as written texts, oral texts (speech) and 
mixed texts (internet chat) available in the public space. The findings indicate that 
the interplay of the legacy of colonialism, adoption of anti-state Marxist principles, 
elitism, ethnicization of politics, domino effect of successfully seceded states and the 
global developments in communication and military technology as the main factors 
for the intensification of secessionist and liberationist politics in Ethiopia. 
Keywords: Ethiopia, nationality, liberation, secession, politics, Waleligne Mekonnen
The world is witnessing the twin processes of universalization and localization which 
ultimately  leads  to  fragmentation  as well  as  tendencies  of  integration  and  at  the 
same time  of  separation, isolation and autarchy. These integrative and disintegrative
1  Wuhibegezer Ferede is a researcher at the Blue Nile Water Institute and assistant professor in the Department 
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impulses primarily challenged the legitimacy and perseverance of the modern state 
which had been the most sacred human institution. As a result, the state system has 
faced challenges both from internal centrifugal forces demanding for dissociation as 
it is witnessed in Ethiopia, Egypt, Southern Yemen, Scotland and Eastern Ukraine and 
the need for transnational forms of association (European Union and African Union). 
The former usually manifested in what is called ‘nationality question’ seeking for 
autonomy or outright secession. The second challenge is linked to globalization and 
has posed considerable challenges to the traditional role of the state.
These twin processes are evident in the Horn of Africa. Thus, we witness both 
trends which call for integration under the auspice of the African Union and Inter 
Governmental Authority for Disaster and Drought and as a series of active and 
complex secessionist and liberationist movements. With the intent of fulfilling the 
dream of the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism and for harnessing the advantages 
of regional integration, both the African Union and Inter Governmental Authority 
for Development are working to ensure integration. However, the region witnessed 
the birth of new secessionist states and it is vulnerable to further disintegration. 
What’s unfolding in the region was/is also pervasive in Ethiopia. After the 1960s, the 
legitimacy of the ancient polity was seriously challenged by ethno-nationalist forces. 
Waleligne’s thesis (1969) became a manifesto of those ethno-nationalist forces that 
saw Ethiopia as a symbol of oppression. However, the country was a unitary state 
until the coming to power of the present regime.
There are two compelling perspectives pertaining to the establishment of ethnic 
federalism in Ethiopia. State nationalists argue that it risks state disintegration. The 
secessionist clause in the constitution and the adoption of federation itself has the 
impact of secessionist acts by allowing a risk of regions to become independent. The 
contenders of this line also argue that there is considerable tension or incompatibility 
between secessionist right and federalism (Erk & Anderson, 2009). On the other hand, 
the liberation front ideologue holds that federalism and the rights of nations to self-
determination, including and up to secession, is the lasting solution (panacea) to the 
nationality question in Ethiopia (FDRE, 1994; Alemu, 2005).
Besides the differing opinions of the two philosophies of what one sees on the 
ground is the increasing risk of disgruntled political forces such as Ogaden National 
Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Amhara Democratic Movement and 
Tigrian People’s Democratic Movement which have all established military fronts to 
challenge the existing political arrangement. Furthermore, localized conflicts have 
mushroomed. This signals that the nationality question is still a living issue that needs 
scholarly attention.  
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In addition, whether the roots and the motives of these movements are simple 
extensions of the nationality question of the past or signify new demands has not 
yet been ascertained though few studies attribute the root of these problems from an 
internal point of view as simple extensions of the nationality questions of the past. 
Furthermore, most of the studies hitherto have scarcely examined the domino effect 
of successful secessionist movements in the region though many African statesmen 
indicated that the secession of Eritrea will stimulate secessionist movements from 
Cairo to Cape Town. Again, when the region experienced the birth of South Sudan, 
African leaders expressed their concerns that the division of Sudan would lead to 
a domino effect. Their fear wrestles on the ground that internationally sanctioned 
secession and creation of a new state would be contagious and thereby encourage 
other secession movements throughout the continent. Therefore, the fundamental 
intention of this paper is to analyze the chemistry/synergy of the exogenous and 
endogenous factors in shaping the birth and escalation of the secessionist and 
liberationist forces in Ethiopia. Specifically, it seeks to examine these movements by 
mapping historical, political, legal, economic, social, cultural and, ethnic factors. An 
investigation of the roots, aspirations and the complex impacts of these political forces 
and movements deserves comprehensive scholarly research so that the identification 
of historic drives and principles that govern the process could be made apparent. 
Within these parameters, the paper addresses the following questions: why are there 
secessionist movements and liberationist fronts in Ethiopia today? Or what historical, 
political, legal, economic, social, ethnic and cultural factors are relevant to explain the 
intensification of secessionist and liberationist impulses in Ethiopia?
SECESSIONISM IN AFRICA
Notwithstanding the prophesies of some eminent scholars such as Fukuyama 
(1992) who had declared that the end of the Cold War would usher in the ‘end of 
history’ that might bring peaceful, stable and cooperative world order, in actual 
fact, the predictions of the realists of returning towards Hobbesian world where the 
fragmentation of international order and the emergence of rivalry among atomistic 
national units became evident. Thus, international politics have been dominated 
by inter and intrastate conflicts that have led to the collapse of states and the rise 
of ethno-nationalism. Therefore, at the global level, the end of the Cold War was 
accompanied by an increase in the number of secessionist movements which sought 
to establish their own political entities. The following cases are ample examples of 
disintegration and centrifugal forces. The separation of Pakistan from India, later 
Bangladesh from Pakistan and; the disintegration of Yugoslavia along ethno-religious 
lines; the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into two republics; birth of East Timor; the 
disintegration  of  Somalia;  the  birth  of  Eritrea  and  Southern  Sudan are important
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examples which show us the potent nature of secessionist movements. We could also 
include the claims in Egypt at the Sinai desert, Southern Yemen, Scotland and Eastern 
Ukraine as contemporary examples of secessionist impulses.
In Africa, the right to exit was established in the 1960s as a decolonization instrument. 
At the onset, it was enforceable only for restoring justice to nations that continued 
under colonial rule in the post-independence period. In line with this prerogative, 
the UN general assembly has prohibited the recognition of dismemberment and 
fragmentation of states in its declaration of the Principles of International Law (UN 
Resolution 1514-XV, 1960). Accordingly, it allowed ethnic, religious and sub national 
cultural entities and groups to claim autonomy only within a state boundary. However, 
in practice the Organization of African Unity was vacillating between these competing 
rights (Hussein, 2008, p. 184). Therefore, Africa secessionist movements, which 
were presented to the global public as analogues to colonial liberation movements, 
eventually assumed the right to exit through the atomization of the mother state. 
According to Bamfo (2012, p. 2) secession has become an imminent threat to the 
integrity of African states, but only a few African governments give recognition to it. 
Thus, native African governments from the colonial to post-independence period have 
confronted secessionism to deter the atomization of states. Nevertheless, after the 
1990s numerous multinational states disintegrated and became hotbeds of separatist 
impulses and, thus, many aspirants of outright secession came to the forefront. The 
cases can be attested by analyzing the experiences in the Horn of Africa which has 
hosted several secessionist movements and where active claims are ongoing.
SECESSIONISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The secession of Eritrea and birth of Southern Sudan are both worthy of mentioning. 
Eritreans relentlessly worked to secure their secessionist right by fighting for about 
thirty years (Wuhibegezer & Emmanuel, 2014). They attained prominence during the 
1974 popular revolution and consummated it during the Post Derg Period (Bahru, 
2008, p. 7).
After secession, Eritrea has also faced a secessionist movement of the Red Sea Afars 
who aspire to establish the Islamic Republic of Afaria by uniting the Afars in Ethiopia 
and Djibouti. The secession of Somaliland and the eventual disintegration of the whole 
of Somalia is another significant landmark worth mentioning. Again, the Rahanweyn 
Resistance  Army  is  fighting  for an  independent  state of  South Western  Somalia. 
Somaliland has its own secessionist movement called Awdal land in the Western part 
of  the  country.  Further  fracturing  continues  in  the secessionist claim of Azania, 
part  of  Juba  land.  Hence, the  collapse  of  Somalia as a nation-state with a de facto
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independence of Northern Somaliland and Puntland shows a reversal towards the 
Pre-colonial pattern of clan autonomy and calls for a revisiting of the works of 
ethno-politicians and theorists of nationalism. The splitting of Sudan into an Arab-
Muslim North and Black-Christian and Animist South is accompanied by breakaway 
movements in Beja, Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Sudan Nubian and South Sudan.
In Ethiopia, the right of secession has appeared in the academic debate as part of 
the student movement politics of the 1960s (Bahru, 2014). Thus, the issue was 
publicizedfollowing the release of Waleligne’s article which argued about the 
existence of many nations subsumed within Ethiopian state nationalism. Due to this 
fact, he is adored by some as the Lenin of Ethiopia. His thesis received momentum 
in the post-revolutionary period and became something of an academic playground 
for legitimizing the secession of Eritrea (Bahru, 2008, p. 7), as well as for secession 
claims from Ogaden (Samatar, 1994, p. 1), Tigray (Alemu, 2005) and Oromo (Asafa, 
1998).
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
According to Paul and Anke (2002), the word secession means ‘self-cession’ implying 
a decision by a community to break away from a parent state. According to this 
definition, secession is a unilateral interruption of bonds and withdrawal from the 
association, usually the state and repudiation of the obligations to obey the state’s 
laws by a group of persons due to certain injustices. Libertarian scholars referred to 
secession as an act of individual liberation from the hegemonic bonds or compulsory 
ties of the state (Kreptul, 2003).
There are two theoretical foundations that try to justify and promote secessionism. 
The first is called “Remedial Right Only” and the other is grouped as “Primary Right/
Choice Theories”. According to the advocates of a ‘remedial right only’, groups who 
believe that their rights are grossly violated have the right to break away from the 
union that they belong to. Therefore, secession can be justified only as a remedy of a 
last resort for persistent and serious injustice (Buchanan, 1997, p. 34). Some versions 
of this strand argue that there can be a special right to secede if the state grants the 
right implicitly or explicitly in the constitution or if there was an agreement/covenant 
in place during the establishment of the association that guarantees secession at a later 
period of time. However, these theories place significant constraint on the right to 
secede by making it conditional on the occurrences of serious injustice. The second 
strand belongs to thinkers who do not put any conditionality in place for the practice 
of secession. They argue that a group should have unconditional rights to secede 
without facing any injustice. Secession is not an instrument on a remedial act to 
mend past grievances. 
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HISTORICAL CAUSES: LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM 
ON STATE BUILDING
This paper analyzes how the interaction/synergy of the exogenous forces shaped by 
dualistic roles of globalization and the domino effect of successful secessionism and 
the internal historical, political, legal, economic, social, ethnic and cultural factors are 
relevant in explaining the intensification of secessionist impulses in Ethiopia. 
The colonial arbitrary dismemberment, without any regard for the pre-existing 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic lines, has promoted secessionism (Ottaway, 1982, p. 
20). European colonialists ignored basic guidelines for partitioning, took decisions 
on scanty information about Africa’s geography and divided territories without 
taking time to consider demographic, ethnographic and topographic imperatives. 
They simply broke up or clustered people, languages, customs and alliances with 
little rational guidance from history, tradition andlogic. Hence, we find an ethnic 
group divided by imaginary lines between two or more countries (Ottaway, 1982, 
p. 20). Contrary to this development, nation states were prescribed to the peoples 
of the Horn as a manifestation of modernity by their colonizing masters. Thus, rigid 
territory centric institutions were transplanted (Ottaway, 1982, p. 15). Ottaway (1982) 
states that the current political tensions and territorial fragmentation crisis facing 
the sub region trace their origin from the institutionalization of nation state which 
calls for irredentism, expansionist nationalism and ethno-nationalism. Indeed, the 
frameworks of the institutional structure as well as the philosophical foundation of 
the nation states are crafted by the European colonial slaughter on the pre-colonial 
institutional structures of the Horn. Again, the post-colonial states in Horn of Africa 
have been territory centric and territories continue to serve as authentic markers of 
social identity. Territorial nationalism has burst out of the artificially installed state 
identity to play in the territorial loss-gain political game (Bahru, 2008, p. 366). This 
marked a great departure from the pre-colonial modes of social organizations of the 
African society (Ottaway, 1982, p. 20) whereby non-territorial markers of identity 
such as family, kinship, religion, tribe and clan ties were integral in determining 
identity. A clear example of such a case is a wandering tribe whose authority structure 
is completely disassociated from a fixed loyalty to a particular piece of land as is 
witnessed among wondering pastoralists. This fenced thinking, which was based on 
territorial nationalism, served as a hotbed for irredentism and secessionist movements 
following the collapse of nation states in the post-colonial period. Therefore, the 
post-colonial political seismic cataclysm in the Horn was decisively guided by the 
foundations laid down during the colonial period and further consolidated by political 
elites. Thus, the haphazard manner in which European powers sliced the continent 
into colonies makes every African country vulnerable to splitting up for a myriad of 
reasons (Bamfo, 2012). The  haphazard  manner  in  which  nations  were created has
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caused  irredentist movement as has been witnessed in the greater Afar, greater Eritrea/
Tigray, greater Somalia and greater Gambela movements. Thus, colonialism, instead 
of serving as a forerunner of globalism in the region, has ended up with counter 
effects, at least in producing partition and hysteria.
The modern state building processes in Ethiopia are not purely of colonial construct 
though not immune from the diffusion of the ideologies and the process of 
territorialisation. Hence, it’s safe to admit that the strategy of state building in Ethiopia 
was ideologically colonized for it was founded on the tents of Westphalia. Similar 
to the rest of the region, the state-building strategy of the Solomonic monarchies 
in Ethiopia was highly centrist and unitary. The policy of creating a unitary state 
remained unfinished as autonomous ethnic and cultural units resisted the process. 
Thus, the multifarious groups were not moulded into a fully integrated nation state. 
Finally, social identities remained in a state of great ambiguity oscillating between 
assimilation and rejection of the mainstream culture. Thus, the imperial drive of 
bringing about political modernization by institutionalizing the nation state, as per the 
order of the day, set the question of nationalities in motion. The question was clearly 
expounded by the students of Haile Sellassie I University College and it has served 
as spirit and argument of the student politics in the Imperial protest. Following the 
downfall of the imperial regime, the Derg attempted to address secession impulses 
through the tents of socialism but the question persisted until its downfall in the 1990s.
In the Post Derg period, EPRDF made a paradigm shift in the state building strategy 
by instituting a decentralization approach claiming that it would end the vicious cycle 
of violence and danger of disintegration along with forging one political and economic 
community. The ruling party has applauded this as a novel change but sections of 
the opposition viewed it as plot for a balkanization of the centralized Ethiopian state 
(Alemu, 2005, p. 332). Some others also viewed it as an unfulfilled promise that 
served for the perpetuation of the orders of the old days (Asafa, 2001).
PANDORA`S BOX TRAGEDY OF COLONIAL BOUNDARIES
The political boundaries that we exhibit merely form the map of Africa and are not 
the making of the people of Africa. According to Ahluwalia and Abebe (2002, p. 1), 
African boundaries are an artificial creation of the European colonial powers that had 
been imposed to imprison the people in a specific environment to be easily controlled, 
exploited and oppressed. Thus, the boundaries of Africa, which were designed in the 
European capitals in the last quarter of the 19th century, led to the partitioning of more 
than 200 ethnic groups throughout the continent. The leaders of the independence 
movement were informed to keep state borders intact and to impede states from 
seeking to reform or reconstruct their boundaries for doing so could result in an active 
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social volcano. Accordingly, as is mentioned on the charter of the OAU, the founding 
fathers believed that leaving colonial boundaries intact would minimize boundary 
conflicts in the continent. 
New African governments tried to adhere closely to the boundaries they had inherited 
to uphold the principle of utipossidetis, which provides that states emerging from 
decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders which 
they held at independence. That understanding has done little to dampen calls coming 
from some governments to clarify boundaries with their p. 38).Therefore, delegates 
at the first Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963 
opted to support the inviolability of national borders as one of the organization’s core 
principles. In 1964, the OAU formally backed this principle at the Cairo Declaration 
of Border Disputes among African States. The OAU was seeking to avoid opening 
a Pandora’s Box as it discouraged groups from making irredentist claims on other 
groups’ territories outside their common borders. 
When we ask the question of why the founding fathers of the OAU feared uniting 
the divided people immediately after independence or why they inherited boundaries 
drawn by the colonial masters instead of resorting towards Indigenous institutions, 
the usual answer is that they did so in order to avoid catastrophic boundary conflicts. 
However, the conflicts that have occurred between nations are blamed on the haphazard 
demarcation of borders (Hughes, 2004).  Examples of these types of situations 
are as follows; the clashes between Egypt and Libya in 1977 when Libyan forces 
occupied Sallum in Egypt; Egypt and Sudan had a dispute over the Hala’ib Triangle; 
Ethiopia and Somalia fought over Ogaden; whereas Libya and Chad fought over the 
Aouzou Strip; Nigeria and Cameroon had disputations over Bakassi; Ethiopia and 
Eritrea fought for controlling Badme and recently Abyie became a bone of contention 
between Juba and Khartoum.
Hence, the first generation of African leaders that worked for the decolonization 
of their continent failed to decolonize themselves from colonial constructs. They 
remained passive in uniting divided people by not unmaking what had been drawn 
by their colonizing masters. When they stood to establish an organization of African 
unity, they hoped to bring about continental unity but instead they became instruments 
perpetuating artificial dividing lines. The boundaries of Somaliland and Somalia, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, Republic of Sudan and South Sudan are examples that show the 
shift of politics of boundaries of Africa contrary to inheritance. The worst impact of 
this process is its replication in defining intrastate territorial claims of ethnic groups. 
In Ethiopia, claims and counterclaims of territories on the basis of real and invented 
histories became the order of the day. Therefore, the high-level boundary conflicts are 
reproducing themselves at local levels.
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DOMINO EFFECT OF THE SECESSION OF 
ERITREA AND SOUTH SUDAN
It is very difficult to measure the level of the regional domino effect of the successful 
secession of Eritrea and South Sudan on the secessionist movements in Ethiopia. 
However, the former was very decisive in shaping the political landscape and the 
constituionalization process in Ethiopia. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) 
was in its early stage and was adopting secessionist manifesto to suit itself with regard 
to the Eritrean question. The Oromo Liberations Fronthad also followed the same 
road traversed by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (Alemu, 2005, p. 332) and 
its splinter group established its headquarters in Asmara. By the same token, the birth 
of the newest state of South Sudan is reactivating the Gambela question. In actual 
fact, the domino effect is facilitated by the CNN effect; the technology breakthrough 
that gave birth to various social media outlets, durable vehicles, satellite mobiles and 
modern guns.
ABUSE AND INVENTION OF HISTORY
The manipulation and reinterpretation of history was one of the instruments of political 
socialization in the region. According to Guazzini (2003, pp. 2-3),  the political abuse 
of history by elites has led to revisions and a quest for a new approach centred on 
cohesive trans-cultural encounters recognizing the significance of the constituents. 
Moreover, Crummy (2003) expounds the encounter as follows;
[...] across the Horn political elites have [...] used history for narrow ends and 
have compromised the conditions for scholarly study of history. The recognition 
of this common experience could be a starting point for a new agenda for the 
historians of the region, the development of historical consciousness that is 
broader  than [...] earlier  forms. This  would  start  with  are-examination  of 
assumptions and a commitment to dialogue. It ought to also include a critical 
examination of the burden of the modern state and its absolutist claim, not 
least to territoriality and absolute borders. (pp. 129-130)
Thus, he called for a new evaluation that re-envisions the hitherto sacrosanct historical 
assumptions and actors along with the conception of modern state. Therefore, a deeper 
scrutiny of the recent secessionist movement in the region depicts how historical 
identities remained powerful tools in organizing and mobilizing peoples against states 
burdened with the historical load burdened upon them by colonial powers. It was the 
abuse of history that served to explain the colonization of Eritrea by Ethiopia and 
the formulation of the black colonization thesis amongst Oromo elites. Due to the 
ongoing  intellectual  failure  of  turning  past politics into binding history, our distant
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past is a matter of political concern as is indicated in many of the public discourses. 
The practical steps needed for the purification of history from ab/uses is smartly 
articulated by Guazzini (2003, p. 11). This exposition prescribes the production, 
reproduction and dissemination of a truly free, ethical and socially worthy historical 
knowledge capable of educating the new generation about the culture of inclusion and 
appreciation of difference (Guazzini, 2003, p. 11).
SOCIO-CULTURAL JUSTIFICATIONS: ELITISM
The legacies of colonialism were not the only reasons which are factored in triggering 
the secessionist movements of the region. Elites had been entrusted with the task of 
envisioning an imaginary community modelled after the nation states of Europe. This 
has ignited elusive passion and fervour of separatism and ultra-nationalism under the 
banner of a ‘mythical nation’. The elitist political entrepreneurs of the region have 
been manipulating identities produced by their own craftsmanship of primordialization 
(Tronvoll, 2003, p. 51; Sisay 2009, p. 121) as a political strategy for securing political 
legitimacy (Guazzini, 2003, p. 4).
For this end, they select or forge identities that suit them in defining their interests 
disguised as the group’s interest. In the process, they affect the self-definition of the 
group, its boundaries and social formation to the extent that its nationality would be 
completely different from its precursor or progenitor. “I am Oromo, Tigray or Amhara” 
as a first discourse which has widely diffused into the self-identification discourse 
in Ethiopia is a case in point. The preoccupation of the populace on divisive and 
politicized identities confers the chance of ideological legitimacy for political elites 
(Guazzini, 2003, p. 3). However, some sections of the society remain sandwiched 
and highly perplexed with the conflicting of values between their traditions and the 
notions of the political elites (Crummey, 2003, p. 117).
This phenomenon has complicated the regional globalization process and 
promotes separatist tendencies. Again, the contingency of forming preference 
in a community moves parallel to the knowledge production and dissemination 
usually spearheaded by elites but yet most of them convey aspects of embedded 
political interest. This shows the systematic distortion of facts; information 
and production of wronged alternatives either by politicizing or de-politicizing 
history and human identity. Thus, elite driven politicization of history and human 
identity continue to play their roles and the way out remains intact awaiting 
determined heralds ready to establish the organic past.
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INVENTION OF IDENTITIES
In spite of the existence of political entities resting on a common and exclusive identity, 
in most cases secessionist or/and irredentist aspirations in the Horn were rooted upon 
the invention of an imagined homogenous political community that rested on critical 
natural resources instrumental for transforming inventions into a reality by way of 
producing a large political community. This disillusioned process is short sighted and 
mostly fails to stretch its roots as far back as the pre-colonial connections; meaning 
that the histories of the communities will be traced from a sagacious and foggy shared 
origin. 
This shows the irony of the project because while Europe, the birthplace of nation 
state, went far along the trans-nationality path, the Horn as a whole is struggling 
to achieve nationality (Crummey, 2003, p. 117). For in realizing the instrumentalist 
dream, political elites, instead of examining the processes that brought about the 
post-colonial realities, were preoccupied in constructing divisive walls centred on 
animosity neglecting pacific interactions.
However, recently there are very few regionalist heads aspiring for the rectification 
of the neglected portion of the Horn’s veritable and rich past. Crummey articulated 
the regionalist vision and aspirations for creating a shared past and common destiny 
amongst the peoples of the Horn by moulding associations of sovereignties. In 
describing the causes that infuse barricades of interstate interconnections, he 
criticizes the betrayal of the intelligentsia against their own society in the production 
of knowledge on the history, culture and politics with a general tone of regret and 
exigency. Crummey (2003, pp. 118-129) curses the political elites for the dysfunctional 
states in the Horn.This shows the systematic distortion of facts; information and 
production of wrongedalternatives that have been manufactured either by politicizing 
or de-politicizing history and human identity. 
This following  subtopic  tries  to  address  some  of  the  basic  political features and 
processes that have fundamentally impacted the genesis and growth of secessionist 
forces in Ethiopia. 
ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICS
Ethnicity is an elusive and fluid concept which has both subjective and objective 
components. Thinkers in the earlier period of the nineteenth century dismissed 
ethnicity as a form of irrational and false consciousness. Accordingly, Marx and 
Engel forecast the disappearance of ethnicity with the emergency of the industrial 
proletariat,  but,  contrary  to  their  view, multi  ethnic  states fractured during the 
post-cold war period and aggravated the intra state conflict (Denis, 2002, p. 459). The
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view that ethnicity is a transit phenomenon in the process of the formation of modern 
nations went through radical revision. There are two perspectives in the understanding 
of ethnicity. The first is the instrumentalist perspective which conceives ethnicity in 
a situational, contextual and subjective sense and the second is that the essentialist/
primordial view is typified by a tendency to conceptualize identity in static terms. In 
fact, ethnic identity is not static but it bears roots in a historically relevant culture. 
Thus, ethnicity deserves to be treated as a phenomenon more complex than either 
primordial identity or the flamboyant garb of self-interest (Fardon, 1994, p. 355). In 
addition, ethnic identity is something that is fluid rather than static, an issue which 
is sometimes used as a justification for negating its authenticity. The most likely 
approach in dealing with it is to mingle both perspectives under a creative synthesis. 
The histories of various ethnic groups within the Horn need to be validated as to 
whether they are accurate or mythical. 
Again, the liberal blueprint of nation-building was instrumented through ethnic 
homogenization and forceful assimilation. This has caused a rise of ethno-nationalist 
movements as they endeavour not to give up their identity (Salih & Markakis, 1998, 
p. 7). Thus, the practice of cultural democracy through a multi-national decentralized 
arrangement has gained momentum in multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-lingual 
societies throughout the Horn because of the disastrous destruction of the nation 
states (Crummey, 2003, p. 123). Thus, state-driven national unification and the era of 
centralization have come to an end. The dysfunctions can be inferred from the irony 
when the architectures of the notion went far into regional union yet the Horn is still 
exercising the project of state building by making new walls out of the old breaks 
(Crummey, 2003, p. 118). 
The abovementioned explanations trace the roots of the ethno-nationalist movement 
for secession from the problem of the state in legitimizing itself while it went to the 
process of nation building. The nation building, as is indicated, in the liberal blueprint 
and the way in which ethnicity was addressed in the process, is argued to be the 
driveand the embedded cause for the rise of secessionist politics in Ethiopia. On the 
other hand, Rok (2002) argued that ethnicity has much to do with competitive politics 
caused by environmental scarcity. It is used by the powerful and/or powerless groups 
to control the state apparatus and its resources. The later explanation emphasizes the 
different impacts in resource allocation and state interference as the main cause for 
ethnic based competitive politics; something which usually manifests as outright 
claims for secession after weighting the power balance of contenders.
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THE POLITICS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND POST-1991 
DEVELOPMENTS
In Ethiopia, the question of nationalities and the right of secession appeared in the 
academic debate as part of the student movement politics of the 1960s (Bahru, 2014). 
Thus, the issue was publicized following the release of Waleligne’s article which 
argued about the existence of many nations masked in Ethiopian state nationalism. 
This article was however challenged by many state nationalists in the movement 
(Ayalewu, 2013).
Due to this fact, he is adored by some as the Lenin of Ethiopia. His thesis serves 
as a basis for legitimizing the secession of Eritrea; a claim from ONLF, OLF and 
TPLF in defiance of state nationalists’ tent of maintaining de-ethnicized unitary state. 
The question caused a state legitimating crisis and a rise of ethno-nationalism which 
saw Ethiopian nationalism as a symbol of oppression, black colonialism and cultural 
suicide. It has also created an impasse between Pan-Ethiopian state nationalists 
and ethno-nationalists. However, Waleligne and his colleagues understood the state 
and its ideology in light of Marxism as an institution of oppression which deserves 
dismantling for ensuring proletariat internationalism. I regard this as tantamount to 
ideological national treason and self-denial.
After the downfall of the Derg, brought about through a coalition of ethno-nationalist 
insurgent groups, there was an attempt of instituting a transitional charter which 
called for redefining the Ethiopian state whereby equal rights and self-determination 
of all the peoples to be the governing principles of political, economic and social 
life of the peoples of Ethiopia would be granted. What had been chartered out in 
this transitionalcharter was later on confirmed in the establishment of Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the secessionistconstitution. Thus, EPRDF 
made a paradigm shift in the state building strategy by instituting a decentralization 
approach (Eshete, 2013)  claiming that it would end the vicious cycle of violence and 
danger of disintegration along with forging one political and economic community. It 
has applauded it as a novel change that has transformed Ethiopia’s political landscape. 
However, both the federal arrangement and the secessionist constitution are intellectual 
and bring with them practical challenges. Scholars and some opposition parties 
criticized the federal arrangement as primordial tribalism that will provoke ethnic 
animosity/violence (Alemu, 2005, p. 332); and as the continuation of Abyssinian 
divide-and-rule by a minority group domination in a new fashion (Vaughan, 2003). 
Recently, we have also witnessed localized identity questions. Still, EPRDF insisted 
that it had instituted political modernization that would ensure Ethiopian renaissance 
by  transcending  the  odds of disintegration. However, if we ask the question of why 
the adoption of ethnic federalism and the  secessionist constitution  (article 39) failed
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to contain such political forces, the answer remains implausible. 
CONCLUSION
The study was focused on historical watersheds without dismissing the hitherto 
mentioned factors that serve as roots for the rise and development of secessionism 
in Ethiopia. Accordingly, the making and interruption of nation state building has 
caused intensification of secessionist, liberationist and irredentist ethno-nationalist 
forces in Ethiopia. A common way to express the later was by using the epithet 
greater. This political cataclysm was further aggravated by the (ab)use of history and 
instrumentalization of social identities. The crux of the matter centred on the binary 
political impasse between ethno-nationalism and state nationalism due to a lack of 
state legitimacy. 
Hence, there is a need for political modernity that liberates the mind tricked by the 
imprints of colonialism diffused through modern education and hastens the moves 
towards creating state legitimacy. As indicated in the discussion above, the politics 
of the past serve to legitimize political claims. Thus, the purification of history from 
(ab)uses through the production and dissemination of professional knowledge is a 
demanding task that awaits experts in the area in lieu of leaving it aside for mis-
educated squabbling elites. The other prominent curse is the competitive ethnicization 
of politics that diffuses into every village and town in Ethiopia and legitimizes real or 
invented injustices of the past and serves for promoting separatism.
In addition to the internal developments, secessionism in Ethiopia is also fostered 
by the domino effect of the birth of secessionist states in the region and by the new 
technological breakthroughs including social media and warfare technologies.
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The Practice of Civic Ethical Education and its Implications 
for the Development of a Democratic Political Culture
Yilkal Ayalew1
Abstract 
The major goal of civic and ethical education is to create a sense of interdependence 
and recognition of political and moral responsibility amongst citizens. This paper 
deals with the implementation of Civic and Ethical Education (CEE) and its role 
in enhancing the political culture. Political culture is highly associated with and 
manifested through the skill and attitudes of citizens. The study was conducted based 
on a qualitative approach. Data were collected from students, teachers, school 
archives, parents, concerned officials and studies conducted on related issues. It has 
been revealed that the practice of CEE has been beset by many problems such as weak 
methodological and assessment techniques, attitudinal problems and the presence of 
a gap between the existing reality out of the school and the theoretical democratic 
values embedded within the subject matter. This reality indicates that the opportunity 
to develop a democratic political culture of youths through teaching civic and ethical 
education remains questionable. It is recommended that the government need to 
urgently rectify the problem both at national and regional state levels.
Keywords: Civic and ethical education, democratic political culture, civic knowledge, 
civic skills
It is almost impossible for any one person to define the meaning of ‘political culture’ 
in a way that everybody could agree on. Several definitions and explanations had 
been suggested and none of them received unanimous acceptance. One of the points 
of divergence is as to whether or not culture is the cause of institutional structures 
(Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 2002, p. 508). This paper is not intended to present a 
convincing assertion on the two sides; rather it is to show the unresolved disagreement 
over the meaning and concept of political culture. 
The fact is that culture is malleable so that it shapes itself according to the existing 
realities. It is transmitted neither unchanged nor without question from generation to
1     Yilkal Ayalew is a lecturer in the Department of Civics and Ethical Studies at Debre Tabor University. 
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generation. By taking the view that culture is not the cause of institutional structures, 
Barry (1970) argues that “a democratic political culture is a learned response to live 
under democratic institutions” rather than pre-and democratic culture and who are 
active participants in the political, social and economic activities of the country; 
citizens who acquire civic virtue and are rational commitment exerting a causal force 
up on those institutions (pp. 51-52). Accordingly, to strengthen a democratic system 
and institutions, citizens who are equipped with a culture of democracy play crucial 
roles. The idea of democracy in this paper means a system of government in which the 
supreme political authority has been vested in the hands of the people and exercised 
either directly by them or indirectly through their elected representatives. Accordingly, 
democracy embraces the principles of equality, individual freedom and opportunity 
to participate for the common people, as those who actually wield political power. 
Democracies like the USA and Western European countries invested huge capital 
on civic education to produce active and informed citizens (Finkel, 2002, p. 994). 
This shows that active and informed citizenry can be cultivated through education; 
democratic values and principles are not inherently attributed to humans rather they 
are acquired through formal or non-formal education (MoE, 2007, p. 7).
In formal education, civic education has an irreplaceable role in equipping all, 
especially young citizens, with civic knowledge, attitudes and skills. Acquiring 
civic knowledge, skill and attitudes is necessary for citizens to become active in 
the democratic processes (Galston, 2004, p. 263). The first dimension, knowledge, 
comprises the facts and ideas of democracy, citizenship, the Ethiopian government 
system and global concerns that students need to know about in order to become 
informed participants in civic life. The second dimension, attitudes, includes the 
democratic ideals and devotion to those ideals that motivate civic commitment. 
The third dimension, skills, includes the ability to navigate the rules and processes 
of citizenship and governance in the society. From 1990 onwards, states had begun 
to pay attention to civic education and now enjoy popularity and acceptance as an 
additional instrument for promoting democracy (Finkel & Smith, 2011, p. 419).
In 1991, the Derg military regime was replaced by the transitional government in 
Ethiopia. In 1993, following the political transformation, a new curriculum on civic 
education was disseminated along with a New Education and Training Policy. Initially, 
the subject was known as Civic Education. Later on, in 2000, it was renamed as Civic 
and Ethical Education (CEE) after a curricular reform took place (Yamada, 2011, p. 
98). The very rationale of the new curriculum was to support and entrench the newly 
established democratic system (MoE, 2007, p. 8). It is argued that a democratic system 
behaviors which gives life to them. The contested nature of the concept and meaning 
meant that the concept of political culture was pushed away by academics. However, 
has  been  effectively  built  when   there  is  active,  informed  citizens’ participation.
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Accordingly, CEE grew to have an irreplaceable role in producing citizens equipped 
with values of good governance capable of discharging responsibilities (MoE, 2007, 
pp. 6-7).
The above traits, knowledge, attitudes and skills, which are supposed to be acquired 
by students, are important in democratic systems. To pursue democratic political 
cultures, the government of Ethiopia had made various reforms at different times on 
the subject matter. Amongst other reforms, in 2007, a blueprint was prepared for the 
subject to set national standards in each grade level. This is to ensure nationwide 
uniformity in the delivery of instruction and students performance. The content 
of the blueprint has mainly focused on three issues. The first is the provision of 
students’ profile after completing each phase of schooling starting from preschool to 
preparatory. The second issue is about what teaching methodologies and assessment 
techniques should be employed in delivering the subject matter. The third issue deals 
mainly with the organizational structures established from regional state to school 
level. Provisions pertaining to methodology and assessment techniques are also not 
free from limitations since there is no implementation strategy. 
There are some studies conducted about the role of CEE in changing students’ 
behavior (Meron, 2006; Dawit, 2006; Birhanu, 2012; Daniel, 2009; Yamada, 2011). 
Their focus was CEE and students’ behavior through qualitative approach followed 
by case study strategy. Yamada undertook a discourse analysis of the curriculum and 
CEE text books in relation to the issues of diversity and fragility. Dawit studied the 
perception of teachers and students towards CEE and its practice in four high schools 
by means of a descriptive survey method. These studies are crucial in filling the gap 
of research pertaining to the practices of CEE. However, there is no comprehensive 
study which examines the challenges thwarting the effective implementation of CEE 
and its role in the development of democratic political culture of students.
The above-mentioned studies and others, including the Ministry of Education (MoE), 
came up with the findings that the subject matter is not in a position toachieve the 
intended objectives, though there are some significant changes in the awareness of 
students towards their rights. The main purpose of this study is to assess the role of 
CEE in enhancing the democratic culture of students. Active, informed and competent 
personalities are highly associated with the skills and attitudes of students (Finkel, 
2002, p. 1015). Hence, to understand the role of CEE for the development of a student 
democratic political culture, no better way is available except assessing the challenges 
that the  subject  matter  has  been  faced  with  up  to  now. Thus, the study intends 
to answer the following two research questions: (1) what existing problems prevailed 
in the execution of CEE? (2) What implication has arisen from the role of CEE in 
building a democratic culture of students?
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Accordingly, the paper is organized in the following manner; exclusive of this part, the 
paper is made up of four other parts. The section that presents theoretical framework 
shows the relationship between education and democratic political culture. More 
specifically, an attempt is made to explain the role of CEE in enhancing a democratic 
political culture as well as the interdependence nature of civic knowledge, attitudes 
and skills with that of a democratic political culture. The way in which the research 
attempts to solve the problem is included within the methodology section. What the 
study has revealed is narrated in the section of discussion of results. In this section, the 
challenges, which have prevailed over the lifespan of CEE are discussed. Moreover, 
the implications of the results with regard to the development of a student political 
culture are explained.
POLITICAL CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Political culture has existed as long as people have recounted observable differences 
among countries or groups. As noted above in the introduction part, the meaning and 
concept of political culture is subject to disagreement amongst scholars of the field 
(Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, 2002, p. 508). The divergence is whether “political 
culture shapes institutional structure or political culture is shaped by institutional 
structure”. The proponents of the first notion perceive culture as a pre-rational 
commitment exerting a causal force upon those institutions (Almond & Verba, 
1963, p. 11). Critical of Almond and Verbas’ position Barry (1970, pp. 51-52) argues 
that a democratic political culture is a learned response to living under democratic 
institutions. The idea that every political system has been influenced by the existing 
norm, tradition and value of the society is acceptable. I argue that modern democratic 
ideals are first born out from enlightened Europeans and appeared as institutions by 
progressive intellectuals involved in politics like the American founding fathers. 
Hence, for the well-functioning of such democratic ideals and institutions people 
who are equipped with democratic outlooks are needed. Presumably the United States 
and many West European countries were aware that people can learn democratic 
values, skills and participatory orientations through civic education and thus devoted 
considerable resources over the past several decades to civic education as part of 
their larger efforts to provide democracy assistance and strengthen civil society in 
emerging democracies around the world (Finkel, 2002, p. 994). Many explanations 
and definitions have been tried culture as the “set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments 
that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying 
assumptions  and  rules that govern behavior in the political system” (Aronoff, 2002, 
p. 11640). Hence, political culture is intimately linked with the notion of ‘behavioral 
revolution’ which signifies a shift” from studying formal institutions to informal 
behaviors which gives life to them. The contested nature of the concept and meaning
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meant that the concept of political culture was pushed away by academics. However, 
following the end of the Cold War, a greater interest has been seen among states to 
have in place a supportive political culture for their democratic institutions.
It is apparent that societies have always been in search of ways in which their young 
citizens can be prepared for citizenship and in how they can best learn to take part 
in societal life. After the 1990s, democracies became convinced of the importance of 
creating a supportive political culture for their democratic systems and institutions (van 
Deth, 2013, p. 9). Today, that interest might better be described as a growing concern, 
particularly in democratic societies. The level of understanding and acceptance of 
the rights and responsibilities among the totality of citizens in a state is determined 
by the maintenance and improvement of constitutional democracy (Stimmann, 1998, 
p. 3). Such improvement of constitutional democracy flourishes again when citizens 
develop responsible ways of thinking, believing and acting (Boyer, 1990, p. 5). 
For this result, education became the best instrument to nurture citizens according 
to democratic political culture. Etymologically the word “education” derives from 
the Latin educere, which means to lead or draw out and from which we retain. This 
provides drawing out or developing the potential within a person. This could consist 
of the activity of drawing out a specific ability, such as the ability to perform some 
skill.
CEE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE
Despite education having been delivered within a formal classroom system, CEE is 
now gaining greater attention than ever before. The learning outcomes of the subject 
matter include the knowledge, attitudes and skills needed by citizens to become 
effective and active citizens. An effective active citizen is a person who understands the 
obligation and undertakes the responsibility to improve community conditions, builds 
healthier communities and addresses social problems (MoE, 2007, p. 4). Accordingly, 
regardless of differences in approach and methodology, programs in an educational 
system should be designed in a way so as to promote common advantages and social 
welfare. The rational for designing and implementing curriculum for CEE at all levels 
of education in Ethiopia confirms the aforementioned narrations. Accordingly, CEE 
has irreplaceable roles in producing citizens equipped with values of good governance 
and democratic thinking and who are active participants in the political, social and 
economic activities of the country; citizens who acquire civic virtue and are capable 
of discharging responsibilities, as well as citizens possessing scientific  knowledge to 
combat backward traditions (MoE, 2007, p. 3). Though CEE is vital in equipping the 
aforementioned values and skills, it needs a supportive democratic culture from the 
government, the school and the society at large to mirror.
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The need to deliver the subject is associated with the notion that democratic values 
and principles are inherently attributed to humans but they are acquired through 
formal or non-formal education. Accordingly, civic knowledge, skills and attitudes, 
nurtured by CEE, are the basis of such a democratic political culture (van Deth, 2013, 
p. 9). Recent research indicates that levels of political awareness highly affect the 
acceptance of democratic principles and attitudes towards specific issues, as well as 
adversely impacting upon political participation as a whole (Finkel, 2002, p. 994). So 
far, political culture is widely perceived as something composed of values, beliefs, 
norms and assumptions which are mostly manifested through believing and acting. 
Civic disposition and skills of citizens are determinant factors in the development 
of democratic political culture.and skills of citizens are determinant factors in the 
development of democratic political culture.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this study, a qualitative approach has been used. Qualitative data about the practice 
of CEE as well as the students’ performance was collected through interview Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) and observation. Interviews were undertaken with 
student representatives, CEE teachers, school principals and wereda and regional 
state experts. Data were also collected through FGDs with teachers from different 
departments and students. Non-participant observation was also conducted to see 
classroom instructions and students’ interaction in the school environment. Document 
analysis was also very important in this study in reviewing students’ records, research 
findings on CEE to strengthen findings as well as to make inferences at national level 
about the challenges pertaining to CEE in the promotion of a democratic political 
culture. Cluster random sampling was used for selecting informants in a total of five 
FGDs from two selected high schools: Hotie Preparatory and Secondary School and 
Hayik Preparatory and Secondary Schools in South Wollo Zone
According to Creswell, a qualitative data analysis is conducted concurrently with 
gathering data, along with data interpretation and writing the research report (Creswell, 
2009, p. 181). The data gathered from the interviews and FGD were first transcribed 
and then thoroughly analyzed. In addition, the researcher used the following steps: 
data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing and verification. This activity 
was accompanied by triangulation of a thematic analysis on data from the literature. 
Then, thematic categories with codes of the data were identified before the research 
report was written. 
CHALLENGES THAT THWART EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CEE
According to a survey conducted by MoE in 2007, there was a problem with the mode
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of instruction in teaching CEE; it was done through a process that made students 
passive and become dominated by the teacher (MoE, 2007, p. 15). The blueprint of 
CEE urges concerned bodies to place a high emphasis upon the process of teaching 
and learning especially with regard to the mode of delivery of instruction. Sadly, 
this is not the case today after the promulgation of the blueprint. Teachers remain 
disengaged from interactive teaching activities like debate, visiting public institutions 
and holding class group discussions that could develop civic skills (Interview and 
Class Observation). 
Civic skill pertains to the state of exercising one’s own rights and discharging 
responsibilities as a citizen (Stimmann, 1998, p. 8). It is the most crucial but inseparable 
component of CEE and encourages students to be equipped with participatory skills. 
Students’ engagement in civic issues implies a practical implementation of what they 
learn in their civic class and it has an irreplaceable impact on the students’ democratic 
political culture.
Civic attitudes are not developed by teaching young people; only the facts of CEE 
are conveyed. Participatory teaching approach is vital for the development of civic 
attitudes of students. Data gathered through FGDs and interviews revealed that almost 
all teachers, students as well as wereda and zonal experts and focal persons agreed 
that students did not develop their civic attitudes vis-a-vis their civic knowledge. This 
scenario is also evident in studies conducted in other regions of the country (Birhanu, 
2012, p. 68; Dawit, 2006, pp. 73-74). Accordingly, students are hesitant to accept and 
respect the values of CEE.  Hence, it requires equipping them with a civic character by 
encouraging active commitment about democratic values such as public spiritedness, 
civility, respect for the rule of law, critical mindedness and willingness to listen, 
negotiate and compromise (SCA, 2014, p. 17; Stimmann, 1998, p. 11).
Classroom observation revealed significant inconsistencies between the textbook 
approach and the teachers’ delivery of instruction. The textbooks were prepared with 
case studies and questions for discussion for students in 2010. However, teachers 
referred to other sources and previous text books to prepare short notes for the 
students. The main reason was lack of interest from the teachers to conduct class 
discussions. Lack of interest in participatory learning by both teachers and students is 
also evident in schools found in other regions (Birhanu, 2012, p. 68; Dawit, 2006, pp. 
78-79). For instance, Dawit (2006, pp. 78-79) revealed that teachers did not employ 
debate or dialogue activities because they fear to carry out debates on political issues 
since there is big gap between theoretical knowledge and the realities on the ground. 
Assesment techniques have irreplaceable impacts on the effective accomplishment of 
civic knowledge, attitudes and skills of the students. In this regard, MoE (2007, p. 9), 
in its blueprint,  provides  some  techniques (Performance Assessment Technique and 
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Portfolio Assessment Technique) as a benchmark to be applied by schools in general 
and teachers in particular. In practical scenario, the above techniques are neither 
implemented in teaching CEE nor institutionalized in the category of assessment 
techniques in schools throughout the Amhara National regional state. The case was 
attributed to a lack of authorized assessment techniques on civic skills and civic 
attitudes. The officer in the Amhara National Regional Educational Bureau says the 
Bureau needs only one school which is committed to being a model in this regard 
and then its unreserved support would be given (Interview with CEE officer at the 
Amhara National Regional Education Bureau). The problem has also been witnessed 
at national level. The questions in the national examination prepared for grade 10 and 
12 fall under cognitive domains which assess the content that ought to be known by 
the students. This leads teachers and students to focus only on the knowledge content 
of the subject matter by relegating the two components of CEE skill and attitude. 
PERCEPTIONS /MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING 
THE SUBJECT MATTER ITSELF
There is ample evidence that supports the argument that CEE is an unlucky subject 
in the Ethiopian academia. One of the most visible grounds is that the subject is 
under pressure and subjected mainly to the political interests of the incumbent 
political party, EPRDF, without showcasing the interests of the opposition or the 
public opinions at large. On the one hand, the subject has been considered as an 
instrument of indoctrination of the incumbent political party to elongate its rule and 
the teachers of CEE are perceived as cadres of such a mission. On the other hand, 
the political elites of the ruling party do not trust the teachers for fear that they could 
use the subject to promote the ideas of the opposition and negative attitudes towards 
‘constitutional order’. These two perceptions or misperceptions fueled each other and 
pose complicated challenge to an effective implementation of the subject. One of 
the challenges mentioned above is that teachers are disengaged from participatory 
learning activities such as debate and dialogue because they do not care/dare to 
touch political issues either appreciating or disregarding the existing political system 
because of presumed consequences (Dawit, 2006, p. 78).
Another attitudinal problem comes from the students and teachers themselves. On the 
one hand, students who participated in the FGDs did not consider CEE as a subject 
with equal weight to other subjects. This attitude emanates from the assumption that 
the content of CEE is similar across all grade levels of general education. As a result, 
students  assume  that  nothing  new  would  be added in learning CEE. However, the 
students’ argument seems to overlook the importance of civic attitudes and skills that 
should  be  built  up   progressively  throughout  all  age  levels. Looking  at  the subject 
matter only from knowledge point of view is not only the problem of the students.
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Rather, teachers and the school administration also share such perceptions. On the other 
hand, the absence of a sense of ownership for the subject matter is manifested in most 
teachers as a chronic attitudinal challenge. This emanates from two reasons. The first is 
the scarcity of teachers who graduated in CEE. Considering the interdisciplinarynature 
of the subject and the newly stipulated curriculum, it is currently being taught by 
teachers who graduated from other fields of study, i.e. history, political science or 
geography. These teachers have no sense of ownership to make them committed to 
the delivery of instruction or to the subject itself. Even though new graduates of CEE 
are recently joining schools, the gap has still not been narrowed. For instance, until the 
time of data collection for this study in Haik Preparatory School (Dec. 2014) there had 
only been one teacher of CEE who was a graduate of CEE. The Regional Educational 
Bureau, for its part, admits the problem; despite the number of graduates increasing 
each year, it is unable to narrow the gap (Interview with CEE officer at the Regional 
Education Bureau, Feb. 2015). The second reason is related to the aforementioned 
political perception and misperception towards the subject matter. Since many other 
teachers and the public consider the subject as an instrument of indoctrination of 
the incumbent political party, the teachers are not interested in demonstrating their 
commitment to the teaching of the subject.
LACK OF MOTIVATION IN THE TEACHERS THEMSELVES
Implementing appropriate and necessary teaching methods and assessment regard, 
both MoE and schools today limit their efforts almost exclusively to teaching civic 
knowledge, especially the kinds of knowledge that can easily be measured by 
standardized achievement tests. Teaching approaches and assessment techniques 
to enhance students’ performance should be conducted in the classroom during 
instruction. techniques are highly demanding. It poses an additional burden to the 
teacher; something which is not the case with most other subject teachers. “Why do 
I suffer if I am not motivated by some incentives” was the response of almost all 
informant teachers during discussions and interviews. As a result, lack of incentives 
for making CEE a priority for the school teachers makes them distance themselves 
from their once central civic mandate. This issue is critical and needs special attention 
by concerned authorities. To bring about promising changes from the subject, the 
teachers need to work more than their normal mandate. For this demanding task, they 
need to get incentives.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF CEE IN DEVELOPING A 
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
The findings of this study have revealed that CEE is not in a position to develop 
students’ democratic  political  culture.  This  is  something that needs immediate and
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serious rectification. The government of Ethiopia has introduced and implemented CEE 
through successive reforms and revisions. According to the Ministry of Education, the 
objective of CEE is to support the democratic system and institutions by producing 
citizens who are knowledgeable about democratic political cultures. Hence, the subject 
has been accorded a special position at policy level to produce informed, competent 
citizens who can engage in civic and political matters and be responsible and ethical 
citizens. However, the results are far from expected. If one applies a simple inductive 
inference; the subject matter arguably has not been successful in producing students 
possessing a democratic political culture. Civic attitudes and skills are about the 
conformity of students with characters of good citizens and who actively participate in 
the socio-political systems respectively. So, it could be put like this; civic attitudes and 
skills are components of CEE that are determinant in the development of democratic 
culture. Both the two high schools studied, as well as other studies, revealed that 
student’ performances in the two components fall below expected outcomes. As 
indicated above, the existing challenges impede upon an effective implementation of 
proper methodology and assessment techniques vital for the development of skill and 
attitude. Therefore, CEE is not achieving its goals in the development of a democratic 
political culture of students. The government needs to reflect once more upon the 
realities outside the school in general and on the subject of CEE in particular.
The absence of expected coordinated efforts from all levels of governments, school 
communities and parents that could motivate the students to develop the expected 
knowledge, attitude and skills led to this significant gap between knowledge on the 
one hand and attitude and skill on the other hand. In this regard, both MoE and schools 
today limit their efforts almost exclusively to teaching civic knowledge, especially the 
kinds of knowledge that can easily be measured by standardized achievement tests. 
Teaching approaches and assessment techniques to enhance students’ performance 
should be conducted in the classroom during instruction. 
Moreover, the three components of CEE cannot be grasped through formal education 
only. Attitude and skills are highly shaped by the values, norms and traditions 
entrenched within societies. Students get confused and frustrated when they observe 
that the reality can often be inconsistent with what they learn in the school. Eventually, 
they began to figure out that they need to learn only for grades and become reluctant to 
strictly follow the principles. One can understand this from the questions that students 
pose in class such as “why does this happen if the principle says like this?”. The factual 
materials they received in schools become incompatible with the system entrenched 
in their society and government offices. This implies that there is a large gap and 
mismatch between CEE learning and the realities of the learner outside the school 
(Dawit, 2006, p. 73).  Such  inconsistencies  between  CEE  and reality are one of the
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most serious problems that obstruct the role of the subject matter for the development 
of democratic political culture. 
The fact remains that the task of aiming to create critical, active and competent citizens 
is commendable on the part of the government but frustrating for these citizens 
dealing with the many evident contradictions within the available course. Therefore, 
values of CEE need to be internalized by both the society and the government. Hence, 
searching for other ways to teach CEE becomes necessary in order to achieve the goals 
of CEE. Amongst other ways, mainstreaming CEE among concerned educational 
sector authorities, parents, media, parliamentary debates, seminars, workshops and 
discussions with the elderly could be helpful for progress.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In general, it has been revealed that in both schools and grade levels studied as part of 
this research, students were not good enough in either civic attitudes or skills which 
are the determinant factors of democratic political culture of citizens. Disengagement 
from methodologies such as debate, field work, presentations and assessment 
techniques appropriate to assess required attitudes and skills pose pressing problems 
in the implementation of CEE. The huge gap between the existing reality out of 
schools and the theoretical democratic values in the subject also makes both teachers 
and students hesitant to act according to the expected situations. Moreover, attitudinal 
problems pertaining to the subject matter and teachers greatly inhibit the effective 
execution of CEE in the schools. Therefore, one can certainly conclude that if civic 
attitudes and skills are determinant elements for the development of democratic 
political culture and if the performance of students is below theexpected levels, CEE 
is not playing its role on the development of students’ democratic political culture.
An immediate rectification is needed to counter the prevailing challenges on the CEE 
practices. To this end, the following are recommendations made in line with the above 
outlined conclusions:
·	 The federal and regional governments should take practical measures in 
building democracy.
·	 Government officials at all levels need to be adherents of democratic values 
and be role models for youths.
·	 Adult civic education needs to be provided with a view towards creating civic 
awareness in societies.
·	 The Amhara National Regional State Educational Bureau needs to prepare
•
• 
•
•
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·	 specific practical guidelines for the implementation of the blueprint. Necessary 
feedback as well as supervision should be given.
·	 The Amhara National Regional State Educational Bureau, the Zonal and 
Wereda Educational offices should all give due attention to the
·	 implementation of CEE beyond sticking to the reports which are not usually 
acceptable. 
·	 The Amhara National Regional State Educational Bureau should prepare 
an authorized assessment technique implemented by all schools to measure 
attitudes and skills.
·	 Both the federal and regional governments should prepare incentives for CEE 
teachers for their additional burden in enhancing attitudes and skills of students.
·	 Teachers should be committed in their jobs to balance students’ civic skills 
with their civic knowledge.
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The Internet and Democratization in Ethiopia: 
Challenges and Prospects
Tezera Tazebew1
Abstract
The traditional Ethiopian political system was closed, having no idea of (Rawlsian) 
public reason and involving little exchanges of information. The ruler and the ruled, 
the center and the periphery (including the frontier) had no significant communication. 
Exchange of information was basically one-way and vertical, i.e. from the center to 
the periphery, from the ruler to the ruled. Since its first entrance in Ethiopia in the 
early 2000s, the internet has widened the Ethiopian public sphere. Still, under a state 
monopoly, internet usage and internet actors in Ethiopia have seen massive increments 
during the last two decades. The internet is facilitating popular mobilization and 
strengthening civil society in Ethiopia. While at times, the Ethiopian government 
has been obliged to respond to public opinion expressed on the internet, the most 
important issue that will determine internet’s role in Ethiopia’s democratization is 
the practical application of freedom of expression. This study investigates the much-
publicized democratic potential of the internet and related technologies to understand 
how (if at all) the medium could be (and was being) mobilized against an authoritarian 
regime. The challenges that the internet’s capacity faced in the democratization of the 
Ethiopian state and society and opportunities ahead will be examined.
Keywords: Internet, media, Ethiopia, democratization
The media has its own impact on politics, domestic and international. The term “CNN 
Effect” has been used to indicate the impact of the media on domestic political dynamics 
and international affairs (Robinson, 1999, p.301). One of the media infrastructures 
that came to the fore during the late twentieth century was the internet; an electronic 
network of computers that allows millions of computer users around the world to 
exchange information. The Internet Revolution that the whole world  began to witness 
since the early 1990s2  has arguments on the internet’s impact on democratization. The 
third  section  traces  already  impacted -both positively and negatively -on  the  daily
1  Tezera Tazebew is a lecturer at the Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, University of Gondar. 
Contact: tezera@ymail.com
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lives of people in terms of personal and societal wellbeing, social relations, pop 
culture and economics (DiMaggio, Paul, Hargittai, Neuman & Robinson, 2001; 
Litan& Rivlin, 2001; Kelty, 2008; Briggle, Brey & Spence, 2012).
One of the areas in which the advent and power of the internet is assumed to have 
its own unique implications is democratization (Weare, 2002; Kahn & Kellner, 
2004). Needless to say, the scholarly debate is far from a consensus on the role of the 
internet on democratization. On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that the 
internet furthers democracy. On the other hand, there are others who argue that the 
internet doesn’t have a role in democracy promotion, or in fact, that the internet hurts 
democracy (Persily, 2017). 
Ethiopia entered the digital age during the early 1990s. This coincided with the 
transition from an authoritarian rule to what was ostensibly an “ambitious attempt at 
democratic transformation” (Ottaway, 1995, p. 67). Over the years, the internet has 
expanded in Ethiopia, with an ever-growing and visible impact, not less in the political 
processes. Yet, much of the debate on the impact of the internet on democratization 
is not supplemented by watertight empirical findings. It is thus the intention of this 
paper to address this lacuna by critically examining the role of the internet on the 
democratization of the Ethiopian state and society and its prospects. Does the internet 
have a role in democratization and, if yes, how? What are the opportunities that the 
internet creates for the democratization of Ethiopian state and society? What are the 
challenges faced in this endeavor? What are its prospects for genuine success in lifting 
Ethiopia out of the prism of authoritarianism? These are the most important questions 
that I want to address within this brief paper.
This study employed a qualitative research methodology. The study used secondary 
sources of data, which are collected from books, journal articles, periodicals and 
other public records, both published and unpublished. The study is underpinned by 
the conceptual framework of technological instrumentalism, which is grounded on 
the assumption that the internet’s impact on political changes is affected by several 
factors “which include political flux, the rate of Internet penetration, and government 
control over the Internet” (Ko, Lee & Jang, 2009, p. 281).
To properly address the topic, this paper will be divided into five main sections. 
Following some brief introductory remarks, the first section provides a brief 
account of the politics of democratization. After indicating the global contours of 
democratization, the second section introduces the arguments and counterthe state of 
2   Indeed, the origin of the internet goes back to the 1960s. It was in the early 1990s, however, that the 
internet was transformed from being a military communication to a commercialized network.
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democratization  in  the  post-1991 Ethiopia. In the fourth section, a brief assessmentwill 
be made of the records of the internet’s role in promoting democratization in Ethiopia. 
Also discussed in this section are the major challenges that threaten the internet’s 
role. In the fifth section, an analysis will be made of the prospects of the successful 
role of the internet for democratization in Ethiopia. Finally, the paper concludes by 
finding that the impact of the internet so far is minimal and how its role in the future 
will be determined by a combination of internal and external factors affecting its use 
and governance. 
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
The analytical approach of this study is grounded on a distinction between democracy 
and democratization. Here, democratization is seen in its broadest signification as 
embodying not just the political aspect of democracy (democratic government), but the 
becoming of democracy a way of life (Zakaria, 2003). As a way of life, democracy is 
a socially constructed system. Criticizing stipulative definitions, Laurence Whitehead 
(2002) offers an alternative definition which emphasizes the ‘constructedness’ of 
democracy. For Whitehead (2002), democracy is not “a predetermined end-state, but 
is a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome, not just as a feasible equilibrium 
but as a socially desirable and imaginary future” (p. 3). From this, Whitehead goes 
onto describing democratization as 
“the process of moving towards this not entirely fixed future state [i.e. 
democracy, which] must be analyzed as a complex dynamic and long-term 
affair. It will also be ‘open-ended’ in the sense that it always remains open to 
further reconsideration and revision in the light of experience”.
DOES THE INTERNET PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION?
As noted above, there is no scholarly consensus on the role and/or impact of the 
internet on democratization. On the one side are what might be called cyber-
optimists and on the other are the cyber-pessimists. In between the two, there are 
cyber-skeptics, representing the amplification theory. First, for cyber-optimists, the 
internet and democracy have positive correlations, i.e. internet furthers democracy. 
The optimism is grounded mainly on earlier history and the nature of the internet 
itself (Best & Wade, 2009; Ko et al., 2009). The precedent of modern communications 
technology impacting on democratic governance was laid by developments related to 
the telephone, radio, television and satellites (Weare, 2002, p. 664).
To the cyber-optimists, the internet does indeed promote democracy. The democracy 
scholar  Larry  Diamond  (2010) was speaking for many when he dubbed the internet
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a “liberation  technology”.  In  their study of the impact of the internet on democracy 
since 1992, Michael L. Best and Keegan Wade (2009), scholars at Georgia Tech, 
concluded that since the turn of this century, the internet has indeed become “a positive 
force for democratization” (p. 255). Recently, the Arab Spring became the poster child 
for this school of thought. 
How does the internet promote democratization? There are several theories explaining 
this correlation. First, the internet is one media of exercising the freedom of expression 
that democracy entails. Second, the most prominent explanation is encapsulated in the 
concept of the dictator’s dilemma (Boas, 2000). Echoing the concepts of prisoners’ 
dilemma and the security dilemma, the dictator’s dilemma describes a condition 
in which globalization has the effect of opening up the communication borders 
of sovereign states, thereby enabling a free flow of information, unconstrained by 
states’ monopoly. This, in turn, can lead to a net decrease in the states’ ability in the 
production and dissemination of information and an increase in their responsiveness. 
The internet can also be used to expose and challenge centralized power.
Third, there is what might be called the ‘digital dissent’ theory. According to James 
Fielder (2012), the internet promotes anti-regime dissent in authoritarian states due 
to three interrelated factors: distance, decentralization and interaction. The internet 
provides a low-cost communication unlimited by the distance. In its architecture, the 
internet is a decentralized medium, “where no one is in control”, as Thomas Friedman 
(cited in Zakaria, 2003, p. 2) puts it.
On the other side are cyber-pessimists, who ardently believe that the internet doesn’t 
promote democracy and that, in fact, it might hurt democracy.3 Manners of usage 
by the state and several non-state actors such as religious institutions, corporations 
and thought-leader individuals determine the internet’s role in democracy promotion. 
Evgeny Morozov (2011, p. 253), a prominent author on digital technology, was 
speaking for many when he lamented the “assumption that more connections and more 
networks necessarily lead to more freedom or more democracy” as cyber-utopianism.
In between these two views, there is the amplification theory, which strictly holds the 
view, by analogy, that for whosoever has, to her shall be added, but whosoever has 
not, from her shall be taken away even that she has. In this view, the internet doesn’t 
provide a condition for democracy in itself. The internet’s role is reframed in terms 
of  the  context;  that  it  only  exacerbates  the  existing  conditions.  Thus,  whereas 
for  statesand  societies  who  have  a  glimpse  of  democracy,  the  internet  will be a 
3   The members of this school are not just scholars, but also authoritarian regimes all around the world. 
Note that the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dubbed social media “the worst menace to 
society” (Letsch, 2013).
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democratizing force, for those who haven’t any or who only have authoritarianism, 
the internet will be a tool of suppression.
DEMOCRATIZATION IN ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia’s recent political history is dominated by attempts at democratizing the 
state and the wider society. For much of its history, the Ethiopian political system 
was dominated by the monarchy. The monarchy was abolished only in the wake of 
thepopular Revolution of 1974. After hijacking the Revolution of 1974, the military 
junta, known commonly as the Derg, instituted what became known as “garrison 
socialism”,a kind of bureaucratic-authoritarian military regime (Markakis, 1979). 
Nonetheless, the Derg proved to be more repressive than the regime it succeeded. The 
Ethiopian state was militarized. The precarious position of the Derg was legitimized 
by aliens and undeveloped ideologies. The new ideology of Ethiopian Socialism 
(a hodgepodge of Ethiopian nationalism and socialism) was introduced, but soon 
overturned by Scientific Marxism-Leninism.  
Opposition to the military regime began almost as soon as it seized power, which 
later grew into a full-blown civil war. After years of struggle, the Derg regime 
was completely overthrown on May 28, 1991. On this day, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was then a coalition of four rebel 
groups, took control of Addis Ababa, the country’s capital and largest city.
The Ethiopian trajectory in the post-1991 period can well be understood by what 
González (2008, p. 5) described as “triple transitions” in the context of Central American 
countries. First, there was a transition from a civil war to peace, albeit a precarious 
one. Second, there was a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic rule. The 
endeavor was to transform the country from its totalitarian past to a democratic future. 
The EPRDF called for a national conference on peace and democracy. A Transitional 
Charter was adopted, establishing the Transitional Government of Ethiopia TGE. 
Finally, on December 8, 1994, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia (FDRE) was ratified (Aaron, 2002; Kassahun, 2003). By the end of  the 
transition period, Ethiopia had embraced electoral democracy. Third, there was a 
transition from a state-led to a relatively market-based economy. Thus, economically, 
the attempt was to build a market-oriented economy which the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
entails. Conducted in line with the external pressures from the international financial 
institutions, the economic exercise (which was at times painful) involved stabilization 
along free market lines, privatization and deregulation.
As democracy was the most acceptable form of government by the time EPRDF came 
to power (and  at  the  end  of  the  Cold  War), it  was  rather  impossible for  the new
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government to deny it (Kassahun, 2003, p. 120). Despite the “discursive shift” of 
theoretical espousal of democracy in its form, in practice the EPRDF oppose the 
substance of liberal democracy (Bach, 2011, p. 642). Thus, notwithstanding the fact 
that Ethiopia continues to hold periodic elections, the basic rights of citizens have 
been suppressed.  It turns out, then, that despite all the hopes and expectations that 
EPRDF’s rise to power or the Constitution created, the record is still on the negative. 
According to Freedom House, Ethiopia is one of the most unfree countries in the world, 
with a continuing poor performance on human rights and democracy (FreedomHouse, 
2017)4. 
In fact, in any measure or in almost every regard, democracy is endangered. In terms 
of press freedom, for instance, the press was freed from the age-old censorship as 
early as 1992. The constitutional abolition of censorship made free expression of 
thought possible but the heyday of press freedom was not to last long. Many media 
organizations and journalists were either suspended or barred from the profession. 
Shutdowns of media outlets were exacerbated in the wake of the violence that followed 
the 2005 election (Stremlau, 2011). What was left was state-owned or EPRDF-inclined 
or –sponsored media such as Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation, Fana Broadcasting 
Corporate, Addis Zemen, The Reporter, or Zami FM. Censorship, despite prohibited 
constitutionally, continued, albeit in a different form. Journalists have been jailed, 
or forced to leave their country for political reasons (Freedom House, 2017). The 
existing level of censorship has “stifled [Ethiopia’s] press” (Washington Post, 2015). 
In terms of elections, the Ethiopian experience since 1991 can be deemed a grand 
failure. In accordance with the constitutional provisions, the first general election was 
held in 1995. The EPRDF won the majority in the 547-seat Ethiopian Parliament. The 
second was held in 2000, at a time when ‘brothers [were] at war’,  i.e. the Ethiopian-
Eritrean war. The third, by far the most contested election, was held in 2005. In 2010, 
the fourth general election was held. The fifth and so far the last and the least contested 
general election was held in 2015 (Merera, 2011; Arriola & Lyons, 2016).
As if the case with many of the elections on the African continent, none of these 
elections result in leadership changes. In fact, the de jure multiparty nature of the 
system is now effectively changed into a de facto one-party rule. The EPRDF, which 
claimed  it  had  won all of the general elections, represents itself as a ‘dominant party’ 
and  speculates  about  ruling  the  country  for  the  decades to  come  (Asnake, 2009; 
Merera,  2011). Thus,  despite  the  elections,  the   Ethiopian   government  has  been 
ignoring the constitution that it itself endorsed, denying the Ethiopian people of their
4   The Freedom House’s “Not Free” status designates a country “where basic political rights are absent, and 
basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied” (Freedom House, 2012, p. 4). 
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natural rights and liberties (Freedom House, 2017). These elections did not usually 
manifest people’s participation. They are often dismissed as nothing more than 
window-dressing for EPRDF’s hegemonic and authoritarian governance (Abbink, 
2014).
Related to this is the weakness and fragmentation of opposition politics (Asnake, 
2011). The divided opposition was also rather ineffective in gaining any concessions 
from the regime. Beyond the party politics, the informal movement of the Ethiopian 
Muslims has been a challenge to the government. According to the 2007 population 
census, Ethiopia is home to about 25,037,646 Muslims, making up almost 34% of 
the population (Central Statistical Authority, 2007). Nevertheless, the movement 
was largely limited only to Addis Ababa and thus did not effectively challenge the 
government (Abbink, 2014).
The current Ethiopian government tolerates no dissent. A proven use of force 
allowed the regime to use repression in periods of political crisis, such as after the 
2005 elections and the 2016 protests. Any form of opposition is suppressed. Critics 
continue to be thrown to jail in the name of anti-terrorism. Those who are not jailed 
are often labeled as criminals and subversive (Gagliardone, 2016). One of the most 
important gadgets that the government (especially the late premier Meles Zenawi) 
used routinely is labeling (Kassahun, 2003, p. 137). In fact, political labeling has its 
roots in Ethiopia with the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Bahru, 
2014). The government lamented its critics as anti-Charter (during the Charter’s day), 
chauvinists, neo-liberals, anti-peace, anti-people, anti-development, rent-seeker, 
street-gang, terrorist, extremists and more. But, these were rather scapegoating 
mechanisms and none of this amounted to real terrorism, extremism or neo-liberal 
tendencies. 
The student body, the traditionally politically active part of the Ethiopian society 
(Bahru, 2014), did not rise in active opposition to the EPRDF government. In fact, a 
student opposition began in the early 2000s in Addis Ababa, only to be quickly aborted. 
There were also some student activities around the country, but, when compared with 
the last six decades of contemporary Ethiopian history, student activism is now in 
decline in the post-1991 Ethiopia. It is in the broader context of the weakening and 
decline of traditional forms of political opposition and the limitations of the ‘political 
space’ under the state-led authoritarianism that the political use of the internet shall 
be analyzed. 
WHAT HAS THE INTERNET DONE SO FAR?
The coming to power of the EPRDF coincided with the ‘globalization of the 
internet’inthe  early  1990s.  However, it was not until the early 2000s that Ethiopia’s
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rush to join the ‘information superhighway’ began in earnest. The internet made 
its first entrance in Ethiopia in the late 1990s. In fact, as early as 1993, there were 
‘internet-like’ electronic communication systems, spearheaded by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (Freedom House, 2011). By the late 1990s, 
pioneering attempts were also made at providing internet services by the non-state 
actors, such as the British Council (Gagliardone, 2016). These initial efforts, however, 
“were blocked or marginalized by the government” (Gagliardone, 2016, p. 42). These 
initiatives were later appropriated by the government. Accordingly, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Corporation ETC, the state-owned telecommunications 
company being the sole Internet Service Provider ISP in the country, established 
national networks, the first of which were fixed lines. 
Since its arrival on the Ethiopian scene, the internet has widened the Ethiopian 
public sphere. Internet usage and actors on the internet in Ethiopia have seen massive 
increments during the course of the last two decades. According to the Internet World 
Stats, from an estimated population size of 104,344,901, there are now an estimated 
11,538,000 internet users in Ethiopia (as of March 31, 2017), with one of the lowest 
global level of penetration (in terms of general population) of 11.1%. Out of these, 
4,500,000 are Facebook subscribers. What is fascinating is the average growth of 
the internet, which is one of the highest in Africa. The number of internet users as of 
March 2000 was 10,000. From 2000 to 2017, internet usage has grown at an average 
of 115,280.0% (IWS, 2017). In fact, the rapid growth of internet penetration and 
usage might be seen as quite a new development in terms of the traditionally prevalent 
‘technophobic’ attitude. Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
introduction of and adaptation to ‘Western’ technologies was always faced with fierce 
resistance. Now, the internet is embraced principally by professionals and students. 
This seems the reason as to why the social media features of the internet are often 
welcomed by Ethiopian internet users. In particular, the Millennials are increasingly 
using the internet (Christian, 2016). First generation of ICT start-ups, including 
internet cafes and computer hardware stores, are also making their appearances.
Thus, in the light of this, what has been done so far on/by using the internet in terms of 
democratization? First, as the scholar Nicole Stremlau (2011) observed, the EPRDF 
has “…embarked on ambitious efforts to shape the internet in waysthat are beneficial 
for the state” (p. 723). Similarly, the media scholar Iginio Gagliardone (2016) has also 
noted that the internet was used as an instrument in support of the national project 
of EPRDF. This statist  usage  of the internet manifested itself in the development of 
several ICT initiatives in e-government and e-democracy. In this regard, mention must 
be made of the development of WoredaNet, which  is  grounded  on the government’s 
assumption  that  ICT  helps  in  deepening  the  process  of  democratization  and 
good governance. A government-run network initiated in 2003 and implemented since
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2005, WoredaNet provides ICT services to federal, regional and (more than 900) local 
governments, with the aim of improving state capacity and ensuring transparency. 
Nevertheless, the practical application of the Woreda Net has not succeeded in 
lessening the distance between the government and the public. According to Stremlau 
(2011, p. 723), continued centralization of power and asserting the presence of the 
central power in the peripheries of the state is the raison d’etre of the government’s 
use of the internet.
Second, the internet has enlarged the Ethiopian public sphere. At the outset, the public 
sphere is understood here to mean “a discursive space in which individuals and groups 
associate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common 
judgment about them” (Hauser, 1999, p. 61). As far as Ethiopia is concerned, this 
discursive space has widened due to the internet. In this regard, the internet has been 
used as an alternative source and means of information and communication, leading 
to what Foucault (1980) described as the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (p. 
81). The internet has been providing some light and has had some success in keeping 
the citizens informed, as well as opening and pluralizing the flows of information. 
In this way, the internet has enabled an appropriation and countering of the state-
governed Ethiopian public sphere.
The internet has also served as a forum of discussion and reflection on public affairs. 
It makes the representation of ordinary citizens’ disparate viewpoints possible. Thus, 
it is a new site for the production and reproduction of public opinion. ‘Public opinion’ 
is freely created and recreated and circulated online. Its creation is often mediated 
by opinion leaders, bloggers and commentators. But, there are also the comments 
and replies of ‘those without a name’. When open exchange on equal footing is not 
possible, the creation of public opinion would often take on the form of polemics 
and satires, often directed against the government or other public figures including 
prominent sportsmen and artists. This is in line with the case of the emergence of the 
bourgeoisie public sphere in the early eighteenth century Europe (Habermas, 1991, 
pp. 14-26). 
However, the discussions and reflections per se do not create social and political 
changes. Thus, to have a genuine impact on democratization, the internet needs to 
be used as an instrument of meaningful actions. Democratic theory is underpinned 
by the participation of informed citizens. In terms of fostering actions, therefore, the 
internet has increased, albeit to a limited extent, political participation and empowered 
ordinary citizens in Ethiopia in two respects.
First, it has strengthened civil society. As long ago as the nineteenth century, the 
French  philosopher  Alexis de Tocqueville  underlined the necessity of civil societies 
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for the well-functioning of democracy. In his formulation, as it does in contemporary 
political research, a vibrant independent media is seen as necessary for the strengthening 
of civil societies (Howard, 2003, p. 32). In Ethiopia, the internet does not create 
civil society. Civil societies of various sorts have indeed long been in existence in 
Ethiopia. Thus, what does the internet do for civil societies in Ethiopia? Notably, 
the internet improved their problem-identification and agenda-setting capacity. In the 
internet, civil societies can share information, educate the people and monitor current 
developments of their concern; whether they are local, regional and/or global. From 
the perspective of the emerging ‘alternative media’ studies (Atton, 2002, pp. 133-138), 
the internet itself can rightly be considered as a civil society. Significant in this regard 
are works on rights advocacy and public policy lobbying and emergence of several 
online communities. An important case might be the 2012 public outcry over the ban 
and strict control of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) such as Skype, Google Talk 
and Viber, which followed the May 24, 2012 draft Proclamation on Telecom Fraud 
Offences, which allegedly criminalizes the use of these media (Argaw, 2012; Daniel, 
2012). 
Secondly, the internet has facilitated social mobilization. Two recent instances are 
provided below. Perhaps, the first major case of internet-mediated popular mobilization 
was the anti-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) demonstrations in April 2015. On 
April 19, 2015, the ISIS terror group released a shocking video showing the killing of 
30 Ethiopians in Libya. Internet users in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian diaspora around 
the world mounted an online campaign criticizing  the government’s response which 
was nothing but a declaration of a three-day national mourning (Al-Jazeera, 2015). 
Internet activists called for anti-ISIS and anti-government demonstrations. This all 
came a mere month before Ethiopia held its fifth parliamentary elections; the first 
to take place since the 2012 death of long-time leader Meles Zenawi. Even with all 
the censorship efforts, the internet campaign brought the matter forth to nationwide 
attention and tempted the government to ‘hijack’ the popular demonstrations in its 
favor. 
More recently, protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions, which one commentator 
described as “the largest and longest demonstrations in recent history” (Neamin, 
2016), were perpetuated by online campaigning. In the Oromia region, following 
perceived encroachments by the Addis Ababa City Integrated Master Plan into the 
region, the youth poured onto the streets in protest. In fact, there were similar protests 
in 2014. But, unlike the 2014 protests, the 2015/16 protests were characterized by 
effective use of the mass media and the internet, especially social media (Awol Allo, 
2016).
To the Oromo crisis  were  added  protests in the Amhara region, which began on July
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12, 2016 (Hamle 5, 2008 EC) in Gondar. The 2016 crisis in Gondar is one of the most 
destructive civil disturbances in Ethiopia’s recent history. The immediate cause of the 
violence and public protests were the issue of boundary demarcation disputes between 
Amhara and Tigray. The protests, however, spread to other parts of the region, mainly 
to Gojjam. It turns out the protests were also anti-government. In these protests, the 
internet played a critical role by allowing the protesters to debate, exchange ideas, 
spread their messages further than ever before and bring together large rallies within 
short notice. 
The government describes these protests as heedless and leaderless (Schemm, 2016). 
Indeed, the protests were without a central organizing force. The use of the internet 
has made the emergence of a singular ‘head’ difficult. Most importantly, however, 
the internet has diminished the significance of any such head. Thus, by cutting off 
the King’s head, to use Foucault’s words, the internet has led to more democratic and 
participatory protests than ever before occurred in the past.
However, the internet was used not only by the state and by the society-against-
the state. The whole society continued to be targeted online, creating at least a 
‘virtual’social change. In Guobin Yang’s (2009) distinction of forms of online 
activism, these forms of online activism can be described as being both cultural and 
social. According to Yang (2009, p. 33), cultural activism refers to online activities 
in which the main concerns are societal values, morality, lifestyle an identity. Social 
activism “focuses on such problems as corruption, environmental degradation and the 
rights of disadvantaged groups”.
The internet can also be a site for knowing and learning about democracy. The political 
scientist Finkel (2003) noted that 
[...] the democratic transformation of an entire society’s attitudes and values 
[emphasis added] is the work of decades and requires the action of large 
structural forces, such as economic modernization and generational succession, 
as well as sustained experience with democratic institutions and responsible 
behavior by opposition and governing elites in turning over power and the 
like. (p. 139)
It is often argued that the internet can be a stimulus to bring about such a change 
in citizens’ basic values. This is especially true in the Ethiopian context, where the 
internet is already impacting social orientations and expectations, specifically of the 
youth, women and men.
Meanwhile, the internet has also negative consequences. Or, to be exact, the way the 
internet  has  been  used  so  far  has created some pitfalls. The single most important
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problem which is often associated with the internet is in increasing social polarization. 
The media fragmentation on the internet has negatively affected national consensus 
even on issues of key importance. To be exact, the internet did not create political 
polarization. As Gagliardone (2016) remarked “the internet was hijacked by the old 
generation”. He pointed out clearly that “the new media, rather than being seized as 
an opportunity for a new generation leaders and advocates to test innovative ideas…, 
were instead initially captured by ‘old politics’, going back to grievances rooted in the 
1960s and 1970s” (Gagliardone, 2016, p. 47). 
Misinformation and the dissemination of fake news are other challenges that impede 
the internet’s ability at bringing about democratization. This, in turn, has poisoned 
civic engagement (Christian, 2017a). A sort of internet bullying sets a dangerous 
precedent where individual rights are grossly violated and mobs now feel free to 
impose their convictions on others.
WHAT COULD THE INTERNET DO IN THE FUTURE?
Given the balance sheet of internet’s limited role in promoting democratization 
in Ethiopia so far, what would be its prospects? There are several factors that will 
affect its role in the future. First is the most important issue of internet access itself. 
As the number of internet users grows (2.9% in 2014 but 12% in  2015), its role 
in democratization might see a leap forward. Nonetheless, this all depends upon its 
accessibility in the first place. According to the Freedom House (2011, 2016), there 
are several obstacles to internet access in Ethiopia. Infrastructurally, the internet, 
despite all the massive increments, has not yet penetrated well into the Ethiopian 
archipelago. Spatially, it remains limited mainly to urban and semi-urban areas. 
However, economically, the internet is not also an easily accessible ‘commodity’. 
Indeed, internet in Ethiopia is very expensive.  As of 2015, Ethiopia is the world’s 
29th most expensive place to get a fixed broadband connection (ITU, 2016).
Secondly, the internet’s role in Ethiopia’s democratization will be determined 
by the practical application of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is a 
constitutionally guaranteed right in Ethiopia.5 Thus far, however, the rating of internet 
freedom is still abysmally low, even by the average African standard (Freedom House, 
2016).
Related to the above point are the state’s attempts at controlling cyber sphere. While at
5 Article 29 (2) of the Constitution of the FDRE provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression without any interference. This right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any media of his choice“.
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times the Ethiopian government had been obliged to respond to public opinion 
expressed on the internet, it, however, desperately wants to assert its dominance on the 
production and dissemination of politically sensitive information on the internet. To 
this end, the government used both ‘technical’ and ‘psychological or soft’ mechanisms 
of control (Fielder, 2012, p. 4). 
Technically, if inconsistently, it censored web contents and blocked unwelcomed sites 
(Freedom House, 2011, 2016; Christian, 2017b). In 2012, the Ethiopian government 
blocked access to the Tor network (Moskvitch, 2012). On October 15, 2016, a 
nationwide state of emergency (SoE) was declared in response to the public protests 
in Oromia and Amhara regions. Among the elements of this infamous SoE was the 
ban of social media. Massive online surveillances were also conducted (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014). The key state agency allegedly conducting these surveillances is 
the Information Network Security Agency INSA.  
Are technical control mechanisms of this sort successful? In 2011, the Freedom House 
noted that “circumvention tools are rarely employed, and most people simply forego 
accessing websites that are blocked”. Recently, however, in response to the blocking 
of the social media sites, the internet community began an extensive use of proxy 
servers, anonymizers and other censorship circumvention tools such as Psiphon to 
maintain information flows. Hence, the technical controls that the state engineered 
could be effectively resisted. Online anonymity is also taken as a way of resisting 
state authority.
Again, along with the technical control mechanisms, there are also soft or 
psychological control mechanisms. Accordingly, those not censored or blocked 
might be accused of terrorism, under the infamous Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 
652/2009. The government has prosecuted and imprisoned people on the basis of their 
online activities.
The online activities might also be de-legitimized offline. The news of the 2011 Arab 
uprisings were, for instance, received in Ethiopia with much enthusiasm that such a 
violent overthrow of government seemed eminent in Ethiopia. Social media activists 
began to wonder whether they could emulate the revolutions (Freedom House, 2012). 
These were mainly propagated by a Facebook page titled ‘Beka’ (Enough!). The state-
owned media acted in full force in undermining the successes of these movements. 
EPRDF’s theoretical organ, Addis Ra’eye, published a review of John R. Bradley’s 
book ‘After the Arab Spring: How the Islamists Hijack the Arab Spring’, urging 
Ethiopians not to repeat the revolutions of the Arab youth. Another sort of ‘soft’ 
control is the use by the government of apologetic authors. According to Freedom 
House (2011),  “the  authorities  use  regime  apologists,  paid  commentators  and pro-
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government websites to proactively manipulate the online news and information 
landscape” (p. 138). This can well be encapsulated in the critical notion of 
‘manufacturing consent’, where the “news media is mobilised (manipulated even) 
into supporting government policy” (Robinson, 1999, p. 301). Thus, rather than 
being democratized by the internet, Ethiopia might pragmatically use the internet as 
a propaganda tool. 
CONCLUSION
The impact of the internet on democratization has recently got both theoretical and 
empirical attention. This paper focused on the role of the internet in the democratization 
of the Ethiopian state and society. The paper considered 1991 as a watershed as it was 
in 1991 that Ethiopia’s incumbent regime (the EPRDF) came to power. Accordingly, 
it was found that the internet’s presence has increased enormously since the early 
2000s. Based on the empirical discussions presented above, two major conclusions 
come forth. The first is that the internet’s impact in democratization of the Ethiopian 
state and society has been limited so far. The reasons and contributing factors for 
this low impact of the internet are mainly endogenous, rooted in the structure of the 
state and society. Second, the prospect of internet’s role cannot be predicted. The 
nature of its impact will vary depending upon several factors: national and global. By 
using the liberty of analogy, then, the internet should not be seen as having the Midas 
touch, that everything the internet does or what the people do on the internet would be 
successful. Or, the internet is not like the legendary philosopher’s stone, the imaginary 
substance that was thought in the past to have the power to change any other metal 
into gold. The still-evolving political (ab)use of the internet will be determined by the 
dynamics of actors with their own specific preferences and governmental regulations. 
The prospects of successful use of the internet will be determined by several factors 
including efficient access, genuine freedom of expression, responsive and able 
political leadership and the building of national consensus.
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Music and Democracy in Ethiopia: A Content Analysis of 
Two Amharic Songs
Solomon Girma1
Abstract
Music influences human life greatly. Likewise, democratic and political conditions 
pave the way to the production of music/songs. Oftentimes, such songs carry political 
or protest themes. Folk songs, patriotic songs or songs of protest have long been 
practiced all over the world and reception of music by almost all people makes them 
accessible to self or group expression. The case in Ethiopia is similar. The present-day 
status of Ethiopia has made me a witness to two sides of the same coin: achievements 
to be celebrated and shortcomings to be criticized. Accordingly, both sides have 
been represented by songs. The most popular songs instilling unity towards the 
construction of the Great Renaissance Dam (a 6,000 mega watt hydro-electric power 
plant) in Ethiopia are good examples of praise songs. On the other hand, protest 
songs were also part of the political sphere reflecting people’s dissatisfaction and 
concerns. Therefore, I examine the contents of these songs and assess them as to how 
we all learn from them. 
Since these songs were produced widely and in various Indigenous languages, this 
paper is specifically designed to thoroughly interpret the lyrics of two songs in Amharic. 
For the purpose of contrast, ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front) by Anonymous has been selected to demonstrate 
praise songs and Yihune Belay’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) has been selected to show 
the other side of the coin. As a result, this paper examines the role of music in the 
Ethiopian democratic tradition, the basics of freedom of speech and democracy and 
compare and contrasts the content of the songs produced in Ethiopia since 2015 (the 
last general election).
Keywords: music, democracy, protest, freedom of speech, Ethiopia, censorship
1 Solomon Girma is a lecturer in the Department of English Language and Literature, University of 
Gondar. Contact: fassol86g@gmail.com
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Meheret Selassie (2016) juxtaposed art and society: art is the reflection of society. 
Furthermore, music has always been an instrument to express anguish, dissatisfaction 
or to rally people for a specific change (Lynskey, 2010). Moreover, Eyayu (1994) 
added to the juxtaposition of art and society. For him, “Art is as old as man himself. 
There has always been a reciprocal relationship between art and society” (Eyayu, 
1994, p. 21). Apart from their aesthetic values, songs, as an important branch of art, 
have also assumed remarkable social roles in history. They have served as a medium 
to express both social and political resentment, arouse feelings of nationalism, thanks 
and pledges to God, as well as to convey messages of joy and sorrow. Songs are part 
of the folk culture and serve as a means by which individuals and groups ritualize, 
organize and make sense of their day to day experiences. As it is indicated in the 
above statement, music not only addresses the routines of life but it also deals with 
serious subjects like democracy. 
Humphreys (2013) reported the great role played by music in the establishment of the 
world’s earliest democracies. According to the English Oxford Living Dictionaries 
(2017), democracy is defined as a system whereby people or all the eligible members 
of a state, typically through elected representatives, form a system of government. 
Even now, this role venerates the association between music and the middle class. 
These popular musical styles and practices not only reflected, but helped create a 
more democratic society. With the spread of democracy, it still “reflects the interests 
of ordinary people”, including improved civil rights “for previously disenfranchised 
groups such as women, children” and various racial, ethnic and religious minorities. 
Eyayu (1994) stated that the legacy of music is undoubtedly immense in Ethiopia; a 
country of long traditions. Clarifying the role of music in Ethiopia, Meheret Selassie 
(2016) is of the same opinion that musicians have always been instruments of 
revolution in Ethiopia because they artistically depict the exact mood of the people 
and critique the government when needed.
Therefore, this paper deals with the concepts discussed above and attempts to answer 
the following questions. What kind of messages do Ethiopian praise and protest song 
artists convey? Who do praise and protest songs in Ethiopia correspond to?  Are 
protest songs all about remonstration? These questions will be answered by analyzing 
the lyrics of both ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF) released by EPRDF as an 
example for praise songs and Yihune Belay’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) as an example 
for protest songs.
THE AFFINITY BETWEEN MUSIC AND DEMOCRACY
Music is a mirror reflecting life: the joy, sorrow and misery of man. According to 
Adegbite (2012), “music  drama  and  visual  arts  are  seen  as  potent avenue for the
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articulation of cultures and are, therefore, of great importance for they are situational 
and psychologically conceived” (p. 20). Moreover, music can be used to articulate 
political and democratic issues. I believe that one of the targets of making music is to 
make money; however, there are a number of songs produced for different purposes. 
The best example of these are protest songs that are sung and distributed in an attempt 
to address political issues.
It is true that music and democracy are two different entities and so long as 
economic conditions impose on men and women to constantly work hard, so long 
will democracy be kept from its full musical heritage. Music demands leisure and a 
conducive environment. However, I believe that combining these two concepts (music 
and democracy) and making the most of them is crucial for artists and members of 
societies to express their viewpoints.
MUSIC AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ETHIOPIA
Ashenafi (1975) recounted that in Europe, “the tradition of bards, skalds and minstrels 
flourished from the middle ages” (p. 47). The Ethiopian version of this tradition is also 
age old. Starting from the time of Azmaris (traditional singers in Ethiopia) (though 
there is no historical record or material evidence as to how old the history of Azmaris 
is), music has served both governments and societies. Tigist Girma, an Amharic 
folklore analyst, stated in her investigation of Azamari lyrics in Gondar that “folk 
songs in some communities are forwarded to comment on the rulers, the audience and 
to praise the same subjects” (Tigist, 2010, p. 18).
Since 2015 (the last Ethiopian general election), a number of praise and protest songs 
have been released. Based on the author’s observation, praise songs celebrating 
government policies and accomplishments in Ethiopia during the last two plus 
decades were considered to be patriotic, were encouraged and are often played on the 
state-owned media. Genet Masresha’s ‘አባይ፤ጭስ አልባው ነዳጅ’ (Abay: The smokeless 
source of energy), Gete Anley’s ‘ይሄው መጣ ቀንሽ’ (now is your time) and Fikraddis 
Nekatibeb and Abebe Berhane’s ‘እንሂድ ወደ አባይ’ (Let us go to Abay) are some of 
the praise songs about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. According to Lynskey 
(2010), praise songs were never subjects of censorship.
On the other hand, when describing songs that do not celebrate government policies 
and accomplishments in Ethiopia, Kristin Orgeret (2008) stated that there exists 
government pressure on the transmission of protest songs and on any song of a 
protesting artist on state-owned media. The fact that most protest song artists are part 
of the Ethiopian Diaspora and can  escape  the censorship adds to the very notions of 
protest songs and freedom of expression. These  restrictions, I believe, are present all
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over the world under the guise of being a menace to existing political orders.
METHODOLOGY
This study uses content analysis. Nachmias and Nachmias (1976) define content 
analysis as an examination of a text’s message to arrive at a conclusion. The to 
be analysed can be content associated with any text or multimedia material (The 
University of Sheffield, 2017). In addition, Kerlinger (1986) defined content analysis 
as a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective and 
quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables. 
In preparing this paper, relevant theorizations such as Lulseged’s (1994) Social, 
economic and political discontent in Ethiopia as reflected in contemporary Amharic 
songs (mid 1950s-mid 1970s) and Orgeret’s (2008) When will the daybreak come? 
Popular music and political processes in Ethiopia have been reviewed in the general 
theoretical framework of music and democracy. Yet, I found them to be one sided. 
As a mitigating technique, I depended mainly on the texts/lyrics of both praise and 
protest songs. In order for me to show the use of music as a means of expression 
for various purposes, one song from praise songs and one song from protest songs 
have been analyzed. I selected the songs based on their popularity and the number 
of issues that each song treats. Therefore, the two songs, ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote 
for EPRDF) by the (EPRDF) and Yihune Belay’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) show the 
general political and democratic atmosphere in Ethiopia during the last three years 
since the last general election was held in 2015. The lyrics of the two Amharic songs 
were translated into English by me.
ANALYSIS ON ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (VOTE FOR EPRDF)
‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF) by the EPRDF was produced at the eve of 
the 2015 Ethiopian general election. It was used as part of the election campaign of 
EPRDF and focused on celebrating EPRDF accomplishments of the last two decades. 
The song generally praises EPRDF as the precursor of the success and prosperity 
of Ethiopia. Ever since the introduction of the multiparty system by the EPRDF led 
government in Ethiopia, five general elections have taken place in Ethiopia so far. 
The irony, in the following extract of song lyrics is that a person needs to decide his/
her taste of what he/she eats implies that EPRDF is of the best option people have in 
the country. Amongst all the existing political parties in Ethiopia, EPRDF remains the 
strongest and democratic party in the country.
The following three lines of the song hail the option from multiple parties that 
people have to choose from. 
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Amharic Transcript Translation
ምግብ ሞልቶ ቢትረፈረፍ 
ምን ቢፈጥር የዐይን አዋጅ
ተስማሚውን እንዲበላ ሰው ለጤናው 
እንደሚበጅ
Even if everything is edible,
Though everything is mouthwatering,
A person always chooses his favorite.
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma.
According to Joselow (2012), EPRDF, led by the late Prime Minister, Meles 
Zenawi, dubbed “The Visionary”, is credited with bringing economic development 
to the country. The government had ushered in mega projects throughout the 
country; pertaining to construction of dams, roads, universities, hospitals and other 
infrastructure which benefit all Ethiopians. By the same token, a number of local 
and foreign commentators witness that EPRDF is at its best in terms of eradicating 
poverty and registering growth. The following verse restates the above argument.
Amharic Transcript Translation
ለራስ ለወገን ላገሩ የማደግ ተስፋን ያለመ 
መሪን ይመርጣል በካርዱ መብቱን እየተጠቀመ
One who is an optimist
Votes for his/her rightful leader
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma. 
The following lines inform listeners that there are a number of political parties in 
Ethiopia though, the incumbent party presents itself as the best and only option people 
have in the Ethiopian political course. In other words, Dagim Afework (2013) stated 
that “Ethiopia has never seen a light of democratization during the times of both the 
Imperial regime and the socialist Derg… However, it doesn’t mean that no attempts 
have been made to bring democratic reforms in the country” (p. 30). The following 
excerpt celebrates the EPRDF’s political success.
Amharic Transcript Translation
ኢህአዴግ የሀገር ዘላቂ ልማት 
ኢህአዴግ የዲሞክራሲ መሰረት 
EPRDF- conductor of sustainable development
EPRDF- pioneer of democracy
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma.
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The following two excerpts reiterate that EPRDF is a democratically elected 
government and that it is held in high esteem by many.
 
Amharic Transcript Translation
ኢህአዴግ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ምንጭ
ኢህአዴግ ሁሌም ህዝባዊ ተመራጭ
EPRDF- pioneer of Ethiopia’s renaissance
EPRDF- a democratically elected government
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma.
Amharic Transcript Translation
የኢትዮጵያችን ህዳሴ የተስፋ ቀን እንዲነጋ
ትርጉም ላለው የህይወት ለውጥ ሌትና ቀን የሚተጋ
ከምርጦች የተመረጠ ለያንዳንዳችን ተስማሚ
ፊትም ወደፊት ኢህአዴግ ያገር ጥቅም አስቀዳሚ
For us to see a new dawn,
EPRDF strives all-day every day.
The ultimate choice of many
That propels the nation to prosperity
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma.
The next verse defends the government’s success in planning creative, engaging and 
effective policies. This, of course, shows how hard the EPRDF led government is 
trying to lessen unemployment and eradicate poverty.
Amharic Transcript Translation
በፖሊሲና እቅዶቹ አዲስ ሀሳብ ያፈለቀ
ህዝቦችን ካጥናፍ እስካናፍ ለልማት ያነቃነቀ
Introducing new comprehensive policies
Has involved its citizens in development 
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma.
Following the fall of the Derg regime, people started to enjoy many human and 
democratic rights that they had previously been deprived. Shimelis Kassa (2015), 
a lecturer at Arbaminch University, stated that “For just over a decade, the EPRDF 
government in Ethiopia has been attempting to implement a novel form of government” 
(p. 176). Likewise, this has created a relatively peaceful setting in which people can 
work and prosper.
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Amharic transcript Translation
ያብሮነት ዲፕሎማሲ የሰላም ሰርቶ ማሳያ
ኢህአዴግ ነው ባለራዕይ ባዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ
Workshop of diplomacy and harmony 
EPRDF is a visionary party in the brand-new 
nation
Extract from ‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF); translation: Solomon Girma. 
YIHUNE BELAY`S ‘ሰከን በል’ (CALM DOWN)
What makes Yihune Belay’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) a protest song is that it condemns 
the response of the Ethiopian government to the demonstrations that took place during 
the unrest in 2016. The BBC (2016) considers in its article on the questions “What is 
behind Ethiopia’s wave of protests?” the cause of the unrest as the accumulation of 
years of frustration from ethnic groups who have been marginalized. Moreover, the 
New York based Human Rights Watch (cited in BBC, 2016) stated that more than 
400 people died in clashes with security forces during the summer protests of 2016. 
Following the recent political unrest in Ethiopia, a state of emergency was put in place 
on October 9, 2016. The Ethiopian embassy (2016) in Washington, D.C. issued an 
article clarifying the need for state of emergency in Ethiopia and that the unrest had 
resulted in an alarming threat to the country’s peace and stability. Though the unrest 
was short lived because of the strict measures enforced, such as; the declaration of 
state of emergency and multiple arrests of protesters by the Ethiopian government, the 
tradition of protest song production is surfacing and it has drawn the attention of many 
singers. The following are among the artists who released singles: Fasil Demoz’s 25 
amet (25 years), Wendi Mak’s Ethiopia yeman nat? (Who owns Ethiopia?), Shambel 
Belayneh’s Embi bel (Say no), Yihunie Belay’s Seken bel (Calm down), Natty Man’s 
Ahun Tenekahu (Now I am provoked). These songs are grouped as protest songs for 
they condemn the measures taken by the Ethiopian government against protesters. 
In addition, these songs are very popular amongst Ethiopians who are dissatisfied by 
the current Ethiopian government. Thus, based on my own observations, I selected 
Yihune Belay’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) as it is popular amongst the public and it 
discusses the varied grievances of the public. 
Yihune Belay is an Ethiopian music performer. He now lives with his family in the 
U.S.A. He has produced many romantic and praise songs that are still popular and 
have local appeal. Due to this, the most recent protest song he released has caught the 
attention of many. According to Bangura (1994), “most ethnic conflicts are caused by 
competition for state resources” (p. 10) and these conflicts invoke identity and other 
related issues. Yihune Belay’s Seken Bel reiterates Bangura’s arguments reflected by 
protesters and tells us his concerns in the following excerpt.
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Amharic Transcript Translation
ማንነት የራስ ነው ሀይማኖት የግል ነው
ሀገር የጋራ ነው ቁልፍና ማሰሪያው ኢትዮጵያዊነት ነው
Though we have different identities,
Ethiopia is the melting pot 
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
The connection between this protest song and Ethiopian New Year is one significant 
point in Yihune’s ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down). It is customary that Ethiopians make a wish 
on the eve or first day of every New Year and it is this way that he presented his New 
Year’s resolution. He wishes that all would come together and that God would make 
our sufferings disappear. The following lines from the song are worth noting:
Amharic Transcript Translation
ባዲሱ ዐመት ባዲሱ ዐመት የለም መሞት
አበባ አደይ አበባ አደይ ሞት ለገዳይ 
በመስከረም በመስከረም ሰላም ሰላም 
Let not a soul be killed in the New Year
Let demise be for the slayer 
May peace be upon all of us in the New Year
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
The following two verses condemn the use of force and violation of democratic rights. 
In addition, Yihune indicates that the wrongs the people complain about are critical, 
deep rooted and long-term. For a long time, the people have been crying out and most 
of their cries have not yet been answered. He calls for calmness and peace in the 
process of resolving issues and states that people should not be blamed for demanding 
justice. 
Amharic transcript Translation
ስሙት ወገኔን አትተኩሱበት
እዩት ወገኔን አታፍጥጡበት
ባዲሱ ዐመት አዲስ ብስራት(2)
Heed the People’s demands; don’t shoot them
Solve the People’s problems; don’t hold grudges
Let there be good news in the New Year
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
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Amharic Transcript Translation
ባዶ እጁን ነው የሚጮኸው 
ሰላማዊ ወንድምህ ነው 
ሰከን በሉ ህዝቤን ተውት 
ድምፁን ስሙት አትግደሉት
The protestors are unarmed
They are demanding their rights be respected
Thus, don’t let them suffer
And solve their problems
Extracted from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); lyricist: Solomon Girma.
Yihune satirizes the inequality between citizens and the fragile aspect of the 
relationship between the government and its people in the following verse. He then 
suggests that it is important to forget and forgive and concentrate on our future as a 
nation. Accordingly, the two most important messages that are conveyed through the 
verse are unity and forgiveness.
Amharic Transcript Translation
Consider none noble,
Consider none minor,
Let there be no killing
Let there be no bloodshed. 
For the father’s sins,
The child isn’t to blame.
There is no wrong in living in unison
It is a win-win solution.
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
The following verse reminds listeners of Aesop’s famous quotation, “United we stand, 
divided we fall”. Yihune’s symbolic presentation of the might of a lion opposed to a 
cobweb reveals the power the many ethnic groups have in the fight against injustice 
and the urgency of focusing on what Ethiopian have in common. For him, division 
equals demise. 
Amharic Transcript  Translation
ድር እንኳን ቀጭኑ ድር እንኳን ለስላሳው 
ሲያብር ሲተባበር ይበልጣል ካንበሳው 
ስማኝ በጥሞና ልንገርህ ወገኔ 
መለያየት ሞት ነው ላንተም ሆነ ለኔ 
Delicate a cobweb is though
It’s strong enough to stop a lion if the mesh is 
strong
Listen to what I have to say;
To be divided is detrimental 
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma. 
አንዱ ካንዱ ሳይበልጥ 
አንዱ ካንዱ ሳያንስ 
አንዱ አንዱን ሳይገድለው 
ደምም ሳይፋሰስ 
በወላጁ ጥፋት 
ልጁ ሳይወቀስ 
ተባብሮ ተፋቅሮ ባንድነት መኖሩ 
ይጠቅመናል እንጂ ምንድን ነው ችግሩ 
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The following extract holds the message that the kind of relationship mentioned in 
the above extract needs to exist not only amongst the local people but amongst the 
locals and the Ethiopian Diaspora. Both sections of the society have a strong bond that 
brings them together at times of joy and adversity. Therefore, both parties must strive 
to create a Utopia, where all Ethiopians can live in freedom. 
Amharic Transcript Translation
በስደት ያለውም ወዳገሩ ገብቶ 
በነፃነት ሊኖር እንደልቡ ገብቶ እንደልቡ ወጥቶ 
ተማምሏል ህዝቧ ላንዴና ለሁሌ 
The expats shall return and reunite
And be able to travel to and fro,
This is the people’s oath 
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
At this moment, Yihune seems to be convinced that it is only God who has all the 
solutions to the problems that exist in Ethiopia. He then concludes the song with 
prayers that God protects Ethiopia and its entire people from all types of adversities 
in life. 
Amharic Transcript Translation
እባክህ ጌታዬ ኢትዮጵያን ህዝቦቿን ጠብቃት 
የጦር መዛመቻ የጠላት መዛበቻ 
የመከራ መካተቻ ከመሆን አድናት 
አደራ እምዬን ኢትዮጵያን ጠብቃት 
We entrust you God, to protect us
Let Ethiopia not be a war front
Let there not be hardship
We entrust you God to protect our country
Extract from ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down); translation: Solomon Girma.
CONCLUSION
It is important to understand that music plays many roles in propagating government 
agendas and criticizing governments’ imperfections. Governments know the use 
of music and they seem to use it often. However, when it comes to protest songs, 
the governments tend to censor or ban the songs from being distributed and heard. 
‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF) by the EPRDF and ‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) 
by Yihune Belay are examples of the two political spheres in Ethiopia. Based on the 
analysis, I was able to see that Amharic praise songs correspond to both the Ethiopian 
government and its people and protest songs relate to the people who are dissatisfied. 
Not every line of all protest songs is about vilification. In fact, protest songs have a 
lot  in  common with praise songs. Therefore, we should not  exert all our energy and
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resources in trying to find the differences between the songs. What is best is to glean 
strong messages from the songs and use them in improving the democratic and 
political conditions in Ethiopia. In this way only can music and democracy thrive. 
Therefore, the message is clear and simple -let both praise and protest songs be sang 
and be used to change people’s lives for the better.
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APPENDICES
‘ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ’ (Vote for EPRDF)
ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ ይምረጡ ይምረጡ 
ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ ይምረጡ ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ምግብ ሞልቶ ቢትረፈረፍ 
ምን ቢፈጥር የዐይን አዋጅ
ተስማሚውን እንዲበላ ሰው ለጤናው እንደሚበጅ
ለራስ ለወገን ላገሩ የማደግ ተስፋን ያለመ 
መሪን ይመርጣል በካርዱ መብቱን እየተጠቀመ
ኢህአዴግ የሀገር ዘላቂ ልማት 
ኢህአዴግ የዲሞክራሲ መሰረት
ኢህአዴግ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ምንጭ
ኢህአዴግ ሁሌም ህዝባዊ ተመራጭ
የኢትዮጵያችን ህዳሴ የተስፋ ቀን እንዲነጋ
ትርጉም ላለው የህይወት ለውጥ ሌትና ቀን የሚተጋ
ከምርጦች የተመረጠ ለያንዳንዳችን ተስማሚ
ፊትም ወደፊት ኢህአዴግ ያገር ጥቅም አስቀዳሚ
ኢህአዴግ የሀገር ዘላቂ ልማት 
ኢህአዴግ የዲሞክራሲ መሰረት
ኢህአዴግ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ምንጭ
ኢህአዴግ ሁሌ ህዝባዊ ተመራጭ
ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ ይምረጡ ይምረጡ 
ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ ይምረጡ ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
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ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ምግብ ሞልቶ ቢትረፈረፍ 
ምን ቢፈጥር የዐይን አዋጅ
ተስማሚውን እንዲበላ ሰው ለጤናው እንደሚበጅ
ለራስ ለወገን ላገሩ የማደግ ተስፋን ያለመ 
መሪን ይመርጣል በካርዱ መብቱን እየተጠቀመ
ኢህአዴግ የሀገር ዘላቂ ልማት 
ኢህአዴግ የዲሞክራሲ መሰረት
ኢህአዴግ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ምንጭ
ኢህአዴግ ሁሌም ህዝባዊ ተመራጭ
በፖሊሲና እቅዶቹ አዲስ ሀሳብ ያፈለቀ
ህዝቦችን ካጥናፍ እስካናፍ ለልማት ያነቃነቀ
ያብሮነት ዲፕሎማሲ የሰላም ሰርቶ ማሳያ
ኢህአዴግ ነው ባለራዕይ ባዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ
ኢህአዴግ የሀገር ዘላቂ ልማት 
ኢህአዴግ የዲሞክራሲ መሰረት
ኢህአዴግ የኢትዮጵያ ህዳሴ ምንጭ
ኢሀዴግ ሁሌም ህዝባዊ ተመራጭ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
ይምረጡ ኢህአዴግን ይምረጡ
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‘ሰከን በል’ (Calm down) by Yihune Belay
አረ ተው ተው በለው
ተው በለው ተው በለው
ማንነቴን ብሎ አደባባይ ወጥቶ
ባዶ እጁን እያየው ሲያልፍ ለሚያልፍ ቀን
ወንድሙን ወንድሙ አልሞ ገደለው
ለሁዬ ለሁዬ ለሁ ለሁ ለሁዬ
ማንነት የራስ ነው ሀይማኖት የግል ነው
ሀገር የጋራ ነው ቁልፍና ማሰሪያው ኢትዮጵያዊነት ነው
ለሁዬ ለሁዬ ለሁ ለሁ ለሁዬ
ባዲሱ ዐመት ባዲሱ ዐመት የለም መሞት(2)
አበባ አደይ አበባ አደይ ሞት ለገዳይ (2)
በመስከረም በመስከረም ሰላም ሰላም (2)
የመስቀል ለታ የመስቀል ለታ ባንድ ገበታ (2)
ባዲስ ዘመን ባዲስ ዘመን ይብቃ በለን(2)
ያ ወገኔ ዛሬ ምን አለ ኦሆ
አትንኩኝ አለ
ያ ወገኔ ዛሬ ምን አለ ኦሆ
አትንኩኝ አለ
ማንነቴን መልሱ እያለ ኦሆ
ሲዘምር ዋለ
ማንነቴን መልሱ እያለ ኦሆ
ሲዘምር ዋለ
ማንነቴን አልሸጥም አለ ኦሆ
አያሻኝም አለ 
ማንነቴን አልሸጥም አለ ኦሆ
አያሻኝም አለ 
ስሙት ወገኔን አትተኩሱበት
CULTURES OF DEMOCRACY IN ETHIOPIA
167
እዩት ወገኔን አታፍጥጡበት
ባዲሱ ዐመት አዲስ ብስራት(2)
ሰከን ሰከን ሰከን
ሰከን በል ሰከን ሰከን በል ሰከን
ሰከን ማለት ሰከን ነው ጨዋነት ሰከን
ሰከን ማለት ሰከን ነው ጀግንነት ሰከን
   ሰከን ወታደሩ ሰከን ሰከን በል ሰከን 
አፈሙዙን ሰከን ሰከን አርገው ሰከን
ቃታህንም ሰከን እንዳትስበው ሰከን
ባዶ እጁን ነው ሰከን የሚጮኸው ሰከን
ሰላማዊ ሰከን ወንድምህ ነው ሰከን
ሰከን በሉ ሰከን ህዝቤን ተውት ሰከን
ድምፁን ስሙት ሰከን አትግደሉት ሰከን
መንግስት በሀገሩ ሰከን በህዝቡ ላይተኩስ ሰከን
ዘሀጢያት ይኩን ሰከን ውግዝ ከም አርዬስ ሰከን
ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን 
ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
አንዲ ካንዱ ሳይበልጥ ሰከን
አንዱ ካንዱ ሳያንስ ሰከን
አንዱ አንዱን ሳይገድለው ሰከን
ደምም ሳይፋሰስ ሰከን
በወላጁ ጥፋት ሰከን
ልጁ ሳይወቀስ ሰከን
ተባብሮ ተፋቅሮ ሰከን ባንድነት መኖሩ ሰከን
ይጠቅመናል እንጂ ሰከን ምንድን ነው ችግሩ ሰከን
ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን 
ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን 
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ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
ሰከን ሰከን ሰከን ሰከን
ድር እንኳን ቀጭኑ ሰከን ድር እንኳን ለስላሳው ሰከን
ሲያብር ሲተባበር ሰከን ይበልጣል ካንበሳው ሰከን
ስማኝ በጥሞና ሰከን ልንገርህ ወገኔ ሰከን
መለያየት ሞት ነው ሰከን ላንተም ሆነ ለኔ ሰከን(2)
ሰከን በል ሰከን ሰከን በል ሰከን ሰከን በልማ ሰከን
ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
ከታሪካዊው ሰከን ከድንቅነሽ ሀገር ሰከን
ከምዬ ኢትዮጵያ ሰከን ከሆደ ዥንጉርጉር ሰከን
ቀይና ቀይ ዳማ ሰከን ጠይምና ጥቁር ሰከን
ወርቀዘቦ ሆነን ሰከን አምረን ብንፈጠር ሰከን
እንዴት እንለያይ ሰከን በቋንቋና በዘር ሰከን በቋንቋና በዘር ሰከን
ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን(2)
ሰከን ሰከን ሰከን
የወገን ጥያቄው ሰከን ክብሩ ተመልሶ ሰከን
በሰላም ለመኖር ሰከን ክብሩ ተመልሶ ሰከን
በስደት ያለውም ሰከን ወዳገሩ ገብቶ ሰከን
በነፃነት ሊኖር ሰከን እንደልቡ ገብቶ ሰከን እንደልቡ ወጥቶ ሰከን
ተማምሏል ህዝቧ ሰከን ላንዴና ለሁሌ ሰከን
እልል እልል በሉ ሰከን እንዲፈታ ህልሜ ሰከን
ሰከን በልማ ሰከን ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
ሰከን በል ተው ሰከን ሰከን በል እንጂ ሰከን
ሰከን ሰከን
እባክህ ጌታዬ ሰከን ኢትዮጵያን ህዝቦቿን ሰከን ጠብቃት ሰከን
የጦር መዛመቻ ሰከን የጠላት መዛበቻ ሰከን
የመከራ መካተቻ ሰከን ከመሆን አድናት ሰከን
አደራ ሰከን እምዬን ሰከን ኢትዮጵያን ጠብቃት ሰከን
ሰከን ሰከን

This conference volume  is a collection of papers that were presented at the conference 
“Cultures of Democracy in Ethiopia” that was held in Gondar in April 2017. The spirit 
and tenor of the essays assembled within this publication focus on the cultural metrics 
that underlie the diverse cultures and meanings of democracy. The issues addressed 
in this book involve topics ranging from dialogue, communication, democratization, 
vulnerable subjects, liberation, self-governing, indigenous concepts, public reasoning, 
intra-party democracy, conflict resolution and secession up to including the question 
of the potential of media and music to act in processes of democratization. What 
they have in common is a call for a better understanding of democracy, for practicing 
democracy, and thus for eventually developing cultures of democracy. This book is the 
result of those deliberations. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Gondar University 
are convinced that this research on cultures of democracy depicts an enriching and 
unique perspective on democratization in Ethiopia.
